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Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the 
Gilded Age 
abstract .  The dominant story of America’s so-called “Gilded Age” describes an era of 
private excess and public corruption. In a rapidly industrializing society, private capital, in league 
with venal politicians, ran roughshod over a national state apparatus incapable of responding to 
the emerging social and economic needs of the day. Only toward the end of this era, with the 
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, did the national government begin to break free 
from a laissez-faire ideology that was antithetical to state building in virtually all of its forms. 
Indeed, on this conventional account, the American administrative state, and with it 
administrative law, only began to emerge in the early twentieth century. And both remained 
underdeveloped until the New Deal constitutional revolution. 
 There is much truth to this familiar narrative, but it is far from the whole truth. State 
capacities built steadily throughout the post-Reconstruction era. Congress created multiple new 
departments, bureaus, and programs, and federal civilian employment grew much more rapidly 
than population. Just as today, conflicts between political parties, the drama of electoral politics, 
and the vagaries of congressional lawmaking dominated the headlines. But the day-to-day 
activities of government were in the charge of administrative departments and bureaus. 
Operating under broad delegations of authority, administrators developed a rich internal law of 
administration that guided massive administrative adjudicatory activity and substantial 
regulatory action as well. Moreover, policy innovation at the legislative level depended heavily on 
the research and recommendations of existing administrative agencies. In short, if we look at 
legislative and administrative practice rather than at constitutional ideology or political rhetoric, 
we can see the emergence of a national administrative state and national administrative law 
before either had a name.  
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According to historical convention,1 federal administrative law emerged 
with the late nineteenth-century passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887 (ICA).2 The ICA initiated federal regulation, housed it in a novel 
administrative body, and elicited the first important judicial attempts to 
integrate national administrative governance into contemporaneous 
conceptions of the rule of law. When combined with the reforms of the 
Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883,3 the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act,4 the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act,5 and the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act,6 the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the gradual 
construction of a modest national administrative state, and with it a national 
administrative law. 
Other students of American political development view even these events as 
leaving the national government largely in the hands of Congress, the courts, 
and political parties. For them, and for most twenty-first-century 
administrative lawyers, administrative law remains virtually invisible until the 
New Deal.7 According to that familiar narrative, the plethora of New Deal 
agencies that were created in the 1930s and early 1940s finally broke the 
national government free from laissez-faire constitutionalism. But muscular 
national administration generated a backlash resulting in the explicitly 
transsubstantive (and now quasi-constitutional) federal Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).8 Here finally was administrative law worthy of the name. 
On this account federal administrative law is a twentieth-century creation and, 
perhaps, a mid-twentieth-century creation at that. 
 
1.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985) (“In hindsight, 
the development of administrative law seems mostly a contribution of the 20th century. . . . 
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, has been taken to be a kind 
of genesis.”). 
2.  Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. 
3.  Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403. 
4.  Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209. 
5.  Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. 
6.  Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (2006)). 
7.  See MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES: A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY (2007); 
THEODORE J. LOWI, ARENAS OF POWER (Norman K. Nicholson ed., 2009). 
8.  Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
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This Article, and its three predecessors,9 have a simple message. The 
standard history of the development of American administrative law is at best 
partial and in many respects incorrect. The national government of the United 
States was an administrative government from the very beginning of the 
Republic. Moreover, that administrative government then, as now, was both 
constituted and constrained by law. In short, America had a federal 
administrative law long before that field of law was either recognized or 
named. 
In some sense this claim is trivially true. Neither Congress nor the 
Constitution’s two executive officers could deliver the mail, collect taxes, 
distribute military pensions, manage the public debt, award invention patents, 
survey and sell public lands, or carry out the host of other functions that 
emerged from legislation passed in just the first few Federalist congresses.10 
And notwithstanding the early shift in political authority, from “big 
government” Federalists to “small government” Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
Democrats, the ratio of national civilian administrative officials to national 
population increased steadily throughout the antebellum period.11 Moreover, as 
administrative capacity grew, both Congress and administrative officials 
constantly reorganized and reformed the structure and practices of national 
administrative institutions.12 
In addition, these early builders of national administration were required to 
answer the same questions that administrative lawyers ponder today. What is 
the appropriate relationship of administration to the elected branches of 
government? Under what legal requirements should administrative 
departments, bureaus, or commissions conduct their business? And what legal 
remedies should be available to persons who believe that administrative action 
has not been conducted according to law? 
 
9.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to 
Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw, Administration and the 
Democracy]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, Recovering]; Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the 
Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant 
Nationalists]. 
10.  Mashaw, Recovering, supra note 9, at 1276-1304. 
11.  See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (1975). 
12.  On the changes in the administrative organization of the United States Government in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see LLOYD MILTON SHORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1923). 
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But, if this is true, why the conventional story of administrative law as a 
twentieth-century creation? Why has nineteenth-century administrative law 
remained invisible to us? A complete answer to that question is more than a 
little complicated. The short answer is straightforward: what we find depends 
upon who is looking, what we look for, and where we look for it. For lawyers, 
early administrative law remains invisible in part because we have been trained 
to look for it in judicial opinions and in transsubstantive statutes or executive 
orders that apply to all, or most, administrative institutions. This is 
administrative law, to be sure. But it is not all of it. And, from the founding to 
the very late nineteenth century, neither of these sources of law produced 
much, if anything, of enduring interest for the administrative lawyer. A search 
of these sources from 1787 to 1887 is destined to disappoint. 
But what if we followed the lead of the 1941 Attorney General’s Committee, 
whose research provided the background materials for drafting the APA?13 
When seeking models of sound administrative governance, they looked at the 
way legislation structured agency organization, at agency practice, at the norms 
that had grown up around similar functions across multiple agencies, and at 
the approaches taken by courts whose reviewing functions were provided in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code. The APA was surely something more than 
a mere restatement of existing administrative law. Yet much of it was drawn 
from that law—a law internal to specific statutory regimes and particular 
agency practices. Common normative threads in those statutes and practices 
included uniformity and consistency in the application of law, notice and 
hearing on contested issues, transparency of agency structures and processes, 
protections against agency bias, division of functions within agencies, and 
internal checks and balances. 
My project in this Article and its predecessors is to push that inquiry back 
over a century. My claim is that the administrative practices that the Attorney 
General’s Committee uncovered in mid-twentieth-century American 
administrative governance did not burst on to the scene in the New Deal or in 
Progressive Era reforms. They can be found as well in the age that Mark Twain 
indelibly branded as “The Gilded Age”: an age that has become for us almost 
synonymous with private excess and government corruption. 
Making out this case cuts against the grain of received understandings. The 
Gilded Age was an age of massive change, but the national government’s 
response to new needs and new demands can rightly be seen as anemic, torpid, 
and too often corrupt. Nor is the historiography of the period simply mistaken 
 
13.  ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-10 (1941). 
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in its claims that American governmental, and particularly administrative, 
developments lagged behind when compared with either the new American 
social reality or administrative state developments abroad. Hence we must 
begin by remembering what post-Reconstruction and pre-Progressive America 
was like and the bases for our widely accepted vision of how it was governed. It 
is only against this background that a revised understanding of administration 
and administrative law begins to appear. 
A. A Nation Transformed 
Postbellum America witnessed the remaking of political, economic, social, 
and cultural life.14 By war and constitutional amendment, national power 
triumphed over state prerogative, but with consequences that were hardly 
predictable given the war’s ostensible aims or the content of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Reconstruction 
failed to produce either a substantially reformed Southern political economy or 
equal citizenship for African Americans.15 And judicial construction of the Civil 
War Amendments eviscerated their civil rights purposes while providing new 
constraints on public regulation of business.16 The new nationalism that the 
North’s victory had promised was, instead, put in the service of a national, 
capitalist market.17 
The elimination of local barriers to commerce, new technologies, and the 
rapid development of the nation’s physical and financial infrastructure 
 
14.  The historical literature on this period is truly massive. Three early works in the History of 
American Life series provide a stimulating overview of historical developments along with 
bibliographical essays. ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA 1865-1878 
(1927); ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY 1878-1898 (1933); IDA M. 
TARBELL, THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS 1878-1898 (1936). 
15.  The classic modern treatment is ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988). See also MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF 
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974) (arguing 
that the limitations of Reconstruction were attributable to divisions in the Republican Party, 
not just resistance by Southerners, Democrats, and President Andrew Johnson). 
16.  See, e.g., JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA, 1865-1900, 
at 109-91 (2007). 
17.  RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE 
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990); LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR MODERN 
AMERICA: NONMILITARY LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS (1968) (arguing 
that national policy moved in this direction even as the war was being fought). 
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transformed the economy.18 This was an age in which inventors like Alexander 
Graham Bell and Thomas Alva Edison became national heroes,19 and 
Americans were recognized as masters in the application of technology to 
enterprise.20 Reacting to the exhibits in Machinery Hall at the 1876 Centennial 
Exhibition near Philadelphia, novelist and commentator William Dean 
Howells concluded that it was in engineering that “the national genius most 
freely speaks; by and by the inspired marbles, the breathing canvases . . . for 
the present America is voluble in the strong metals and their infinite uses.”21 
Tremendous expansions in railroad transportation drove industrial 
development.22 The railroads’ demands for capital, labor, and materials 
stimulated the economy. Their capacity to move people and products cheaply 
buoyed other markets and spurred the development of territories underserved 
by earlier transportation revolutions in steamships and canals. American 
railroads conquered time as well as space. To produce a coherent and 
transparent national railroad timetable the railroads created unified time zones. 
Local time disappeared. 
Although the evolution of the American economy away from its agrarian 
past toward its industrial future had begun much earlier,23 the decades 
 
18.  See THOMAS C. COCHRAN & WILLIAM MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1942); CARL N. DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION, 
1876-1900 (David M. Potter & Carl N. Degler eds., 1967); ROBERT HIGGS, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865-1914: AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION 
(Ralph L. Andreano ed., 1971). 
19.  For standard biographies, see ROBERT V. BRUCE, BELL: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE 
CONQUEST OF SOLITUDE (1973); and ROBERT CONOT, A STREAK OF LUCK (1979). 
20.  See, e.g., SIEGFRIED GIEDION, MECHANIZATION TAKES COMMAND: A CONTRIBUTION TO 
ANONYMOUS HISTORY (1948); JOHN W. OLIVER, HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 
(1956). 
21.  W.D. Howells, A Sennight of the Centennial, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1876, at 92, 96. 
22.  On railroad development in this period, see ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, RAILROADS AND 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY (1964); THE RAILROADS: 
PIONEERS IN MODERN MANAGEMENT (Alfred D. Chandler ed., 1979); and GEORGE ROGERS 
TAYLOR & IRENE D. NEU, THE AMERICAN RAILROAD NETWORK, 1861-1890 (1956). 
23.  See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815-1848 (2007); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN 
AMERICA, 1815-1846 (1991). Richard Hofstadter argues that the notion of the self-sufficient 
farm family as the backbone of the nation was a myth by the time of Tocqueville’s travels. 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 23-93 (1955). Farmers 
grew cash crops and speculated in farm land; they were in commerce as much as in 
agriculture, and by 1840 the mass exodus of young men from the farm to urban areas had 
already begun. Id. According to Hofstadter, Populism in what he calls “The Age of Reform” 
was spurred more by the collapse of a speculative bubble in farm lands than by the plight of 
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following the Civil War were characterized by massive growth in the size, and a 
revolution in the organization, of industrial enterprises.24 Consolidation 
brought to the fore men like John D. Rockefeller in oil, Andrew Carnegie in 
steel, Pierpont Morgan in finance, and James Duke in tobacco.25 As the 
association of a few prominent names with massive enterprises suggests, 
postbellum economic development in America produced massive fortunes and 
dramatic changes in the concentration of wealth. In 1840, there were perhaps 
twenty millionaires in the United States; by 1910 there were probably twenty 
in the U.S. Senate. Indeed, by 1893 the Census Bureau estimated that 9% of 
the families in America owned 71% of the wealth.26 The new American rich 
were objects both of fascination and resentment.27 Their luxurious lifestyles 
generated tastes for conspicuous consumption among the rising middle classes. 
Their aggressive, not to mention monopolistic, business practices stimulated 
the Populist and Progressive political movements. The Gilded Age merged 
with the “Age of Reform,”28 whose early accomplishments included the 
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 
Industrial revolution in America is commonly associated with three other 
developments that changed the social and political, as well as the economic, 
 
farmers. Id. Populism’s vision of an agrarian America was completely out of date before the 
movement began. Id.  
24.  On these general developments, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE 
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, JR., 
BUSINESS INCORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800-1943 (1948); and EDWARD C. 
KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1860-1897 
(1961). 
25.  On the careers of these titans of industry, see, for example, CASS CANFIELD, THE INCREDIBLE 
PIERPONT MORGAN: FINANCIER AND ART COLLECTOR (1974); LOUIS M. HACKER, THE 
WORLD OF ANDREW CARNEGIE: 1865-1901 (1968); ALLAN NEVINS, STUDY IN POWER: JOHN D. 
ROCKEFELLER, INDUSTRIALIST AND PHILANTHROPIST (1953); and JOHN K. WINKLER, 
TOBACCO TYCOON: THE STORY OF JAMES BUCHANAN DUKE (1942). 
26.  SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 136, 
275 (1942); C.L. Merwin, Jr., American Studies of the Distribution of Wealth and Income by Size, 
in 3 CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN NAT’L INCOME & WEALTH, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 3, 6 (1939). 
27.  See, e.g., STEWART H. HOLBROOK, THE AGE OF THE MOGULS (Lewis Gannett ed., 1953); 
MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861-1901 
(1934). 
28.  The classic treatment is HOFSTADTER, supra note 23. Accord ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF 
REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877-1917 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 
1999). 
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outlook of American citizens.29 The first was massive immigration. The 
railroads famously imported Chinese workers to do the hard manual labor at 
low wages that many Americans rejected. But there were also huge inflows 
from Western Europe, particularly Ireland. The competition of steamship lines 
for customers, in combination with the promotional efforts of state agencies, 
the federal government, and industrialists eager for cheap labor encouraged a 
tidal wave of immigration already stimulated by European economic 
stagnation and the lure of opportunity in an America experiencing a full-
throttled industrial revolution. Emma Lazarus’s poem that adorns the pedestal 
of the Statue of Liberty idealizes the efforts from the 1860s through the 1880s 
to attract immigrants to America. As those lines suggest, the country welcomed 
immigrants, indeed sought them, but Lazarus’s humanitarian emphasis reveals 
little of the complexity of their reception. Immigrants challenged the economic 
position of skilled workers, the political control of the Republican Party, and 
the moral authority of dominant protestant religious groups. Reaction was 
almost inevitable. The press lampooned immigrants’ stereotypical attributes; 
nativist politicians demonized them. By overwhelming margins, Congress 
adopted America’s first national legislation restricting immigration in 1885.30 
The growth of organized labor paralleled, but hardly matched the growth 
and power of big business. As the mechanization of industry that had begun in 
the Jacksonian period accelerated in postbellum America, the plight of the 
American worker deepened. National industries demanded national unions to 
protect workers’ interests, but internal cleavages in the union movement and a 
hostile legal environment inhibited effective organization. Strikes became more 
common and widespread, often attended by violence and police suppression of 
union activity. Although most union demands were for the humanization of 
capitalism—shorter hours, protections for women and children, and more 
healthful working conditions—union opponents dampened public enthusiasm 
 
29.  For a multidisciplinary treatment of how the changes in the basic ideas and ideals by which 
Americans lived were reshaped in this period, see ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE 
INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE (1982). 
30.  On the course of immigration and assimilation in postbellum America, see THOMAS J. 
ARCHDEACON, BECOMING AMERICAN: AN ETHNIC HISTORY (1983); JACK CHEN, THE CHINESE 
OF AMERICA (1980); OSCAR HANDLIN, RACE AND NATIONALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1957); 
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 
(1955); STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE 
OF THE CHINESE, 1785-1882 (1969); and PHILIP TAYLOR, THE DISTANT MAGNET: EUROPEAN 
EMIGRATION TO THE U.S.A. (1971). Notwithstanding the lack of national immigration 
legislation, state regulation had persisted since the early days of the Republic. For a 
discussion of this early history, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-43 (1996). 
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for the union movement by associating it with socialism, and even with 
revolution. Agitation for national legislative reform of working conditions was 
generally unsuccessful.31 
Finally, as American industrialization attracted youth from the countryside 
and immigrants from abroad, it concentrated both the population and the 
ownership of the means of production. New cities appeared and old ones grew 
at remarkable rates. During the three decades immediately following the Civil 
War, urban population in the United States grew twice as fast as rural 
population, notwithstanding the vast settlement of the Western states that was 
occurring simultaneously. The problems created by rapid urbanization—
overcrowding, poverty, poor health, and crime—are deeply familiar. 
Urbanization also accentuated the clash of cultures among immigrant groups 
and between them and native-born Americans. By 1890, in eighteen of the 
cities having a population greater than 100,000, immigrant adults 
outnumbered native adults. The title of Charles Loring Brace’s 1872 book, The 
Dangerous Classes of New York, and Twenty Years’ Work Among Them,32 perhaps 
captured the general public perception of urban immigrant labor. 
The failure of local city governments to respond to the needs of these 
populations provided fertile soil for the rise of the big-city political machine. 
Working long days at low wages, and crowded together in dilapidated 
tenements, the urban immigrant and lower classes needed help. The machine 
supplied assistance and jobs in return for loyalty, labor, and votes. Even where 
 
31.  For a conventional starting point, see 4 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1965). Some other useful works include ROBERT V. BRUCE, 1877: 
YEAR OF VIOLENCE (1959); JERRY M. COOPER, THE ARMY AND CIVIL DISORDER: FEDERAL 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES, 1877-1900 (1980); HENRY DAVID, THE 
HISTORY OF THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR: A STUDY IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONARY 
AND LABOR MOVEMENTS (2d ed. 1958); GERALD N. GROB, WORKERS AND UTOPIA: A STUDY 
OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1865-1900 (1961); HERBERT 
G. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA: ESSAYS IN 
AMERICAN WORKING-CLASS AND SOCIAL HISTORY (1976); STUART BRUCE KAUFMAN, 
SAMUEL GOMPERS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 1848-1896 
(1973); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 (1987); MICHAEL NASH, CONFLICT AND 
ACCOMMODATION: COAL MINERS, STEEL WORKERS, AND SOCIALISM, 1890-1920 (1982); 
PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1964); LLOYD ULMAN, THE RISE OF 
THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION: THE DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS STRUCTURE, 
GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (1955); NORMAN J. WARE, THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1860-1895: A STUDY IN DEMOCRACY (1929); SAMUEL 
YELLEN, AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES (1969); and IRWIN YELLOWITZ, THE POSITION OF THE 
WORKER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1865-1896 (1969). 
32.  CHARLES LORING BRACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK, AND TWENTY YEARS’ 
WORK AMONG THEM (1872). 
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reformers managed to beat the machines at the polls, as when the New York 
City reformers dethroned the Tweed Ring in the 1870s, their gains were largely 
limited to the elimination of massive corruption. Reforms aimed at alleviating 
the serious social and economic conditions of city residents did not gain 
traction until the 1890s and beyond.33 
The rapaciousness of the industrialists and the corruption of city politics 
also infected the national government. Edwin L. Godkin, the editor of both The 
Nation and the New York Evening Post, sought to characterize the whole of 
society in the title of his article Commercial Immorality and Political Corruption.34 
Godkin’s views were not unrepresentative of reform-minded Americans.35 In 
describing the triumph of the completion of the transcontinental railroad, 
Representative George F. Hoar lamented, “I have seen our national triumph 
and exultation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous reports of 
three committees of Congress, two of the House and one here, that every step 
of that mighty enterprise had been taken in fraud.”36 Dorman B. Eaton, a New 
York reform leader, described the national political parties as “highly 
complicated organizations through which politicians are enabled to make 
themselves a great power for their own benefit and for coercing and baffling 
the people.”37 Henry Adams summed up the period’s politics with his usual 
pith: “One might search the whole list of Congress, Judiciary, and Executive 
during the twenty-five years 1870-1895 and find little but damaged 
reputations.”38 
 
33.  On the rise of the city and its problem and politics, see WILLIAM A. BULLOUGH, CITIES AND 
SCHOOLS IN THE GILDED AGE: THE EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN INSTITUTION (1974); THE CITY 
BOSS IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE READER (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. ed., 1976); ALLEN F. 
DAVIS, SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
MOVEMENT, 1890-1914 (1967); LEO HERSHKOWITZ, TWEED’S NEW YORK: ANOTHER LOOK 
(1977); ROY LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN 
NEW YORK CITY, 1890-1917 (1962); BLAKE MCKELVEY, THE URBANIZATION OF AMERICA, 
1860-1915 (1963); ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878-1898, (1933); 
VINCENT SCULLY, AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE AND URBANISM (1969); and SAM BASS WARNER, 
JR., THE URBAN WILDERNESS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CITY (1972). 
34.  E.L. Godkin, Commercial Immorality and Political Corruption, 107 N. AM. REV. 248 (1868). 
35.  JOHN G. SPROAT, “THE BEST MEN”: LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE (1968). 
36.  1 GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 308 (1903). 
37.  Dorman B. Eaton, Parties and Independents, 144 N. AM. REV. 549, 550 (1887). 
38.  SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE 
RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 214 (1984). 
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B. Locating Public Administration and Administrative Law 
If the postbellum period in America is remembered positively, it is largely 
for the inventiveness and energy of the private sector. The railroad and the 
telegraph spanned the continent, and great industries and great cities seemed 
to spring up from almost nothing. Enormous wealth was created and the 
extravagance of the rich created a market for art and architecture that fueled 
what is now known as the American Renaissance.39 Social movements for the 
rights of workers, farmers, and women urgently pressed state and national 
governments for reforms in both the political and economic systems. And 
while those movements gained responses at the state and local levels, Theodore 
Lowi asserts that “it would be impossible to gain any awareness or 
understanding at all of these social movements by studying the laws of the 
national government.”40 
Lowi’s image is of a Congress largely devoted to patronage and plunder 
and of presidents, other than Lincoln, who are remembered, if at all, for being 
impeached or assassinated, or for heading magisterially corrupt 
administrations. The centralized American state that emerged from the Civil 
War with a muscular national administrative agenda—Reconstruction—
abandoned those purposes for a laissez-faire state catering to Northern 
capitalists and to the separatist tendencies of a “redeemed” but unreconstructed 
South.41 On this account one might look at the title of this Article and respond, 
“What administration? What administrative law?” Surely, as in the 
conventional historical account, interest in public administration and 
administrative law at the national level in the United States should begin near 
where this Article proposes to end, with the enactment of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, creating the Interstate Commerce Commission, or with its 
predecessor, the Civil Service Commission created by the Pendleton Civil 
Service Act of 1883.42 
 
39.  See Richard Guy Wilson, Architecture, Landscape, and City Planning, in BROOKLYN MUSEUM, 
BROOKLYN INST. OF ARTS & SCIS., THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 1876-1917, at 74 (Brooklyn 
Inst. of Arts & Scis. ed., 1979). 
40.  LOWI, supra note 7, at 78. 
41.  See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE 
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990). 
42.  For analyses dating American administrative law and the American administrative state 
roughly to the ICC or the beginning of the twentieth century, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 
439-66; HOFSTADTER, supra note 23, at 164; LOWI, supra note 7, at 77-78; STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); CAMILLA STIVERS, BUREAU MEN, 
SETTLEMENT WOMEN: CONSTRUCTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
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There is surely something, perhaps much, to this view. The field of public 
administration was in some sense invented by Woodrow Wilson in an article 
published in the same year as the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.43 
And there seems to have been nothing published on America administrative 
law, as such, until 1893. Moreover, the works of the pioneers in American 
administrative law, Ernst Freund and Frank Goodnow, often drew as much on 
European as American sources and, when treating American law, did not 
distinguish between state, local, and national developments.44 Viewing public 
administration or American administrative law from the perspective of 
intellectual history, these fields do not exist until they are theorized as such by 
academics or practitioners in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. 
There are many other reasons why observers might believe that federal 
public administration and administrative law in the Gilded Age are unlikely 
subjects for sustained interest. One is the enduring myth of laissez faire. 
Laissez faire was, indeed, the defining creed of many postbellum intellectuals 
and reformers. However, they constantly lamented the government’s failure to 
follow that creed’s ideological dictates.45 And as William Novak points out in a 
recent article,46 that myth was already under attack in 1887. Novak quotes 
Albert Shaw’s complaint that 
 
(2000); and DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL 
THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1st ed. 1948). Alternatively, one might 
begin with the Civil War and Reconstruction eras that this Article largely omits. While 
worthy of its own separate treatment, the extensive military administration of that period 
makes it a misleading guide to the development of American domestic governance. 
43.  Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887). 
44.  For Ernst Freund’s principal works, see ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER 
PERSONS AND PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1928); ERNST FREUND, CASES ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS (2d 
ed. 1928); and ERNST FREUND ET AL., THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(1923). For Frank Goodnow’s major works, see FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY (photo. reprint 1996) (1893) 
[hereinafter GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]; FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1905) [hereinafter 
GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]; and SELECTED CASES ON AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF OFFICERS AND 
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (Frank J. Goodnow ed., 1906). The one early book that 
deals most prominently with national administrative law in the United States, BRUCE 
WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF 
PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903), also appears in the early twentieth century. 
45.  See SPROAT, supra note 35. 
46.  William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008). 
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The average American has an unequaled capacity for the entertainment 
of legal fictions and kindred delusions. He lives in one world of theory 
and another world of practice. . . . Never for a moment relinquishing 
their theory [of laissez faire], the people of the United States have 
assiduously pursued and cherished a practical policy utterly 
inconsistent with that theory, and have not perceived the discrepancy.47 
Novak goes on to argue that the history of the American state has been hobbled 
by a concentration on the way in which American government checks and 
balances coercive power, without paying attention to the ways in which both 
policies and institutional arrangements create an infrastructure through which 
the state guides and shapes the economy and the society. But myths endure 
precisely because of their stereotypical quality, their ability to tap into some 
psychological truth that cements their hold on the imagination, not because 
they necessarily fit all the facts. 
In a similar vein, “event-centered” histories of American political and 
institutional development tend to focus on major changes in the direction of 
government policy. From that perspective the creation of a new form of 
regulatory institution, the independent commission, can be interpreted as 
establishing law and legal control on a new footing—one that emphasizes 
political independence and technical expertise—the conventional hallmarks 
that distinguish administration from politics. This argument, of course, gives 
credence to the story that connects the origins of American administrative law 
to the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the ICC. Of course event-
centered or “big bang” analysts may disagree about the size of the bang 
necessary to make a difference. For some the independent commission 
movement failed to mark a significant new direction in state development. 
Theodore Lowi and Morton Keller, for example, agree that the bang that 
created the American administrative state did not occur until the New Deal.48 
How much bang is enough depends upon what sorts of effects the event 
chronicler is seeking. Lowi and Keller are primarily interested in changes in the 
shape of the politics that surround national policy. From their perspective the 
New Deal may be the appropriate turning point. On the other hand, as Dan 
Carpenter has shown, if one is interested in the degree to which administrative 
institutions gained autonomous policymaking authority, both the New Deal 
 
47.  Id. at 753 (quoting Albert Shaw, The American State and the American Man, 51 CONTEMP. 
REV. 695, 696-97 (1887)). 
48.  See KELLER, supra note 7; LOWI, supra note 7. 
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and the Progressive Era big bang approaches miss much of the action—both 
before and after their respective bangs occurred.49 
Finally, students of state building might insist that there is no fully 
developed administrative state until there is a fully developed bureaucratic 
apparatus. By “fully developed” I mean a bureaucracy built upon a career civil 
service that is trained specifically for public administration and that makes 
policy through the application of scientific knowledge, relatively free from 
political interference or control. From this perspective, “common law” 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are still 
underdeveloped administrative states, at least by comparison with countries 
like France or Japan. In those latter countries training for the public service is 
state-sponsored and specifically linked to government employment. These 
state-trained bureaucrats are expected to spend their careers in the public 
service, to move across subject matter domains, and to eventually occupy high 
policymaking positions. The “expertise” of the public servant in these systems 
is a function of the way in which the state itself trains and organizes the 
bureaucracy for public service. By contrast, in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the substantive expertise of bureaucrats tends to be certified by 
independent universities and professional associations, not by state-sponsored 
institutions. And, of course, in the United States, policymaking is formally, and 
in recent years, increasingly, located in offices occupied by political appointees 
who are not careerists.50 On this account, however much Americans rail against 
“bureaucrats,” conventional talk about the “American administrative state” 
misdescribes a polity that remains devoted to electoral politics, citizen and 
interest group participation in government, and decentralized exercise of 
political authority. 
I take a rather different approach than any of those just rehearsed. My 
focus is on administration, not bureaucracy, major policy shifts, or the 
organization of politics. By administration I mean simply the development and 
implementation of law and policy by officials specifically charged with that 
responsibility, whether or not bureaucratized in a Weberian (or even more 
demanding) sense. Moreover, I am searching not for big bangs, but for the 
accretion and development of administrative jurisdiction and capacity, 
sometimes in legislation, but often in the initiatives and routines of 
administrators themselves. I am focusing, therefore, on practice, structure, and 
 
49.  DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATION, 
NETWORKS AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). 
50.  On the differences between bureaucratic organizations that are state or society centered, see 
BERNARD S. SILBERMAN, CAGES OF REASON: THE RISE OF RATIONAL STATE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, 
THE UNITED STATES, AND GREAT BRITAIN (1993). 
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policy, not on social movements, political rhetoric, or legal justification. As 
such, my inquiry tends to find transsubstantive ideas in the patterns of 
legislative and administrative action, not in the language of political debate, 
academic analysis, or legal doctrines generated by judicial review. 
In order to see administrative law in an era that mostly denies its existence, 
my inquiry is structured around three very general issues of governmental 
organization. Following the lead of Frank Goodnow,51 I see administrative 
officers as operating within three overlapping accountability regimes: political 
accountability to elected officials; hierarchical or managerial accountability to 
administrative superiors; and legal accountability to individuals and firms 
through judicial review. To repeat my earlier thesis: in all eras of American 
national history, much of our law has been both developed and applied by 
administrative officials. And in each period administrators have been subject to 
the three accountability regimes just outlined—regimes that both build and 
bind the administrative state. 
The distinctive characteristics of administration and administrative law in 
particular periods depend upon the relative importance of these regimes in 
structuring and checking administrative discretion and the particular 
mechanisms that political, administrative, and legal actors deploy. Both the 
forms of and the balance among regimes shift over time. Indeed, it is the 
distinctive form and balance among these accountability regimes in the 
organization of nineteenth-century national administration that has made 
administrative law invisible. But in every era there is a law of administration. 
To ignore that “administrative law” prior to the Interstate Commerce Act, in 
what I now tend to think of as “the lost one hundred years of American 
administrative law,” is to ignore much of how American administrative 
institutions have been built, maintained, and constrained. And, in my view, it 
is to ignore the incremental and pragmatic processes by which American public 
law usually develops. 
C. The Plan of This Study 
This Article treats the Gilded Age incarnation of each of these three 
accountability regimes in turn. Part I describes developments in the political 
control of administration in postbellum America and the emergence of the 
“apolitical” civil service ideal, partially embodied in the Pendleton Act of 1883. 
As in all periods of American history, political control of administration in this 
period features both organizational changes in the political branches and the 
 
51.  See GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 44, at 371-72. 
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continuing struggle between presidents and congresses for dominance. The 
defining feature of this era might be said to be the migration of the provision of 
secure tenure in office from a congressional strategy to weaken presidential 
control over high-level administrators to an institutionalized protection for 
lower level officials that, in practical effect, constrained congressional power. 
Part II looks at developments in judicial review. Prior to 1860 judicial 
review of administrative action by federal courts had, to modern eyes, a 
peculiar structure. Review by mandamus or injunction was extremely limited, 
and statutes providing for appeals to federal courts from administrative 
decisions were virtually nonexistent. If an officer had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and statutory authority that permitted the exercise of any 
discretion, the courts would not interfere with his substantive judgments. 
Similarly, administrative procedures were deemed acceptable if they were 
provided by statute or legitimated by custom. On the other hand, officers sued 
as individuals for damages were in effect subjected to de novo review for any 
error of law or fact. Officially immunity had been somewhat precariously 
established for cabinet level officials, but lower level officers were protected 
only by a “reasonableness” defense in a few instances provided by statute.52 
And other suits involving “private rights,” but indirectly challenging prior 
official determinations, followed the forms of private actions that hardly 
acknowledged their “public law” implications. In the postbellum world this 
structure began to weaken, but it would take many years to morph into the 
almost directly contradictory structure that we know today—a public law 
system of direct, presumptive, appellate-style53 review of official action and 
virtually universal absolute or qualified immunity for officials from damage 
suits related to their official functions. 
Part III depicts the processes and structures of managerial or bureaucratic 
accountability. This is where nineteenth-century administrative law mostly 
developed. A feel for this “internal administrative law” will be provided 
through two case studies. The first is a study of mass administrative 
adjudication: the awarding of veterans’ pensions by the Bureau of Pensions in 
the Department of the Interior. In many ways the second half of the nineteenth 
century might be called an age of administrative adjudication. While we now 
think of mass administrative adjudication as an artifact of the mid-twentieth-
 
52.  For further elaboration, see Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 
1669-84. 
53.  On the development of the “appellate model” of judicial review in the early twentieth 
century, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative 
Law (forthcoming), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CompAdminLaw/Thomas 
_Merrill_compAdLaw_paper.pdf. 
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century welfare state, these practices in fact have a much longer history. Tens 
of thousands of claims were adjudicated, not just by the Court of Claims in 
suits against the United States, but also by the United States Patent Office, the 
Revenue and Accounting Officers in the Treasury’s Division of the 
Comptroller, the district and general land offices of the Department of the 
Interior, and, as the case study will feature, the Bureau of Pensions. 
Notwithstanding the relatively casual attention to administrative procedure in 
both Congress and the courts, those charged with adjudicating these claims 
developed highly structured and often quite formal processes of 
decisionmaking. As we shall see, these processes were not entirely free from 
congressional or judicial oversight, but important substantive, and virtually all 
procedural, norms for administrative adjudication were constructed by the 
agencies themselves. 
Similarly, we have come to think of the pre-ICC era as one that is quite free 
from administrative regulation at the national level. To be sure, by comparison 
with state and local regulation, national regulation was quite limited. But, it 
was hardly nonexistent. The major transportation safety issue of the mid-
nineteenth century, passenger travel on steamships, had been addressed in a 
remarkably modern and comprehensive regulatory scheme of standard setting, 
licensing, inspections, and penalties prior to the Civil War.54 Less 
comprehensive national regulation had been applied to other areas of 
waterborne commerce, ranging from seamen’s contracts to infectious diseases 
to embargoes and nonimportation laws.55 The federal government had long 
regulated trade with Indian tribes, perhaps a competitor with the Jeffersonian 
Embargo of 1807 to 1809 and the Fugitive Slave Laws of the 1850s, for the 
nineteenth century’s most obvious regulatory failure. But, as the second case 
study will reveal, regulation could grow up in the interstices of apparently 
“nonregulatory” functions. During the period under study, the Post Office 
began, and for many years pursued, antifraud and antivice regulation that 
targeted lotteries, obscenity, and a range of commercial deceptive practices 
facilitated by the use of the mails. While violation of the postal statutes carried 
criminal penalties, the Post Office administratively interdicted banned articles 
and excluded violators from using the mails. This regulatory scheme was also 
adjudicatory in form, but not on the vast scale witnessed at the Pension Office. 
Nevertheless, Post Office regulation was broad in scope. Its antifraud activities 
occupied territory subsequently supervised by the Federal Trade Commission, 
 
54.  For a description of the steamship travel issue, see Mashaw, Administration and the 
Democracy, supra note 9,  at 1628-66. 
55.  See Mashaw, Recovering, supra note 9, at 1277; Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 9, 
at 1647-96. 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
Both case studies, one in benefits administration, the other in regulatory 
enforcement, illustrate the development of a substantial internal law of 
administrative adjudication. Moreover, the normative structure of that law, 
unlike the late nineteenth-century external law of judicial review, is deeply 
familiar to contemporary administrative lawyers. With scant direction from 
Congress, and none from the courts, agencies built systems of adjudication that 
featured transparent procedures and precedents, internal separation of 
functions, professionalization of adjudicatory personnel, safeguards against 
personal and political bias, and robust opportunities for documentary or oral 
hearings. From this perspective we might understand the so-called “rights 
revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, in part, as a consolidation in constitutional 
doctrine of administrative practices that represent a continuous, but seldom 
acknowledged, administrative law tradition. 
Part IV provides a summary of where administration and administrative 
law stood as America entered what has been called its “Age of Reform.” While 
reacting against the excesses of commerce and the failures of governance in the 
Gilded Age, the reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were also building on administrative structures, practices and legal 
understandings that are often obscured by attention to the postbellum 
Republic’s well-deserved reputation for corruption and vituperative political 
rhetoric. The coda concludes with a brief reflection on the jurisprudential 
status of the internal administrative law that this Article describes. 
i .  political control of administration 
Discussions of political control of administration in the United States often 
feature parables of a tragic fall from constitutional grace. In one parable, 
historic democratic control of administration by Congress, through detailed 
statutory prescriptions and close control over administrative expenditures, has 
given way to an unaccountable bureaucracy exercising enormous policy 
discretion under vague statutory delegations of authority56 while extracting 
 
56.  These views are common both to some political scientists, see, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE 
END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979), and to 
constitutional and administrative lawyers, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) 
(arguing for the resuscitation of the moribund nondelegation doctrine). 
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ever larger appropriations from a poorly informed and compliant Congress.57 
In the other, democratic control by the constitutionally ordained “unitary 
executive” has been undermined by the twentieth-century creation of multiple 
independent commissions and a host of organizational arrangements that 
diffuse authority and hamstring presidential direction of administrative 
discretion.58 Both of these parables imagine a world that never was. 
Presidents and congresses have undeniably struggled with each other over 
control of administration from the earliest days of the Republic. That battle 
still rages and remains as inconclusive in 2010 as it was in 1789. The only 
difference is that it now surfaces, at least occasionally, in the courts, whereas 
throughout the nineteenth century the contest was waged exclusively in 
Congress and the court of public opinion. The period under study here was no 
exception. The peculiar and paradoxical feature of the presidential-
congressional struggle in the Gilded Age is that formal constriction of 
presidential power over appointments and removals in the Civil Service Act 
almost certainly did more to weaken congressional than presidential control of 
administration. 
As we shall see, this period also provides a rich illustration of the 
weaknesses of both congressional-control and unitary-executive mythology. 
Gilded Age presidents were almost uniformly weak executives who ceded most 
of their patronage power to congressional delegations and local party elites. 
But while many federal officers may have been beholden to individual 
congressmen or party machines for their jobs, their authority was poorly 
circumscribed by either statutory specificity or congressional budgetary 
controls. Indeed, as we shall see, administrators sometimes pleaded in vain for 
more concrete statutory directions, confronted a Congress with virtually no 
capacity to evaluate their budget requests, and often drafted the legislation that 
provided their jurisdiction and the organization of their bureaus. 
 
57.  The classic statement is in WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971). 
58.  The literature on the “unitary executive” debate is enormous. For an extended argument 
that the President has always had, and the Constitution demands, an unimpaired power of 
appointment, removal, and direction over federal officers, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON 
TO BUSH (2008). For classic critiques of the unitarian approach, see Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); and Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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A. Appointments and Removals, Again 
The struggles over the President’s power to remove federal officials, which 
began in the first Congress and marred Andrew Jackson’s presidency, erupted 
with a vengeance after Andrew Johnson succeeded Abraham Lincoln. Johnson, 
a moderate Southerner who had provided sectional balance for the Republican 
ticket of 1864, attempted to continue Lincoln’s generous Reconstruction 
policies. But Johnson faced a Congress dominated by radical Republicans who 
had quite different ideas. 
In firm control of both houses of Congress following the election of 1866, 
congressional Republicans moved aggressively to prevent the President from 
undermining its Reconstruction policies. Congress prohibited the President (or 
the Secretary of War) from issuing Army orders or instructions save through 
the General of the Army, Ulysses Grant. The same statute established the 
Army’s headquarters in Washington and prohibited the President from 
removing, suspending, or relieving Grant from command or assigning him to 
duty outside Washington without the Senate’s consent.59 With Reconstruction 
firmly under Grant’s control, Congress then passed a new Reconstruction Act 
requiring a much more thoroughgoing reform of politics and governance in the 
Southern states before they could be readmitted to the Union.60 
The radicals were hardly finished. Their Tenure of Office Act61 required 
Senate approval for the removal of any officer appointed with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The President could remove or suspend an officer when 
Congress was not in session only on specific grounds of misconduct. Any such 
suspension was required to be reported to the Senate within twenty days of the 
beginning of its next session. Should the Senate fail to agree that the removal 
was proper, the officer was to resume his duties. Johnson vetoed the bill on 
both constitutional and policy grounds. Johnson’s veto was overridden, but he 
was not deterred. In an attempt to reclaim control over Reconstruction policy, 
Johnson removed Secretary of War Stanton, who had close ties to the 
congressional Republicans.62 He also removed the more radical military 
governors in the South, replacing them with generals who shared his milder 
approach to Reconstruction. 
 
59.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485. 
60.  Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2. 
61.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430. 
62.  Letter from Andrew Johnson, President of the U.S., to the Senate (Dec. 12, 1867), reprinted 
in 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3781 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]. 
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The battle between Johnson and the Congress then took on tragic-comic 
proportions.63 The Senate rejected Johnson’s reasons for removing Stanton, 
who resumed his office. Johnson then removed him again and appointed 
adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas as interim Secretary of War. Stanton 
declined to vacate his office and barricaded himself inside the War 
Department. The House responded with a Bill of Impeachment whose 
principle ground was violation of the Tenure of Office Act. 
Johnson survived impeachment by one vote in the Senate. As Johnson’s 
able counsel in the impeachment trial pointed out, not only was the Tenure of 
Office Act arguably unconstitutional, as written it did not apply to Johnson’s 
removal of Stanton. The Act provided that cabinet members would hold office 
during the term of the President by whom they were appointed, and would be 
subject to removal only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Stanton had 
been appointed by Abraham Lincoln, not by Andrew Johnson, and Senator 
John Sherman, who authored that language and headed the conference 
committee on the bill, had informed the Senate that the Tenure of Office Act 
would not apply to Johnson should he remove any of Lincoln’s cabinet 
appointees.64 One third plus one members of the Senate were apparently 
convinced by one or the other, or perhaps both, of Johnson’s arguments. 
Even those who support a strong view of the “unitary executive,” that is, 
that the Constitution gives the President the power to remove and control all 
policymaking subordinates in the executive branch, agree that the Tenure of 
Office Act and Johnson’s impeachment significantly weakened the presidency 
during the Gilded Age.65 To be sure, presidents resisted,66 but Congress 
remained ascendant.67 Its members tended to view this as the natural order of 
things. As John Sherman put it, “The Executive Department of a republic like 
ours should be subordinate to the legislative department. The President should 
obey and enforce the laws, leaving to the people the duty of correcting any 
errors committed by their representatives in Congress.”68 The post-Johnson 
 
63.  For a brief but more complete description of the contest, see CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 
58, at 179-87. 
64.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1516 (1867). 
65.  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 58, at 189, 218. 
66.  See id. at 189-216. 
67.  For standard accounts, see WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (1947); JOSEPH 
P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF 
APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1953); and WOODROW WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1885). 
68.  1 JOHN SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND CABINET: AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 447 (1895). 
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subservience of the President to Congress was especially marked in relation to 
presidential appointments. President Grant reportedly said, with apparent 
equanimity, “The President very rarely appoints, he merely registers the 
appointments of members of Congress.”69 
Not all presidents were so docile as Grant. His immediate successor, 
Rutherford B. Hayes, put the contest between the President and Congress over 
the control of administration on a different footing. Hayes was a civil service 
reformer who believed in appointments based on open competitive 
examinations and the elimination of civil servants’ participation in political 
activity beyond voting and public speaking. Indeed, he made the first 
substantial movements toward civil service reform by issuing executive orders 
to that effect.70 Hayes seems to have understood that the establishment of the 
political authority of the President required the reduction of the political power 
of Congress. And, in a context where congressional appointment was the 
norm, moving a substantial number of government jobs “outside of politics” 
would weaken Congress, particularly the Senate, and empower the President. 
The struggle between Congress and the President over appointments and 
removal and the struggle for civil service reform overlapped, but they were not 
the same battles. The former was fought largely on a constitutional plane 
emphasizing ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances. The latter 
was a movement to curb corruption in government and increase administrative 
competence. 
B. The Path to Pendleton 
Were politics and history “rational,” the story of the development of civil 
service reform in the post-Civil War era might go something like this: the Civil 
War demonstrated the staying power of an industrial society when pitted 
against an agrarian one. The war made clear what the prescient already knew—
the future belonged to industry and commerce, not to agriculture. Moreover, 
the farsighted might have understood that this new economy and its 
government could not be built on the foundations of the past. Rapid 
industrialization would challenge the government with new social and 
economic problems. Even a public service composed of honest but untrained 
backwoodsmen straight out of Jacksonian mythology would be inadequate to 
 
69.  2 JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG, AROUND THE WORLD WITH GENERAL GRANT: A NARRATIVE OF THE 
VISIT OF GENERAL U.S. GRANT, EX-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO VARIOUS 
COUNTRIES IN EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA, IN 1877, 1878, 1879, at 265 (1879). 
70.  Exec. Order (June 22, 1877), in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 62, at 4402-03 (1877); 
Exec. Order (May 26, 1877), in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 62, at 4402 (1877). 
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the task of twentieth-century governance. A spoils system that exalted partisan 
patronage and disparaged technical competence was not long for the new 
world. 
But history and politics are seldom so straightforward. That civil service 
reform went hand in hand with rapid industrialization does not demonstrate 
that the latter caused, or even much influenced, the former. Civil service reform 
in the Gilded Age71 was as much a moral crusade as a battle for technocratic 
competence.72 The Grant Administration was corrupt on a scale never before 
witnessed in the United States, and its recurrent scandals were understood to 
be intimately connected to the way in which officials were selected and party 
loyalties maintained. If industrialization was a cause of civil service reform, it 
was largely in the sense that the wealth generated by industrialization created 
breathtaking opportunities for corruption in a spoils-oriented public service. 
And, the scale of theft and corruption exposed in post-Civil War America gave 
it a notoriety that virtually demanded a reform movement. 
Given Congress’s major role in patronage appointments, it is not too 
surprising that civil service reform was championed first by presidents or 
aspiring presidents, not by congressmen. To be sure, Andrew Johnson had 
been impeached because of his refusal to abide by the Tenure of Office Act. 
But, the warfare between Andrew Johnson and the radical Republicans of his 
own party was political warfare about Reconstruction, not about reform of the 
 
71.  The standard history is PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 
(1958). Further general histories include ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883 (1961); and U.S. OFFICE OF 
PERS. MGMT., U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEAL: A HISTORY OF THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE (2003). 
72.  This is not to say that the latter demand was unimportant. Industrial and mercantile 
interests needed a post office and customs houses that functioned efficiently. Indeed, one 
area in which the reform of the civil service may have followed the “rational” format 
described in the text involved the application of merit principles in the Patent Office. As the 
ownership of patents migrated from individual inventors to corporate enterprises, American 
business demanded a more stable basis for investing in the development of products 
ostensibly protected by patent. This could not be accomplished unless the Patent Office 
were put on a more regular and scientific basis so that patents, once issued, gave reasonable 
certainty that they would hold up in court. Hence, while early proposals for general civil 
service reform languished in the Congress, the Patent Office began merit-based hiring and 
promotion in 1869. The process of patent examination rapidly became professionalized and 
bureaucratized and the accomplishments of the Office were presented to the Congress and 
the public as a triumph of the bureaucratic system which protected both the inventor’s 
property rights and the access of the public to the commercialization of useful technological 
advances. These developments are chronicled in Kara W. Swanson, The Bureaucracy of 
Genius: Striking the Patent Bargain in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Aug. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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public service. And, although the President in the post-Civil War period had 
thousands of offices nominally under his control, he was a prisoner of the 
spoils system rather than a political leader who cemented his party’s loyalty to 
him, and to his electoral success, through his power of appointment. 
It was the historically reviled Grant who first appointed a Civil Service 
Commission to look into the reform of the public service.73 Perhaps equally 
significant, Grant’s authority to appoint the Commission derived from a rider 
tacked on to an appropriations bill by Carl Schurz, a proponent of civil service 
reform well before his election to the Senate.74 The formal pattern of reform 
was presidential initiative with congressional acquiescence, but the real heart of 
the civil service reform movement lay outside the government. 
The extragovernmental civil service reformers of the 1860s and 1870s were 
the heirs of the Abolitionist Movement, indeed, sometimes the same persons. 
They saw the partisan spoils system as a scourge on the republican political 
landscape that, like slavery, had to be removed in order to free the nation from 
immorality and corruption. The reformers’ analysis of the spoils system and its 
relationship to democratic values was in some ways reminiscent of Jackson’s 
view of the antidemocratic, Federalist public service. But, while perhaps benign 
in its initial conception, from the reformers’ perspective, rotation in office had 
become a cancerous growth that threatened American democracy. 
The first report of Grant’s Civil Service Commission reflects the moral 
fervor of the reform crusade. The document was prepared by the commission’s 
chair, George William Curtis, one of the major players in the civil service 
reform movement. In Van Riper’s description, 
[T]his fifty page document begins soberly enough, but after a few 
pages of introduction quickly develops a distinct Old Testament 
eschatological flavor, declaring, “The moral tone of the country is 
debased. The national character deteriorates.” As if this and forty more 
pages like it were not enough, the report then resoundingly concludes: 
“The improvement of the Civil Service is emphatically the people’s 
cause, the people’s reform, and the administration which vigorously 
 
73.  For a discussion of the Grant Civil Service Commission and its demise, see LEONARD D. 
WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 281-87 
(1958). 
74.  Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 495 (1871). 
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begins it will acquire a glory only less than that of the salvation of a free 
Union.”75 
When the Grant Commission expired for lack of congressional appropriations, 
the battle was carried on outside of government by civil service reform leagues 
at the local, state, and national levels.76 
To modern eyes, the idea that civil service reform would purge the public 
service of venal motives and reestablish a republic of virtue seems wonderfully 
naïve. In her analysis of the reformers’ ideology, Ruth M. Berens describes the 
“political man” of the civil service reformers as 
a good citizen, loving liberty but preferring the public welfare to his 
private well-being. He put policy above party, and when virtue was at 
stake, maintained his independence. The economic man who was to 
become the future civil servant held the government service in great 
esteem, and was anxious to take upon himself the mantle of public 
stewardship. He prepared himself carefully for the examinations and 
strove to the utmost in the competition. Once appointed, he was 
attentive to duty and anxious to secure promotion. He loved his 
country, desired security, and was content with a modest salary, since 
merit brought advancement. The political and economic man, moves 
 
75.  VAN RIPER, supra note 71, at 81-82. Added to this high moral tone was a more complex 
analysis included in the Commission’s final report in 1874. Following the introduction there 
appears a section entitled “The Evils to be Remedied” which begins: 
There had been developed, mainly within a single generation, and was existing 
with fearful powers of expansion and reproduction an aggressive and 
unscrupulous spirit of mercenary partisanship, which, promoting and dominating 
the pursuit of politics as a trade, and seeking public office and party and caucus 
leadership principally for the spoils of money and patronage they could 
command, was degrading all party action and popular estimation and impairing 
alike official integrity, political honor, and private morality. This spirit developed 
and animated all over the country large numbers of little and great partisan 
combinations, faithful to no party principles, inspired by no patriotic sentiments, 
conducting no useful debates, contributing nothing to public intelligence or 
public virtue, but mettlesome and insatiable, everywhere, whenever any official 
selection was to be made, or any official authority was to be exercised. 
Id. at 82. 
76.  While a moral rather than a technocratic crusade, the scope of the reform movement was 
limited. Civil service reform was not a prelude to some grander program of social and 
economic reform designed to cure the social evils of industrialization. On the ideology and 
practice of social services for the lower classes, see GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER 
CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION 111-12 (1965). On the 
classical liberal ideology of reform leaders, see SPROAT, supra note 35. 
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like a beneficent robot through the pages of reform literature, is not 
held up as an ideal—a procedure which would neither have taxed the 
credulity of the reader nor biased the assumptions of the reformers—
but with a surprising superficiality assumed as a foundation upon 
which to base reform.77 
This was an essentially religious campaign carried on in an age in which 
religious images, epitomized by William Jennings Bryan’s “crown of thorns” 
and “cross of gold” speeches, were the standard coin of political exchange. But 
as with most moral crusades, success hinged as much on contingency and the 
baser instincts of erstwhile allies, as on the rightness of the reformers’ cause. 
While civil service reform was a constant and repetitive theme of editorials and 
stories in the daily and weekly press throughout the post-Civil War period, the 
contingency that galvanized public opinion was the assassination of President 
Garfield in 1881 by a man found to be a “disappointed office seeker.”78 The 
President’s death was interpreted to and understood by the nation as a symbol 
of the low state to which American government had fallen through exploitation 
of the spoils system of administration. Before, the spoils system had been 
equated only with theft—now it was equated with murder. 
By the time of the election of 1882, civil service reform had become a major 
issue in most parts of the country. Indeed, it was such an issue, that the 
Democratic Party, languishing throughout the whole of the post-Civil War 
period, very nearly took back the presidency. The lively prospect of a 
Democratic administration four years hence moved a Republican Congress to 
action. Jumping on the public bandwagon, it passed the civil service reform 
measure sponsored by Senator George H. Pendleton and drafted by the New 
York Civil Service Reform Association.79 
Of course, the demand for new public policy does not necessarily mean that 
it will be supplied. Responsiveness to general public clamor is certainly one 
explanation for the passage of civil service reform in 1883. But, as Ronald 
Johnson and Gary Leibcap argue,80 we need some further explanation of why 
 
77.  Ruth M. Berens, Blueprint for Reform: Curtis, Eaton and Schurz (1943) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, University of Chicago), quoted in VAN RIPER, supra note 71, at 84. 
78.  The Merit System and the Parties, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1904, at 8 (stating that Garfield was 
shot by a “crazy, disappointed office seeker”). 
79.  Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403. On the reform period leading to the Pendleton Act, 
see CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1905). 
80.  RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LEIBCAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE 
PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
(1994). 
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politicians, presumably dependent upon patronage for their offices, would 
throw that system over because of the demands of the idealistic reform 
movement or public clamor that was not likely to be maintained. On their 
view, the explanation lies in the way in which the spoils system had come to 
disserve the interest of both the President and Congress. The vast increase in 
public employment following the Civil War had made the spoils system 
ungovernable. So many offices were to be filled that neither presidents nor 
representatives and senators could devote sufficient time to it to ensure that 
appointees were both loyal to them and reasonably competent. Appointments 
were thus in effect delegated to political operatives at the state and local level. 
As a consequence, office holders viewed local politicians as their benefactors, 
which, in turn, made the national politicians dependent upon the local power 
structure to mobilize voters in general elections. Moreover, to the extent that 
the public service was seen as corrupt and incompetent, national politicians, 
not the locals, were blamed for the inadequacies of the public service. 
To make matters worse, according to Johnson and Leibcap, presidents, 
representatives, and senators increasingly relied on industrial and commercial 
interests for support. Because these interests transcended local political affairs, 
the constituencies of national and local politicians were overlapping but far 
from congruent. And, in increasingly expensive national campaigns, the 
assessments on patronage appointees supplied a decreasing percentage of the 
funds necessary for effective campaigning. In these circumstances, it was in the 
interests of both presidents and representatives and senators to limit the reach 
of the spoils system and curtail their dependence on local political machines. 
And, in bending to the demands for reform, Congress and the President hardly 
took a radical approach. 
The Pendleton Act was both unsurprising and limited in its basic 
principles. It called for competitive examinations for hiring and promotion and 
provided relative security of tenure for covered office holders (that is, tenure 
during good behavior). The implementation of these principles was left largely 
to the President and the new Civil Service Commission. Moreover, while these 
principles were similar to those in the British Civil Service and elsewhere, they 
had a decidedly American flavor. Examinations were to be practical rather than 
theoretical or academic, as were British exams.81 In addition, the merit service 
was not to be a closed system creating a unified state bureaucracy. Offices were 
to be open by examination throughout the civil service system, not just at the 
bottom. Hence, appointment to offices above the entry level could be from 
outside as well as from within. What Stephen Skowronek has called the “state 
 
81.  Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 301, 313 (1959). 
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of courts and parties”82 was not about to be displaced at a stroke by a 
bureaucratic class that viewed itself as representing the state. To this degree, 
Jacksonian theories of democracy remained. 
Nor was the President’s removal power seriously circumscribed. Civil 
service employees were not removed for partisan political reasons, but 
enforcement was left to incentives. If appointment had to be by competitive 
examination, then perhaps the temptation to remove for partisan reasons 
would be stifled. And, of course, lying not far beneath the surface of this 
hopeful interpretation of the Pendleton Act’s relative security of tenure was the 
American constitutional experience. Attempting to circumscribe the power of 
presidential removal would reopen yet again the constitutional controversies of 
1789, the Jacksonian era, and the Johnson impeachment. 
As the Pendleton Act tread cautiously around the boundaries of the 
President’s removal power, it also dealt lightly with presidential appointments. 
For remember, the Constitution gives the appointment power either to the 
President or, for inferior officers, to the President, the courts of law, or the 
heads of departments, as the Congress shall by law prescribe. The Civil Service 
Commission was not any of these constitutionally ordained parties. The 
Pendleton Act itself brought only about ten percent of the positions in the 
federal public service into the competitive civil service. The rest were to be 
incorporated by presidential executive order, if and when the President saw 
fit.83 
This creeping quality to the Civil Service Law had a distinct political 
advantage. To the extent that incoming presidents profited from the 
availability of offices not covered by the Act, outgoing presidents would see the 
possibility of their handiwork being undone by the next incumbent. They thus 
had a political incentive, and indeed would be importuned by their existing 
appointees, to take more and more of the public service into the civil service 
system on their way out of town. Commitment to reform and the need to 
 
82.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 39.  
83.  In prescribing examinations for the competitive service, the Civil Service Commission was, 
of course, not itself making appointments. And, the Constitution allows the placement of 
appointments for “inferior officers” elsewhere than in the President. Nevertheless, as 
Attorney General A.T. Akerman opined at the time of the creation of the Grant Civil Service 
Commission, the Congress “has no power to vest appointments elsewhere, directly or 
indirectly.” 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 521 (1871). By “elsewhere” Akerman meant elsewhere than 
in the constitutionally named places. And at some point restrictiveness in the requirements 
for qualifications would at least “indirectly” invade the appointments power. Much better, 
therefore, that if any invading of the President’s power were to be done, the President would 
do it himself. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s functions were largely technical and 
advisory. The Commission proposed; the President disposed. 
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reduce the effort demanded to appoint and oversee a rapidly expanding public 
work force provided further incentives for expansion. Once in place, therefore, 
the reforms of Pendleton were rapidly consolidated. Over fifty percent of the 
public service outside the Post Office was covered by the Pendleton Act within 
five years of its passage.84 
C. The Efficacy of Political Control 
The Pendleton Act neither took federal administration “out of politics” nor 
consolidated the President’s power with respect to administration. The statute 
ensured that a substantial percentage of the federal civil service would have the 
basic competence of a decent common school education. And it limited the 
degree to which federal officials could provide an army of contributors and 
campaign workers controlled by local party machines. But, the Pendleton Act 
in no way interfered with the capacities of Congress or the President to 
influence administrative action using their traditional tools: appointments, 
removals, legislation, appropriations, investigations, and oversight. The 
interesting question is the degree to which these traditional tools permitted 
Congress or the President to maintain control over important policy choices or 
whether administrators exercised significant, independent discretion to make 
law in the course of implementing it. 
As I have noted, presidential power was at a low ebb from Lincoln’s 
assassination to the inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt. Presidents won some 
victories concerning the maintenance of their removal powers and could reduce 
congressional and local influence with each new batch of federal government 
employees covered into the civil service system by executive order. But this is a 
far cry from having effective control over the federal bureaucracy. On 
presidential control and influence in the period 1869 through 1901, Leonard 
White, the great student of public administration in the nineteenth century, 
concluded,  
[the presidents] were at the head of the machine, but the machine had 
power of self-propulsion and power to preserve its own shape and 
motion. The established course of the public business went on its 
 
84.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 73. For a more detailed discussion of the enactment and 
consolidation of the Pendleton Act reforms, see WHITE, supra note 73, at 278-364. 
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appointed way, for the most part without requiring or inviting the 
collaboration of the man who sat in the White House.85 
White’s study of congressional control of administration revealed much 
greater activity, but with decidedly mixed results concerning the course of 
administrative development.86 By his account, Congress constantly inserted 
itself into administration through private acts and investigations. But the 
former distracted Congress from the consideration of general issues of policy, 
and the latter tended to be completely ineffectual in the absence of 
congressional staff. 
To be sure, Congress was active in establishing new departments. It created 
a Department of Agriculture in 1862, under a Commissioner not of cabinet 
rank,87 then raised the Department to executive cabinet status in 1889.88 
Congress established a similar, nonexecutive Department of Education in 
1867,89 but subsequently abolished the Department and moved its functions to 
the Interior Department.90 A Department of Justice, first suggested by 
President Washington, was finally created in 1870,91 and labor got a 
department with noncabinet status under the direction of a Commissioner in 
1888.92 
Congress was constantly active in establishing and reorganizing 
departments, bureaus, and offices. Theodore Lowi estimates that “[n]early half 
of [Congress’s] output during the Distributive Era [1800-1933] was . . . 
constituent policy.”93 Lowi also notes that Congress reorganized and 
institutionalized itself continuously from 1816 onward to ensure that there 
 
85.  WHITE, supra note 73, at 109. In the same vein, White argues that bureaus often eluded 
effective departmental control, and hence, indirectly, presidential control as well. Officers 
dealing with public lands, patents, military pensions, and Indian affairs were all nominally 
in the Interior Department, but their strong supportive networks outside of government 
allowed them to operate semiautonomously. Id. at 175-81. 
86.  Id. at 68-92. 
87.  Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387.  
88.  Act of Feb. 9, 1889, ch. 122, 25 Stat. 659. 
89.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434.  
90.  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 242; Act of July 30, 1869, ch. 176, 15 Stat. 92, 106. 
91.  Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162.  
92.  Act of June 13, 1888, ch. 389, 25 Stat. 182. This department received cabinet status as a part 
of the new Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903, and was finally established as a 
separate department in 1913. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 141, 37 Stat. 736. 
93.  LOWI, supra note 7, at 77. By constituent policy, Lowi means to include acts that create a new 
agency or department or reorganize the government, that is, that are constitutive of 
governmental organization. 
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were standing committees that paralleled the jurisdiction of major 
departments. Hence, Woodrow Wilson’s famous conclusion that 
“Congressional government is committee government.”94 
But it would be a mistake to imagine that many of the activities that are 
evident from perusing the statute books represent congressional initiatives. To 
be sure, the creation of a department often involved high politics and generated 
partisan ideological conflict. Whether any aspects of education policy should be 
a national concern and whether interests such as agriculture or labor should 
have departments devoted to issues of particular interest to them were 
controversial questions, often contested on grounds of constitutional principle. 
But how the work of administration got done was largely a function of how 
departments organized themselves, and, in this regard, the departments had 
the leading role. Outside of the Treasury Department, in whose workings the 
Congress maintained its historically lively interest, the creation or 
reorganization of bureaus and assignment of personnel was generally done by 
departments. Legislation addressing these matters responded to departmental 
proposals or recognized structures that had already been established by 
administrative action.95 
Congress seems to have been quite self-conscious about the direction of its 
administrative state building. Williamjames Hull Hoffer has recently argued 
that the period 1858 to 1891 represented a distinctive “second state.” That state 
lay between the limited government, assembly dominated, and 
antibureaucratic “first state” of antebellum America, and the enlarged, activist, 
expert administrative “third state” that emerged in the first half of the 
twentieth century.96 Hoffer describes the building of this second state as 
following a distinctive progressive logic. It began with federal sponsorship of 
activities through funding, land grants, or data gathering; moved on to federal 
supervision of the sponsored activities through new bureaus or departments; 
and ended in a standardization or unification of policy through federal rules. 
 
94.  LOWI, supra note 7, at 76 (quoting WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A 
STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1885)). 
95.  SHORT, supra note 12, at 220. 
96.  WILLIAMJAMES HULL HOFFER, TO ENLARGE THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: 
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN STATE, 1858-1891 (2007). 
Hoffer’s analysis is based on a comprehensive review of congressional debates surrounding 
the Morrill Land Grant Colleges legislation; the statutes creating the Department of 
Agriculture, the Freedman’s Bureau, the Department of Education, and the Bureau of 
Labor; plus the debates over the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, judicial or circuit court 
reform, and the Blair proposals for federal support of common schooling. 
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Hoffer emphasizes that these developments involved a layering of new 
“second state” ideas on top of older first state commitments to local control, 
collective decisionmaking, and protection against authoritarian administrative 
excesses. His case studies provide example after example of a Congress that 
used data and reports compiled by administrative agencies as a basis for its 
legislative debates, amendatory legislation, and the creation of new agencies. 
Indeed the new agencies were charged to generate data, studies, and reports 
that would either (1) provide the basis for unification of state and local 
activities around best practices, or (2) provide the basis for further 
congressional legislation to ensure that federal resources were properly 
deployed. Noting that between 1862 and 1888, Congress created as many new 
departments as had been created in the previous history of the United States, 
Hoffer concludes, “In the congressmen’s minds this was no longer the state ‘of 
courts and parties’ and had not been for years.”97 
Although Hoffer’s study is ostensibly based on congressional rhetoric, he 
finds much of the evidence for the second state build up of national and 
administrative capacities in what Congress did. Proponents often masked the 
progressive logic of new initiatives by concentrating on the contextual details 
that motivated congressional action. In Hoffer’s words, 
[T]he thought processes behind an expanded national government in 
the United States, from 1858-1891, did not constitute a series of radical 
departures, but, rather, revealed a halting, gradual, and almost self-
effacing series of overlapping dramas. . . . Congressmen learned to 
encode novelty as the most conservative possible response to absolute 
exigency or as the most practical housekeeping measure to deal with 
pesky inefficiencies.98 
As Hoffer’s careful study of congressional debates suggests, when looking 
at congressional legislation one must be careful not to allow the form of the 
legislation, or the partisan debates surrounding it, to obscure the degree of 
administrative discretion that new statutes vested in administrators. While 
congressional statutes empowering departments, bureaus, and commissions 
continued to contain massive detail, critical questions remained for 
administrative determination. The range of administrative discretion available 
under apparently detailed statutes will be manifest in the subsequent 
discussion of military pension adjudication and Post Office restrictions on the 
use of the mails. But other examples abound. 
 
97.  Id. at 171. 
98.  Id. at 197. 
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In some sense administrative influence, if not direction and control, of 
national policy was a virtual necessity in dealing with complex matters. 
Although Congress organized itself into specialized committees, it had little or 
no staff and was preoccupied with particularized legislation that responded to 
constituents’ petitions. Even in the antebellum, Jacksonian era, the drafting of 
important legislation had migrated to the departments and bureaus.99 A highly 
detailed statute that seemed to give administrative officials modest discretion, 
such as the statute creating a national currency and a national banking 
system,100 represented proposals originated and developed by the Treasury.101 
While in form it elaborated highly specific congressional decisions, the 
legislation, in substance, ratified Treasury policy. 
The 1871 statute consolidating and amending the piecemeal laws enacted 
since 1838 for the regulation of steamboat safety provides an even more 
dramatic example.102 Although the Act’s seventy-one sections contain 
enormous amounts of detail concerning safety equipment, boiler pressures, 
navigation lights, and the like, these provisions codify many rules previously 
adopted by the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats and respond to 
suggestions for legislative reform that the Board had pressed on the relevant 
congressional committees for two decades.103 Moreover, the new statute 
continued in force the broad discretion of local boards in licensing boats, 
boilers, and personnel,104 and of the Supervisory Board in making further rules 
and regulations having the force of law.105 
The enormous detail of appropriations statutes could also be deceiving. 
These often contained elaborate specification of personnel and salary, among 
other things. But, with respect to some of the largest items of expenditure, 
appropriations for the Army, the Navy, military pensions, and the Post Office, 
Congress simply allocated lump sums. Its attempts to control expenditure by 
prohibiting transfers among accounts, holdovers from year to year, and 
advanced obligations of funds not yet appropriated were not terribly 
successful. Departments came back for deficiency appropriations under the 
implicit threat of ceasing to operate. They generally received the funds they 
 
99.  See Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1668-69. 
100.  Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. 
101.  ALBERT S. BOLLES, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM 1861 TO 1885, at 43 
(1886). 
102.  Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat. 440. 
103.  See Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1643-53. 
104.  Act of Feb. 28, 1871, §§ 12-17, 16 Stat. at 445-47. 
105.  Id. §§ 24-30, 16 Stat. at 449-50. 
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requested. Indeed, the specialized organization of Congress tended to work 
against fiscal control. The Treasury had no authority to screen departmental 
requests or estimates. These went directly to different committees which 
competed to fund the activities within their jurisdictions. To a significant 
degree, agencies controlled the allocation of their own funding, if not the total 
amounts allocated.106 While late twentieth-century public choice scholars may 
have overstated the degree of administrative control over Congress as a matter 
of contemporary political economy,107 that approach may more accurately 
characterize the relationship between administrators and congressional 
committees in the Gilded Age. Woodrow Wilson’s congressional committee 
government could simultaneously be administrative government. 
Congressional abdication of regulatory policymaking is the arena that tends 
most to exercise modern critics of the administrative state. And there is a 
tendency to imagine a pre-New Deal or pre-Progressive Era world in which 
national regulatory policy, if adopted at all, was specified clearly by statute. 
This image is false.108 Congress’s modest forays into direct federal regulation 
during this period often ceded virtual carte blanche to the implementing 
authorities to develop substantive policy. For example, although extremely 
hesitant about entering a field that had been a traditional province of state 
regulation, when Congress finally passed a general quarantine, it conferred 
remarkably broad authority: 
[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall, if in his judgment it is necessary 
and proper, make such additional rules and regulations as are necessary 
to prevent the introduction of such [communicable] diseases into the 
United States from foreign countries, or into one State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia from another State or Territory or the District 
of Columbia . . . .109 
 
106.  On congressional control, or lack of control, over appropriations, see WHITE, supra note 73, 
at 54-67. 
107.  The basic argument for agency control through monopolization of information is from 
NISKANEN, supra note 57. For a sympathetic revision of Niskanen’s model which finds his 
strongest claims overstated, see Gary J. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and 
the Size of Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1983). 
108.  For discussion of broad delegations of regulatory authority in antebellum legislation, see 
Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1628-66; Mashaw, Recovering, 
supra note 9, at 1292-96; and Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 9, at 1650-95. 
109.  Act of Feb. 15, 1893, ch. 114, § 3, 27 Stat. 449, 451 (granting additional quarantine powers 
and imposing additional duties upon the Marine Hospital Service). On the development of 
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The statute regulating communicable diseases in animals was similarly 
expansive. Although internal regulations were to be enforced by state authority 
(financed by federal funds), the rules and regulations promulgated by the 
Commissioner of Agriculture were simply to be those “he may deem necessary 
for the speedy and effectual suppression and extirpation of [communicable 
animal] diseases.”110 And when dealing with the exportation of livestock, the 
Secretary of Treasury was authorized to establish such regulations “as the 
results of [his] investigations may require,” and to prevent the exportation of 
diseased animal by such steps and measures “as he may deem necessary.”111 
Congress’s halting pre-ICC approach to railroad regulation evidenced a 
similar willingness to rely on administrative discretion. In 1878, Congress 
adopted an investigation and reporting scheme for railroads that had received 
any federal subsidy, that is, most of them.112 Although the new auditor of 
railroad accounts was only empowered to investigate and make reports to the 
Secretary of the Interior, these reports were to contain information “on the 
condition of each of said railroad companies, their road, accounts, and 
affairs.”113 In order to carry out this function the auditor was empowered to 
examine all of the railroads’ books and accounts, and “to prescribe a system of 
reports to be rendered to him by the railroad companies.”114 
So far as the statute provides, the auditor, later Commissioner of Railroads, 
could demand any information he thought useful. And in its earliest food 
safety regulation, Congress empowered the administrators to exclude from 
commerce any substance “made in imitation or semblance of butter” if they 
found that it contained “ingredients deleterious to the public health.”115 Filling 
in these large and loose terms was left entirely to administrative discretion. 
 
federal quarantine laws in the nineteenth century, see Edwin Maxey, Federal Quarantine 
Laws, 23 POL. SCI. Q. 617 (1908). 
110.  Act of May 29, 1884, ch. 60, § 3, 23 Stat. 31, 32 (establishing a Bureau of Animal Industry). 
111.  Id. §§ 4-5. 
112.  This system was similar to the regulatory scheme pioneered by Charles Frances Adams in 
Massachusetts. On the Massachusetts system, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF 
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. 
KAHN 1-56 (1984). 
113.  Act of June 19, 1878, ch. 316, § 3, 20 Stat. 169, 170. The auditor was upgraded to the title of 
“Commissioner of Railroads” in the General Appropriations Act of 1882, ch. 130, 21 Stat. 
385, 409 (1881). These powers of investigation and required reports are very similar to those 
provided to the ICC, and after judicial construction of the ICC’s other powers, about all that 
it wielded. SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 151. 
114.  Act of June 19, 1878, § 3, 20 Stat. 170.  
115.  Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209, 212. 
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None of this is to deny, of course, that Congress retained formal power to 
rein in administrators through appropriations, amendatory legislation, and 
investigations. The point is merely that, as the world became more 
complicated, initiative and information advantages migrated increasingly to 
those who spent their working hours concentrated on a single subject. 
Administrators were seldom autonomous, then or now, in the strong sense of 
an ability to make policy clearly contrary to the desires of the political 
branches.116 But administrative discretion subject to relatively loose political 
control is a constant in American law, not an invention of the twentieth 
century. 
i i .  legal control of administrative action 
Contemporary administrative lawyers are accustomed to what Thomas 
Merrill has called the “appellate review model” of judicial review of 
administrative action.117 That model has many forms and variations, but its 
central features are borrowed from appellate review of lower court decisions. 
Agencies, like lower courts, are expected to develop the facts and apply the 
relevant law. On appeal, the reviewing court accepts the record as provided by 
the lower court or agency and modulates the intensity of its review depending 
upon whether the issue is one of fact or policy—for the agency—or one of 
law—for the reviewing court—subject, of course, to the recognition that legal 
interpretation and policy choice may be so conjoined as to defy separation. 
Beyond procedural regularity, contemporary judicial review is largely devoted 
to determining, under multiple verbal formulae, whether agency action has 
been reasonable. 
This was not the nineteenth-century approach. Direct review of 
administrative action by mandamus or injunction was sharply limited by the 
Supreme Court’s position that mandamus was inappropriate whenever the 
Administrator was engaged in anything more than a ministerial, 
nondiscretionary task. On the other hand, where cases were before the courts 
exercising original jurisdiction, as in damage actions against government 
officers or patent infringement suits, the courts exercised de novo 
decisionmaking power concerning both questions of fact and questions of 
 
116.  For the elaboration of this idea of autonomous administrative authority, see DANIEL P. 
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATION, NETWORKS, AND 
POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). 
117.  Merrill, supra note 53. 
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law.118 Gilded Age judicial review followed this basic pattern, and indeed to 
some degree enlarged upon it. But, around the edges, one can glimpse 
harbingers of the appellate model, as well as judicial concern that its essentially 
bipolar approach was inadequate to the realities of an emerging administrative 
state. 
To contemporary eyes it surely was. Where common law actions were 
available, courts negated whatever advantages inhered in administrative 
judgment by de novo redetermination. Where only writ review obtained, 
administrative discretion insulated officers from all but cursory judicial review. 
“Reasonableness,” the touchstone of modern presumptive, but deferential, 
judicial review was virtually irrelevant in either form of proceeding. 
A. The Limits of Mandamus 
Mandamus loomed large in federal court jurisprudence in part because the 
federal government was engaged in a number of high-volume distributive 
activities, notably the issuance of land and invention patents, and the provision 
of military pensions. Denial of a patent or a pension was in essence a refusal to 
act, and mandamus was the appropriate writ to force government action. 
While only available from the federal courts in the District of Columbia, most 
high government officials could be sued there. Many litigants made their way 
to the capital to seek mandamus. They generally had an unhappy time. 
Although the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was at times 
sympathetic to the extension of mandamus jurisdiction to control official 
action, in case after case the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
narrowness of the writ.119 Moreover, the Court, in Gaines v. Thompson,120 for 
the first time explicitly made the mandamus jurisprudence applicable to suits 
for injunction. In Gaines, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Secretary of the 
Interior from canceling his entry on a piece of public land. Because the plaintiff 
was attempting to stop a government action rather than mandate it, he may 
have taken comfort from the 1858 case of Walker v. Smith.121 In Walker, the 
Court had provided full merits review of a General Land Office decision in a 
 
118.  See Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1669-84. 
119.  See, e.g., United States v. Comm’r, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 563 (1866) (denying mandamus to 
compel the issuance of a patent by the Commissioner of the General Land Office); Comm’r 
of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (5 Wall.) 552 (1866) (denying mandamus to compel the 
Commissioner of Patents to reexamine a patent application). 
120.  74 U.S. (5 Wall.) 347 (1868). 
121.  62 U.S. (21 How.) 579 (1858). 
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suit for injunction without mentioning the mandamus jurisprudence. A 
unanimous Supreme Court, in a rather a cryptic opinion by Justice Grier, said: 
Whether, after the Land Office have issued the scrip to a claimant, 
another person alleging fraud or misrepresentation, and claiming 
himself to be the “proprietor” intended by the act, might not obtain the 
interference of the courts, to obtain a transfer of the scrip to himself, is 
a question not presented in this case.122 
One might easily read that sentence as suggesting that forcing the Secretary’s 
hand by mandamus to issue a script or a patent was to be distinguished from 
actions for prohibitory injunction. 
Gaines, however, put this theory to rest. The Court there described its 
mandamus jurisprudence as but part of a “general doctrine, that an officer to 
whom public duties are confided by law, is not subject to the control of the 
courts in the exercise of the judgment and discretion which the law reposes in 
him as a part of his official functions.”123 This doctrine, the Court said, “is as 
applicable to the writ of injunction as it is to the writ of mandamus.”124 The 
Court took a straightforward functional approach, noting that there was no 
difference between an officer being stripped of his right to exercise discretion 
 
122.  Id. at 581. 
123.  74 U.S. at 352. For this last bit of reasoning, the Supreme Court cited its decision in 
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), the case in which the State of Mississippi 
sought to enjoin Andrew Johnson from carrying out the Reconstruction statutes. Mississippi 
v. Johnson was, indeed, an injunction case, and part of the Court’s reasoning in that case 
relied on the obvious proposition that President Johnson’s activities under the 
Reconstruction Acts were hardly ministerial, nondiscretionary duties. But, Mississippi v. 
Johnson was, in essence, a political question case. Indeed, the Court imagined that action of 
the sort requested would involve it in a political imbroglio. What, the Court asked, was it to 
do if the President complied with an injunction forbidding execution of the Reconstruction 
Acts and Congress attempted to impeach him for his failure to implement those same 
statutes? Was the Court then supposed to enjoin Congress from engaging in impeachment? 
Id. at 500-01. 
This political question approach was carried further in Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 50 (1867), where Georgia sought to restrain the Secretary of War and the general in 
command of the military district comprising Georgia, Florida, and Alabama from enforcing 
the Reconstruction Acts. Instead of rehearsing the mandamus jurisprudence and the usual 
distinctions between discretionary and ministerial functions, the Court simply concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction. In the words of the opinion, this was because “a case must be 
presented appropriate for the exercise of judicial power; the rights in danger, as we have 
seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong 
to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity.” Id. at 76. 
124.  Gaines, 74 U.S. at 352. 
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by a court forcing him to do something and being stripped of his right to 
exercise discretion by the court forcing him not to do something.125 
Moreover, in Gaines, the Court made clear that this principle covers the 
whole of the executive’s discretionary powers, not just obviously political 
judgments. For when concluding that the acts of the Secretary of the Interior 
involved were not ministerial, the Court found discretion in the fact that the 
determination of the validity of the plaintiff’s entry on public lands was “a 
question which requires the careful consideration and construction of more 
than one act of Congress.”126 The need for agency statutory interpretation thus 
excluded judicial review. The language of the Gaines opinion makes the 
modern Chevron doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of their own 
statutes seem a grudging acknowledgement of the interpretive discretion 
Congress intends to repose in administrators. 
B. Officers vs. Offices 
Postbellum mandamus jurisprudence nevertheless reflected movement 
toward reconceptualizing direct judicial review as a public action designed to 
control official behavior rather than as a private lawsuit between individuals, 
one of whom happened to occupy a public office. Recognition of the “public 
law” nature of judicial review was incremental and began inauspiciously. In 
Secretary v. McGarrahan,127 for example, the Court engaged in dictum that 
suggested that mandamus would not lie against a current officeholder where 
the decision in question had been made by his predecessor. Mandamus was 
characterized as a personal action available only against named individuals.128 
United States v. Boutwell129 confronted the issue directly. The question in 
Boutwell was whether a new Secretary of the Treasury could be substituted as 
the defendant in a case in which the prior incumbent had resigned after the 
lower court decision, but before the decision by the Supreme Court. In rather 
broad terms, the Supreme Court said, “The office of a writ of mandamus is to 
compel the performance of a duty resting upon the person to whom the writ is 
sent . . . . If he be an officer, and the duty be an official one, still the writ is 
 
125.  Id. at 352-53. 
126.  Id. at 353. 
127.  76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 298 (1869). 
128.  The decision is somewhat confusing because the Court combined this dictum with concerns 
about finality. The predecessor could no longer carry out the duty and the current 
officeholder had never been given an opportunity to act on the matter. Id. at 303, 313. 
129.  84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604 (1873). 
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aimed exclusively against him as a person, and he can only be punished for 
disobedience.”130 There was a technical wrinkle of constitutional dimensions 
that might have limited the Boutwell holding: the Court believed that it was 
being asked to exercise “original jurisdiction over both a new party and a new 
cause.”131 Congress’s attempt to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in 
mandamus actions had been ruled unconstitutional in Marbury v. Madison.132 
The McGarrahan and Boutwell private-action conception of mandamus was 
both reinforced and potentially undermined by Rees v. Watertown.133 The 
plaintiff in Rees had obtained a judgment against the city of Watertown, as well 
as a writ of mandamus to compel the city to levy a tax to pay his judgment. But 
before the writ could be served, a majority of the members of the city council 
resigned and the marshal, viewing the writ as personal, declined to serve it on 
the new council members. The hapless Rees went through this process twice 
more. Each time his writ was evaded by officials resigning their posts. Rees 
then attempted to get the federal court to levy the tax itself. But the Supreme 
Court easily rejected the notion that a court order could levy taxes—a clear 
exercise of legislative authority.134 The Court then told the plaintiff that his 
proper remedy was a writ of mandamus against the town council, noting, 
laconically, that this was so notwithstanding that “it has been thus far 
unavailing, and the prospect of its future success is, perhaps, not flattering.”135 
Apparently recognizing that its approach to mandamus made a mockery of 
the writ if officials were willing to resign, the Court backed away from that part 
of Boutwell. It managed to do so first in Commissioners v. Sellew136 by ruling that 
the Boutwell principle did not apply when the writ was directed against a board 
rather than an individual officer. According to the Court, the county board in 
that case was a corporation with continuing existence. The opinion suggested 
that “[o]ne of the objects in creating such corporations, capable of suing and 
being sued, and having perpetual succession, is that the very inconvenience 
which manifested itself in Boutwell’s case may be avoided.”137 
 
130.  Id. at 607. 
131.  Id. at 609. 
132.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
133.  86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1873). 
134.  Id. at 116. 
135.  Id. at 117-18. 
136.  99 U.S. 624 (1878). 
137.  Id. at 627. 
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The Court carried this notion further in Thompson v. United States,138 
holding that the writ could be served notwithstanding a change of officials 
“where, as in this case, there is a continuing duty irrespective of the incumbent, 
and the proceeding is undertaken to enforce an obligation of the corporation or 
municipality to which the office is attached.”139 Although the Court claimed 
that this was analogous to the writ of mandamus against corporations, the 
defendant in Thompson was the clerk of an unincorporated township. Even so, 
the Court believed that the duty was the township’s, not the clerk’s. The Court 
suggested a more general retreat from the Boutwell approach when it said, “[i]f 
the resignation of the officer should involve an abatement, we would always 
have the unseemly spectacle of constant resignations and reappointments to 
avoid the effect of the suit.”140 
Elsewhere in its mandamus jurisprudence, the Court recognized that it was 
dealing with bureaus and offices, not just with statutes and officers. In United 
States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black,141 two separate plaintiffs sought mandamus 
against the Commissioner of Pensions. The first plaintiff was denied his writ 
on the straightforward ground that the Commissioner had simply “adopted an 
interpretation of the law adverse to the relator,”142 which, of course, meant that 
his discretion was not subject to control by mandamus. In the second case, 
however, the Commissioner’s adverse decision had been reversed on appeal to 
the Secretary of the Interior. When the Commissioner failed to comply with 
the Secretary’s decision and declined to issue a pension order, the Court viewed 
this as making out a prima facie case for a writ of mandamus. Principles of 
hierarchical control within departments limited the discretion an officer might 
otherwise exercise. In the Court’s words, “when a superior tribunal has 
rendered a decision binding on an inferior, it becomes the ministerial duty of 
the latter to obey it and carry it out.”143 
C. From Mandamus to Merits Review? 
It is but a short step, of course, from finding that the Secretary’s decisions 
are binding on subordinates to finding that departmental regulations or 
precedents are binding on the department. On this theory, one might expand 
 
138.  103 U.S. 480 (1880). 
139.  Id. at 483. 
140.  Id. at 484. 
141.  128 U.S. 40 (1888). 
142.  Id. at 48. 
143.  Id. at 52. 
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the reach of mandamus substantially by finding that prior departmental 
instructions, circulars, guidelines, practices, or precedents, until changed, 
bound the department as a whole, not just subordinate personnel. The 
“internal law” of administration would thus convert otherwise discretionary 
decisions into ministerial ones subject to judicial control. The Supreme Court 
of the District of Columbia seems to have attempted to exploit this progressive 
logic in a pair of cases involving international claims. 
United States ex rel. Angarica de la Rua v. Bayard144 involved a mandamus 
suit to force the Secretary of State to pay over interest on funds withheld from 
the plaintiff in connection with a claim against the Spanish government. Spain 
had sent payment via the Secretary of State, who decided to retain a portion of 
the award until it could recoup certain of its commission expenses from the 
Spanish government. The Secretary bought United States securities with the 
withheld portion of the award and sent a letter to the plaintiff saying, “[I]t is 
hoped that no great delay will incur in receiving the payment from Spain, 
which will liberate this reserve for expenses, and the Department will expect to 
keep this reserve invested in interest-bearing securities of the United States to 
cover the delay in the distribution to the claimants.”145 When the Secretary 
eventually paid over the funds, but without the interest, the plaintiff sued, 
claiming that the letter constituted a promise by the U.S. Government which 
eliminated the Secretary’s discretion to retain the interest. 
The Supreme Court for the District of Columbia agreed that a commitment 
by the United States of this sort would make the Secretary’s action ministerial 
and enforceable by mandamus. However, that court declined to find that the 
Secretary had made a binding promise to remit the interest. In addition to 
believing that the Secretary’s actions in the whole field of foreign relations were 
“political” and therefore not subject to judicial control, the court thought that 
the Secretary’s letter was a mere expression of intent or statement of policy, not 
a binding rule. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld that judgment, but on 
different grounds. In that Court’s view, the Secretary of State had no authority 
to bind the United States to the payment. Hence, whatever his intention, there 
was no binding contract and his successors’ discretion concerning how to deal 
with the matter remained.146 
Two years after its decision in Angarica, the Supreme Court for the District 
of Columbia carried its reasoning to the logical conclusion. United States ex rel. 
 
144.  15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 310 (1885). 
145.  The letter is quoted in the Supreme Court opinion in United States ex rel. Angarica de la Rua 
v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 255 (1888). 
146.  127 U.S. at 261. 
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White v. Bayard147 involved payments made pursuant to the decisions of a 
claims commission established to settle American citizens’ disputes with 
Mexico. The commission found that Mexico owed White a sum of money and 
some other beneficiaries assigned their claims to him as well. In accordance 
with that decision, Mexico began making periodic payments to White via the 
Secretary of State. Meanwhile one Richard Porter sued White claiming that he 
deserved some of the money that had been assigned to White. For nine years 
the Secretary of State ignored this dispute and paid over installments to White. 
When Secretary Bayard took office, however, he withheld the tenth installment 
pending some definitive resolution of the legal battle between White and 
Porter. White sought a writ of mandamus to force Bayard to release his money. 
The Supreme Court for the District of Columbia issued the writ, reasoning 
that the Secretary of State had a clear statutory duty to forward payments from 
the government of Mexico to claimants who had received awards from the 
commission. This, of course, hardly answered the question of whether the 
Secretary could suspend payments pending the outcome of the legal battle 
between White and other claimants. But the Supreme Court for the District of 
Columbia found that the Department of State had previously recognized White 
as the assignee of the disputed claim after full argument and hearing. These 
past departmental decisions created a strong presumption against Secretary 
Bayard’s change of policy. The court admitted that Bayard might change the 
Department’s practice, if he had a legitimate reason. But, the simple fact that 
there was now a legal dispute between Porter and White could not be 
considered as the equivalent of a denial that White was the proper assignee of 
the claims. Given the Department’s prior decision in White’s favor, and its 
practice of paying him the first nine installments, the Secretary was considered 
as no longer having discretion to withhold further payments. 
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to follow the District of Columbia 
Supreme Court down this road toward substantive review of administrative 
discretion based on the Department’s prior decisions and practices.148 The 
Court held that the Secretary “was not bound to decide between such 
conflicting claims, after he had notice of them.”149 Moreover, it hypothesized 
that the Secretary’s decision might ultimately be different from that of the 
court that was hearing the Porter-White lawsuit. From the Supreme Court’s 
perspective, the mere notice of this dispute between Porter and White rendered 
White’s right to the money no longer clear and indisputable and thus made a 
 
147.  16 D.C. (5 Mackey) 428 (1887). 
148.  Bayard v. United States ex rel. White, 127 U.S. 246 (1888). 
149.  Id. at 250. 
MASHAW_PRESS_V1WEB.DOC 5/10/2010 2:40:30 PM 
federal administration and administrative law in the gilded age 
1407 
 
mandamus order inappropriate. The Supreme Court did not even discuss the 
lower court’s suggestion that the Secretary’s prior determination after notice 
and hearing made it incumbent upon him either to make a similarly formal 
finding that White was not the proper assignee or to continue making the 
payments. 
D. The Rigors of Indirect Review 
Although the Supreme Court rejected expansion of the scope of judicial 
review in actions for mandamus or injunction, indirect challenges suffered a 
quite different fate. Where the legality of official action came before the courts 
in common law actions between private parties, judicial review switched from 
extremely limited to de novo determination of both law and fact. This was true 
even if the common law action was against an officer for damages resulting 
from the officer’s conduct in the line of duty. The general principal was stated 
simply in Rogers v. Marshal150: “[O]fficers of the law, in the execution of 
process, are obliged to know the requirements of the law, and if they mistake 
them, whether through ignorance or design, and any one is harmed by their 
error, they must respond in damages.”151 Moreover, in these damage actions, 
the existence or nonexistence of administrative discretion played an opposite 
role from the one it played in mandamus or injunction cases. 
Buck v. Colbath152 provides perhaps the most apt discussion. There, a 
marshal was sued for trespass after seizing certain goods pursuant to a writ of 
attachment. According to the plaintiff, he seized goods that were not owned by 
the party against whom the writ had been issued. The marshal defended by 
asserting that he was merely following the court’s orders under the writ. The 
Supreme Court, however, distinguished between two types of writs of 
attachment. In one, the process or order by the court described in detail the 
property to be seized. In the other, the writ simply directed the officer to levy 
on property of one of the parties to the litigation sufficient to satisfy the 
demand against him. Under the first type of writ, the officer had no discretion. 
Hence, if the court validly ordered the process and the officer followed it he 
had an absolute defense to personal liability. On the other hand, in the second 
category of cases, like the one here, the officer had “a very large and important 
field for the exercise of his judgment and discretion.”153 He was, therefore, 
 
150.  68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644 (1863). 
151.  Id. at 650-51. 
152.  70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865). 
153.  Id. at 344. 
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“bound to exercise his own judgment, and is legally responsible to any person 
for the consequences of any error or mistake in its exercise to his prejudice.”154 
In short, however erroneous an officer’s determination, if he had discretion in 
its exercise, his actions could not be controlled by mandamus or injunction. On 
the other hand, when sued in damages, an officer exercising discretion was 
liable if he made an error. Whether error existed was for de novo 
determination by the court trying the damages action. 
Patent litigation and land cases responded to similar principles, although in 
the latter a division of responsibility began to emerge between court and 
agency, somewhat along the lines of the appellate model’s law-fact distinction. 
As we have seen, neither mandamus nor injunction could be used to control a 
land officer’s discretion with respect to the issuance of patents, the validation 
or cancellation of entries onto public lands, or the like. However, once the Land 
Office had acted, litigation between adverse claimants for the same tract could 
put at issue the validity of administrative determinations. Defendants in these 
proceedings often attempted to set up the Land Office decisions as conclusive, 
and early cases often treated them as such, provided the court found that the 
Land Office had jurisdiction over the property.155 Equity jurisdiction, however, 
began to break down this pattern. Moreover, instead of moving from limited 
review, confined to the question of jurisdiction, to de novo review of law and 
fact, the Supreme Court articulated a new division of function between court 
and agency. 
Lindsey v. Hawes156 is a good example. The Land Office had granted a 
patent for a particular parcel to Hawes which the plaintiff sought to have set 
aside. Hawes argued that the action of the Land Office, as a coordinate tribunal 
with jurisdiction, was conclusive. The Supreme Court disagreed. The plaintiffs 
had not been parties to the proceeding by which Hawes obtained his patent. 
Where several parties were affected by an adjudication between a single party 
and the government, the Supreme Court believed it only right that those 
affected might later challenge the findings of the administrative adjudication in 
a court of equity. The Court then held for the plaintiff on the ground that the 
Land Office interpretation of the land statutes was incorrect and Hawes’s 
patent was therefore invalid.157 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action: A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 197, 216-19 (1991). 
156.  67 U.S. (2 Black) 554 (1862). 
157.  Id. at 563. 
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Johnson v. Towsley158 is to the same effect, but provides a much more 
thorough discussion of the role of courts of equity in reviewing Land Office 
determinations. Moreover, in Johnson v. Towsley there were no missing parties 
when the Land Office made its determination. The local Register and Receiver 
of Public Lands had awarded the patent to Towsley over Johnson’s objections 
and that decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Land Office. The 
Secretary of the Interior overruled the Commissioner and granted the patent to 
Johnson instead. 
Before the courts, Johnson argued that the Secretary’s decision and delivery 
of the patent were “conclusive of the rights of the parties not only in the land 
department, but in the courts and everywhere else.”159 The Supreme Court 
agreed that it was “general doctrine that when the law has confided to a special 
tribunal the authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the 
course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope of its 
authority, is conclusive upon all others.”160 Nevertheless, the Court said “there 
has always existed in the courts of equity the power in certain classes of cases to 
inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice, and wrong in both judicial and 
executive action . . . when it invades private rights.”161 
The Supreme Court went on to discuss functional reasons for the existence 
of this power in the courts of equity. It noted that Land Office proceedings 
were susceptible to the influence of fraud, perjury, and mistake. Moreover, if 
there were no such power in the courts of equity, private rights might be at the 
sufferance of the executive branch, which might recall a patent long after 
granting it. And without equity court involvement, there would be no way of 
resolving situations in which the executive seemed to have granted conflicting 
patents to the same parcel.162 
Johnson complained that in prior cases courts of equity had refused to 
accept the Land Office determination as final only if there had been some 
element of fraud or mistake. The Court acknowledged that there needed to be 
some special ground for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.163 But it refused 
to accept the proposition that when the officers “by misconstruction of the law, 
 
158.  80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72 (1871). 
159.  Id. at 81. 
160.  Id. at 83. 
161.  Id. at 84. 
162.  Id. at 84-85. 
163.  Id. at 86. 
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take from a party that to which he has acquired a legal right under the sanction 
of those laws, the courts are without power to give any relief.”164 
Johnson v. Towsley thus seemed to set up a division of labor between the 
Land Office and the courts. Land Office determinations were generally 
conclusive, but could be upset by a court of equity when the Land Office had 
made a mistake of law. Later cases affirmed and refined, but also limited, this 
principle. In Marquez v. Frisbie,165 the plaintiff had alleged that the Land Office 
had made a mistake of law. But, even so, the Court declined to review the 
decision. As the Court explained, “where there is a mixed question of law and 
of fact, and the court cannot so separate it as to see clearly where the mistake of 
law is, the decision of the tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is 
conclusive.”166 In short, the courts would give relief only “if it can be made 
entirely plain . . . that on facts about which there is no dispute, or no 
reasonable doubt, those officers have, by a mistake of the law, deprived a man 
of his right.”167 
We thus begin to see in some of the land cases the emergence of the idea 
that there is a division of responsibility between reviewing courts and 
administrative agencies. Judgments about the facts and the application of law 
to fact are for the agency; pure questions of law can be determined 
independently by the courts. Note, however, that these intimations of the 
emergence of the “appellate model” of judicial review are in cases between 
private parties contesting titles to real property. The form of the action is 
crucial, because it implicates a constitutional separation-of-powers question: 
whether private rights between private parties can be finally adjudicated by 
administrative adjudicators.168 And that, of course, is a question that bedeviled 
 
164.  Id. 
165.  101 U.S. 473 (1879). 
166.  Id. at 476. 
167.  Id. The plaintiff also asserted that there was fraud, but the Court found that the plaintiff was 
merely trying to “stigmatize acts which are adverse to the plaintiff’s view of his own rights” 
and was not alleging any actual fraud. Id. at 478. 
168.  For the view that the divergent practices of nineteenth-century courts hinge crucially on the 
understanding of the concept of “public rights” in that period, see Caleb Nelson, 
Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007). 
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the Supreme Court well into the late twentieth century169 and still has no truly 
satisfactory resolution.170 
These cases, therefore, were limited inroads on the dominant bipolar model 
of judicial review—de novo review or nothing. I can only speculate concerning 
the reasons that impelled courts to provide somewhat broader review of 
administrative action in land cases. One possibility is suggested by the general 
history of common law property litigation. For centuries, land disputes had 
been the bread and butter of common law adjudication. The notion that courts 
were powerless to intervene to correct obvious errors of law whenever title 
related back to a decision concerning a public land grant was a legal anomaly 
that could not be sustained.171 A second, more focused, possibility is that the 
specific history of fraud, perjury, and corruption in public lands transactions172 
led the courts first to allow investigation of those types of claims and then to 
make the next logical step to permit review of clear legal error. Whatever the 
background causes, this form of review remained limited to public lands 
disputes until the origins of the practice were forgotten or purposefully 
ignored. 
According to Louis Jaffe’s standard account,173 the law-fact distinction 
morphed into something like a general presumption of the reviewability of 
administrative action for legal error in the 1902 case American School of Magnetic 
Healing v. McAnnulty.174 With sweeping language that seemed to reject 
virtually the whole of the mandamus and injunction jurisprudence of the 
nineteenth century, the Court said: “The acts of all . . . officers must be 
justified by some law, and in case an official violates the law to the injury of an 
 
169.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (holding that 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could decide a limited class of private rights 
claims). 
170.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). 
171.  Land Office decisions were probably the most common subject of judicial review 
proceedings in the federal courts during the second half of the nineteenth century. Justice, 
then Professor, Scalia, in 1970, described the proceedings as having reached “habeas corpus 
proportions.” Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 
884 (1970). 
172.  For an extended treatment of the difficulties in surveying and selling the public lands, 
including the adjudication of thousands of private claims, see Mashaw, Reluctant 
Nationalists, supra note 9, at 1696-1734. 
173.  LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327-53 (1965). 
174.  187 U.S. 94 (1902). 
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individual the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.”175 To be sure, 
the barriers to direct judicial review did not fall all at once,176 but the seeds of 
that collapse were sown in the late nineteenth-century Land Office cases. 
Justice Peckham in McAnnulty cited only three cases for the proposition that 
errors of law were generally reviewable. They were all public lands cases.177 
Justice Peckham did not mention, of course, that those cases, unlike 
McAnnulty, were all proceedings within the federal court’s equity jurisdiction 
in contests between private parties concerning public lands. Thus by selective 
myopia does the law of judicial review of administrative action continue to 
develop.178 
i i i .  administrative adjudication and the “internal law” of 
administration 
A study of administrative adjudication in the second half of the nineteenth 
century reveals a legal world that is, to the contemporary legal imagination, 
both familiar and strange—familiar in the structure of adjudicatory institutions 
and procedures, but strange in the sources of that familiarity. The structures 
and processes of administrative adjudication were designed and built almost 
entirely by the administrative agencies themselves. Judicial requirements of 
constitutional due process were nonexistent, and statutes providing 
adjudicatory jurisdiction almost never specified either internal agency 
structures or required adjudicatory processes. Yet, as we shall see, a robust 
common law of adjudication—both substantive and procedural—grew up 
 
175.  Id. at 108. And this was in a case directly reviewing the legality of a fraud order by the Post 
Office Department. 
176.  See JAFFE, supra note 173; Merrill, supra note 53. Moreover, judicial review remained highly 
deferential. According to Reuel E. Schiller,  
By the 1920s, courts consistently deferred to agency actions with respect to public 
health, customs and postal regulations, the administration of veterans’ pensions, 
and various licensing regimes. The same was true of the actions of taxing 
agencies, the Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Land Office, and the 
Bureau of Immigration.  
Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 408 (2007) (internal footnotes omitted). 
177.  187 U.S. at 108 (citing Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U.S. 362 (1901); Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 
93, 99 (1898); and Burfenning v. Chi. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 321 (1896)). 
178.  My personal favorite modern example of this is Justice Douglas’s startling and ahistorical 
reading of the standing provisions of the APA in Association of Data Processing Organizations 
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For a recent detailed account see Elizabeth Magill, Standing for 
the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131 (2009). 
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within administration as agencies struggled to manage their adjudicatory 
caseload, unify decisions across multiple deciders, develop reliable evidentiary 
bases for decisionmaking, and provide fair opportunities for contest by 
interested parties. 
This “internal law” of administration was significant both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. While we are prone to imagining that mass administrative 
adjudication is a feature of the second half of the twentieth century, the Bureau 
of Pensions was deciding hundreds of thousands of cases in the immediate 
postwar years, and it continued to do so for decades as Congress repeatedly 
amended and expanded military pension eligibility. The Land Office, the 
Patent Office, the Court of Claims, the Controllers Office of the Treasury, and 
the Post Office decided tens of thousands more. 
These were not trivial cases. Land was still the greatest source of wealth, 
even as industrial capital, often protected by invention patents, was striving for 
dominance. Decisions by the Land and Patent Offices were both, therefore, 
economically consequential, as were the decisions of the Pension Office. 
Although pension amounts were small, a remarkable proportion of Northern 
families depended upon military pensions for a part of their livelihood.179 
Finally, a fraud order by the Post Office often simply ended a firm’s capacity to 
do business. Yet, virtually none of those adjudicatory actions were subject to 
judicial review, detailed statutory constraints, or systematic political oversight. 
As noted previously, I will portray the nineteenth-century model of 
administrative adjudication through two case studies: pension adjudication at 
the Bureau of Pensions and regulation of pornography, lotteries, and fraud by 
the Post Office. But before beginning those more specific inquiries, we should 
seek to understand the general contours of this legal world of mass 
adjudication and internal administrative law by viewing it through the eyes of a 
contemporary observer. Happily for us, an acute observer is available, one who 
seems to have originated the now largely forgotten category of “internal 
administrative law.” 
A. The General Contours of Agency Adjudication 
In 1903, Bruce Wyman published The Principles of the Administrative Law 
Governing the Relations of Public Officers. His book was the first attempt to 
systematize American administrative law at the national level. More 
 
179.  By 1893, for example, the number of pensioners had reached one million, and pension 
expenditures consumed forty-two percent of the federal government’s income. Peter Blanck, 
Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 126 (2001). 
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importantly, for purposes of this discussion, Wyman distinguished sharply 
between what he called the “external” and the “internal” laws of 
administration. According to Wyman, the external law—legislation and 
common law—regulates the relationship between citizens and officials. The 
internal law—agency or executive rules, orders, guidelines, and precedents—
arranges the relations between or among public officers and structures their 
activities.180 
Like the cases on judicial review rehearsed in Part II, Wyman viewed these 
spheres as connected, but largely distinct. When a citizen sues for damages 
pursuant to the common law, he or she is entitled to recover unless the officer 
acted in accordance with his or her statutory mandate. On the other hand, 
courts have no warrant to interfere with administration by prerogative writ 
(principally mandamus or injunction) so long as officers act within their 
jurisdiction and comply with the internal law of administration laid down by 
superiors who have discretionary authority to direct their activities.181 Indeed, 
Wyman was so insistent upon this separation—one that immunizes 
administrative discretion from judicial interference—that he argued that 
statutes providing appellate judicial jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of 
administrative discretion should be held unconstitutional.182 
True to the premise that external administrative law was relatively limited, 
Wyman’s treatise is devoted in large part to the elucidation of internal law, the 
actions, regulations, and decisions of administrators when performing their 
administrative functions: execution, legislation, and adjudication. Moreover, 
Wyman devotes nearly half of his book to our current subject. His appendices 
reprint statutes, regulations, and manuals relating to administrative 
adjudication concerning military pensions, claims against the United States, 
customs disputes, patent cases, cases before the land offices, and complaints 
concerning the administration of the internal revenue laws. Wyman recognizes 
that he is breaking new ground here, although he puts the matter rather 
delicately: 
 
180.  WYMAN, supra note 44, at 1-23. 
181.  Id. at 4-8. 
182.  Id. at 75-85 (discussing United States v. Duell ex rel. Bernardin, 172 U.S. 576 (1899); United 
States v. Richie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525 (1854); and United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 40 (1851)). Wyman approves of the decisions in Ferreira and Richie, which construe 
congressional appeal statutes to avoid the unconstitutional conferral of judicial power to 
review administrative discretion, and condemns Duell, which upholds the patent statute 
permitting appeals of patent decisions to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. 
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It is still the doctrine that all controversies must be decided in the 
judicial courts; which must be so, it is said, because the theory of the 
law of the land involves the supremacy of the ordinary judicial 
tribunals. In the face of such theories, the jurisdiction of the 
administration to determine its own controversies has been established 
to an extent not often appreciated.183 
As noted above, the offices and bureaus that populate Wyman’s appendices 
were deciding tens of thousands of cases every year, many of them with 
complete finality. 
Wyman goes on to discuss a host of cases to illustrate the basic point that 
the allocation of jurisdiction to administrators to determine controversies is 
simply a function of legislative design and the internal arrangements made by 
the administration for adjudicating disputes.184 Moreover, while the external 
law of administration governs the administrators’ jurisdiction to decide, in 
Wyman’s view the procedures for determining administrative controversies are 
a function of the internal law.185 Here again, Wyman reflects the due process 
doctrine of his times. Once it was determined that judicial process was not 
demanded by the Constitution and that the Administrator was following 
whatever procedures were required by statute, the due process inquiry was 
virtually at an end.186 The question of whether the private party had received 
due process and the question of whether the decision sought to be reviewed 
could be decided by administrative adjudication consistent with Article III were 
essentially the same question. As Wyman’s treatise and subsequent 
scholarship187 reveal, the Article III question that exercised the legal mind at the 
close of the nineteenth century was not whether administrative jurisdiction 
invaded judicial prerogatives, but whether the judiciary could, consistent with 
the Constitution, be given jurisdiction to hear appeals from adjudications 
statutorily allocated to the administrative process. 
While we will here be concerned largely with the processes and activities of 
two offices, Wyman’s appendices reveal remarkably consistent approaches to 
administrative adjudication across a range of different types of controversies. 
This commonality may have been facilitated by the common departmental 
 
183.  Id. at 321. 
184.  Id. at 320-41. 
185.  Id. at 342. 
186.  See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1855); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). 
187.  See Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1679-81; Merrill, supra note 
53, at 53-55. 
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home for three of the major adjudicatory agencies, the Patent, Land, and 
Pension Offices. But similarity of approach was not limited to these three, and 
in many respects these offices functioned quite independently of Interior 
Department oversight and control.188 
In virtually all cases, the administration specified how claims or protests 
were to be presented, what evidence should be submitted and in what form, 
who had initial authority to make determinations, to whom appeals might be 
directed, time limits for filing claims and appeals, and so on. Intermediate 
appeals in high-volume cases were often to special boards or commissions that 
performed only adjudicatory functions. Some decisionmakers’ independence 
was protected by statutory “for cause” removal requirements and limitations 
on the number of members of the multimember board who could be appointed 
from the same political party.189 
Variation existed, of course, as procedures were tailored to different 
adjudicatory functions. Procedure in adversarial cases, such as patent 
interference claims or mutually exclusive claims to public lands, tended to be 
more formal, with greater attention to matters such as the sufficiency of notice, 
or the avoidance of ex parte presentation of evidence. And, as my case studies 
of pension claims and Post Office regulation will reveal, adjudicatory systems 
were built and administered to facilitate the policies and accommodate the 
politics that provided the substance of and contextual environment for radically 
different government programs. But, apart from the very limited judicial 
review provided, the modern administrative lawyer would find little surprising 
in the administrative adjudicatory processes utilized in the late nineteenth 
century. 
In addition to the statutes themselves, substantive adjudicatory norms were 
provided by agency regulations, manuals, guidelines and instructions, and to 
some degree, opinions of the Attorney General and judicial decisions. 
Increasingly, however, departments and agencies built up bodies of internal 
doctrine and precedents and made them available to all interested parties. 
Between 1868 and 1887, the government began publishing adjudicatory 
decisions of the Treasury (under the customs laws), the Patent Office, the 
 
188.  See WHITE, supra note 73, at 175-81 (ascribing this independence to the support of strong 
networks of politically influential private interests). 
189.  See, e.g., Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136. This statute established a nine-
member board of general appraisers in the customs service of the Treasury Department. The 
members were appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. They served 
without a specified term and could be removed only for cause. 
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Solicitor of the Post Office, the First Comptroller, the Land Office, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Pension Office.190 
The recognition that these adjudicatory functions created law gave impetus 
to the recognition that specialized tasks required specialized administrators. As 
one of the officials of the Land Office put it, those determining land disputes 
needed to be “able men of legal education and mature judgment.”191 At the 
Land Office an appellate Board of Law Review was created in 1881, and staffed 
by the Commissioner of the Land Office and two legal assistants.192 As 
demonstrated in my case studies, the regularization of procedural and 
substantive adjudicatory norms often went hand in hand with the 
specialization and professionalization of administrative offices. Quite often this 
“bureaucratization,” in the Weberian “rule of law” sense, antedated the 
Pendleton Act. Whatever was happening elsewhere in the governmental 
service, adjudicatory functions were recognized as requiring specialized skills, 
functional differentiation of personnel, and protection from the politics of 
patronage. 
B. The Case of Military Pensions 
The provision of veterans’ pensions is one of the oldest functions of 
national government in the United States. As its title indicated, the first 
pension statute adopted under the 1787 Constitution merely amended and 
carried forward policies that had begun in the Confederation.193 Every war, and 
many periods of peace, brought forth new pension legislation covering new 
classes of beneficiaries. 
1. The Rise and Rise of Military Pensions 
The Civil War and the postbellum periods were exceptional, perhaps, only 
in the enormous increase in coverage, expenditures, and work for the Pension 
Office.194 Beginning in 1862,195 Congress passed pension legislation in every 
 
190.  See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 124-25 
(1982). 
191.  WHITE, supra note 73, at 203 (quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE 
GENERAL LAND OFFICE 11 (1880)). 
192.  INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND 
ORGANIZATION 29 (1923). 
193.  Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. 
194.  The Pension Office had been given important legislative status in 1833 with the creation of 
the Office of Commissioner of Pensions in the War Department. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 54, 
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Congress and often in every year. As an unpublished paper puts the matter, 
pension legislation had a “simple pattern: more money for more veterans over 
time.”196 For example, under the 1862 statute, eligibility extended to “any 
officer, noncommissioned officer, musician, or private of the army, including 
regulars, volunteers, and militia, or any officer, warrant, or petty officer, 
musician, seaman, ordinary seaman, flotilla-man, marine, clerk, landsman, 
pilot, or other person in the navy or marine corps.”197 By 1873, others had been 
discovered who warranted benefits. In addition to those listed in the 1862 Act, 
the 1873 Consolidation Act included: 
[A]ny enlisted man, however employed, in the military or naval service 
of the United States, or in its marine corps, whether regularly mustered 
or not . . . any pilot, engineer, sailor, or other person not regularly 
mustered, serving upon any gunboat or war-vessel of the . . . United 
States . . . any person not an enlisted soldier in the army, serving for the 
time being as a member of the militia under any State under orders of 
an officer of the United States, or who volunteered for the time being to 
serve with any regularly organized military or naval force of the United 
States, or who otherwise volunteered and rendered service in any 
engagement with rebels or Indians . . . any acting assistant or contract 
surgeon . . . or any provost-marshal, deputy provost-marshal or 
enrolling officer . . . .198 
And while the 1862 Act had included widows, minor children, dependent 
mothers, and dependent sisters as eligible to receive benefits because of the 
death of a serviceman, the 1873 Act broadened this category to include 
dependent fathers and brothers as well.199 
Every amendment or extension of eligibility brought a raft of new 
applications, and reapplications by existing beneficiaries whose benefits had 
been enhanced. For example, an 1871 statute made veterans of the War of 1812 
 
4 Stat. 619, 622. That Office was periodically continued for two-year terms in 
appropriations legislation, until made permanent in 1849 and relocated in the Interior 
Department. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395. 
195.  An Act To Grant Pensions, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566 (1862). 
196.  Claudia Linares, The Civil War Pension Law 2 (Univ. of Chi. Ctr. for Population Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2001-6, 2001). The standard treatment of the political and social origins 
of the post-Civil War military pension system is THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS 
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992). 
197.  An Act To Grant Pensions, 12 Stat. at 566. 
198.  Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, 17 Stat. 566, 566-67. 
199.  Id. at 570. 
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and their dependents eligible for pensions without proof of disability. From the 
time this legislation took effect in February 1871, to October 1, 1872, the 
Pension Office received more than twenty thousand new claims, a remarkable 
number for a war that had been over for nearly sixty years.200 Congress was 
still liberalizing the 1812 pension system as late as 1886.201 
But this caseload was nothing compared to that spurred by Civil War 
pension legislation. Should the burden of claims processing decrease, Congress 
could almost always be counted upon to provide the Pension Office with more 
business. Prior to 1879, for example, benefits were payable from the date of a 
soldier’s death or discharge from duty provided that the application was filed 
within five years of the relevant date. Applications filed after that five-year 
window were payable only from the date of a completed application.202 A 
successful lobbying effort by pension agents and attorneys203 produced the 
removal of the five-year window restriction.204 Applications flooded in. The so-
called “Arrears” statute had dramatic effects. Between 1874 and 1878, the 
Pension Office adjudicated between 30,000 and 45,000 claims a year, and 
provided benefits to about 230,000 persons at an expenditure of roughly thirty 
million dollars. In 1880, the office adjudicated 50,000 new claims, and by 1883 
the number exceeded 100,000. This was mass administrative adjudication, 
which would require serious managerial effort for years to come. 
An even greater liberalization of the pension statutes occurred just as the 
period under discussion closed. After years of rancorous debate, a massive 
lobbying campaign, and an initial veto by President Grover Cleveland (which 
may have cost him a second consecutive term),205 newly elected President 
Benjamin Harrison signed legislation in 1890 that eliminated the requirement 
that pensions be based on a service-connected disability.206 Section 2 of that 
Act provided that all persons who had served ninety days during the Civil War 
were honorably discharged and “who are now or who may hereafter be 
suffering from a mental or physical disability of a permanent character, not the 
result of their own vicious habits” were entitled to a pension. Existing 
 
200.  WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 113 (1918). 
201.  Act of Mar. 19, 1886, ch. 22, 24 Stat. 5. 
202.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1873, § 15, 17 Stat. at 572; Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 264, § 6, 15 Stat. 235, 236. 
203.  GLASSON, supra note 200, at 165-66. 
204.  Act of Jan. 25, 1879, ch. 23, § 3, 20 Stat. 265, 265. 
205.  President Cleveland’s unpopularity with the Grand Army of the Republic, the chief 
lobbying group for increased pension coverage and rates, is often credited with causing his 
defeat by Benjamin Harrison in the 1888 election. STUART MCCONNELL, GLORIOUS 
CONTENTMENT: THE GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC, 1865-1900, at 149 (1992). 
206.  Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, 26 Stat. 182. 
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beneficiaries with service-connected disabilities were not disqualified from 
receiving these additional pensions. Moreover, because the test for disability 
related only to incapacity to perform manual labor, beneficiaries were not 
required to be out of the labor market. As one early scholar and sometime critic 
of the pension legislation put it, “[p]ensions were provided for the highly paid 
but rheumatic lawyer, for the prosperous business man hurt in a street 
accident, for the ex-soldier public official with heart disease, and for the 
mechanic who had lost a hand in an industrial accident.”207 Once again, the 
response was enthusiastic. Whereas in 1890 the Pension Office was paying a 
little over 500,000 pensioners a total of $73 million per year, by 1900, the 
pension rolls had reached nearly one million and annual expenditures had also 
doubled. 
2. Making Pension Policy 
Managing claims adjudication entailed more than deciding cases. The 
Pension Office was required to make policy as well. Congress often left major 
gaps in the pension legislation and, even when statutes were relatively specific, 
failed to anticipate problems that arose in administration. 
The 1862 statute that began the Civil War pension system, for example, 
provided that pensions were available to Army or Navy servicemen who were 
disabled “by reason of any wound received or disease contracted while in the 
service of the United States and in the line of duty.”208 Benefits were provided 
according to rank but were to be rated in accordance with the severity of the 
disability suffered. Note, however, that the statute did not say disabled for 
what or how ratings were to be determined. The Pension Office was left to 
interpret the meaning of disability and to provide some uniform system for 
relating specific injuries to levels of compensation. Commissioner Joseph H. 
Barrett reported to Congress in 1864: 
While the Act of July 14, 1862, does not distinctly state that the 
disability to be taken into account is that for procuring a subsistence by 
manual labor, such has been the construction of its meaning . . . . In 
estimating the degree, reference is not had to the particular 
employment of the applicant before entering the service, but to his 
capacity for manual labor of any kind. The loss of a limb, or of its 
extremity, has always been rated as a total disability; and the other 
 
207.  GLASSON, supra note 200, at 236. 
208.  An Act To Grant Pensions, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566, 566 (1862). 
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effects of wounds have been estimated proportionably, as nearly as may 
be.209 
In short, the Commissioner was left to determine, apparently based on 
practice under prior pension laws, a host of substantive questions: that 
disability meant work disability and that work meant manual labor; that 
disability was to be gauged in relation to employment in the general economy, 
not in terms of the applicant’s preservice or postservice vocation; and that a 
baseline of total disability would be established in relation to specific losses. 
Proportionate awards would then be made on the basis of whether particular 
injuries had equivalent or lesser effects in relation to that baseline standard. 
In “procedural” sections of the Act, Congress was hardly any more 
definitive. With respect to the adjudicatory process, Congress stated 
delphically that applicants were entitled to a pension “upon making due  
proof . . . according to such forms and regulations as are or may be provided by 
or in pursuance of law.”210 “[I]n the line of duty” was undefined and would 
become a constant source of controversy.211 And while the statute empowered 
the Commissioner to appoint civil surgeons to examine applicants and to 
reexamine beneficiaries to determine whether their disabilities continued, 
Congress had nothing to say about who these civil surgeons might be and how 
they might be integrated into the adjudicatory process. 
Over time, Congress responded to some of these issues. For example, in 
1866, it established three grades of disability,212 each of which, or its 
equivalent, entitled the claimant to a particular dollar amount of compensation. 
But Congress left in effect the 1862 Act which had made payments based on 
rank and on total disability. Thus, under the 1866 legislation, a private who 
was presumably entitled to eight dollars per month for total disability under 
the 1862 statute could obtain a payment of fifteen dollars per month for a 
 
209.  H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-1, at 657-58 (1864). 
210.  An Act To Grant Pensions, 12 Stat. at 566. 
211.  See infra notes 276-287 and accompanying text. 
212.  Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, 14 Stat. 56. The first included those who had lost both hands or 
both eyes or who were “otherwise so permanently and totally disabled as to render them 
utterly helpless, or so nearly so as to require the constant personal aid and attendance of 
another person.” Id. at 56. A second grade of disability included loss of both feet or one hand 
and one foot or claimants who were “otherwise so disabled as to be incapacitated for 
performing any manual labor, but not so much so as to require constant personal aid and 
attention.” Id. And finally, there was a third grade of disability which included loss of one 
hand or one foot and claimants who were “otherwise so disabled as to render their inability 
to perform manual labor equivalent to the loss of a hand or a foot.” Id. 
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disability that was merely equivalent to the loss of one hand or one foot.213 Nor 
did Congress provide any guidance on what “equivalence” might mean under 
any of the three grades of disability provided in the 1866 legislation. Examples 
need not be added. Notwithstanding Congress’s more than lively interest in 
veterans’ pensions, much concerning both the construction of an appropriate 
adjudicatory process and the development of substantive and evidentiary 
policies would be left to Pension Office discretion. 
3. Processes of Pension Adjudication 
By the time of the Civil War, adjudication of military pension claims had 
long since abandoned its early practice of using federal judges as 
“commissioners” to make a factual record214 in favor of a wholly administrative 
adjudicatory system. Postbellum claims processes evolved in response to new 
legislation and new information gained in the process of adjudicating claims. 
But the basic structure of operations was relatively straightforward.215 Three 
questions had to be answered. First, had the applicant been attached to the 
Army or Navy in one of the capacities that was pensionable under the relevant 
legislation? Second (prior to 1890), was the applicant under a disability that 
was the result of an injury or illness incurred in the line of duty? And, finally, 
did the disability resulting from that injury or illness qualify the applicant for a 
pension, and at what level? 
According to Robert Sewell’s 1865 treatise,216 the serviceman applying for 
benefits was to execute, before a court (or an official authorized to administer 
oaths), a declaration witnessed by two parties attesting to his identity, the fact 
of service and injury, and his current residence and occupation. Sewell goes on 
to describe in great detail an ideal application with a number of highly 
technical requirements that would aid in a favorable outcome. 
When a claim arrived in the Pension Office, it was forwarded to an 
examiner in one of the geographically organized adjudicating divisions, who 
determined whether the applicant’s declaration and accompanying evidence 
 
213.  See GLASSON, supra note 200, at 129-31. 
214.  See Mashaw, Recovering, supra note 9, at 1332-33. 
215.  This description is based upon Instructions and Forms To Be Observed in Applying for Pensions 
Under the Act of July 14, 1862, reprinted in ROBERT SEWELL, PRACTICE IN THE EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE PENSION, BOUNTY, AND PRIZE LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 260 (1865). Accord CALVIN B. WALKER, TREATISE ON PRACTICE OF PENSION 
BUREAU, GOVERNING ADJUDICATION OF ARMY AND NAVY PENSIONS, BEING UNWRITTEN 
PRACTICE FORMULATED (1882). 
216.  SEWELL, supra note 215, at 81-119. 
MASHAW_PRESS_V1WEB.DOC 5/10/2010 2:40:30 PM 
federal administration and administrative law in the gilded age 
1423 
 
stated a prima facie case for a pension. If so, the examiner then requested a 
service record from the Adjutant General of the Army and any available medical 
records from the Army’s Surgeon General. He also ordered a civil surgeon’s 
examination from one of the surgeons who had been approved for making 
such examinations by the Pension Office. The Pension Office treated the 
Adjutant General’s report as conclusive concerning dates and facts of 
enlistment, service, and discharge; the Surgeon General’s medical records were 
also treated as presumptively correct, but could be rebutted by other evidence. 
Civil surgeons’ reports were also entitled to deference by the examiner. The 
medical evidence might also include a report by a three-person Board of 
Surgeons, which was available to the claimant if the initial civil surgeon’s or 
Surgeon General’s reports were unfavorable. After 1883, virtually all 
examinations were done by a three-person medical board in the first instance 
and the review board process was retained only for those cases initially 
examined by a single physician. 
Having collected this information, the examiner then forwarded a brief 
recommending either acceptance or rejection to his division chief. According to 
a second treatise penned by Deputy Commissioner Walker, the examiner was 
to be 
careful to bear in mind that he is in charge at the same time of both the 
interest of the claimant and the government, and does not look upon 
every case with suspicion, regarding himself as the agent of the 
Government to protect it alone, or on the other hand, consider himself 
a special agent of the claimant, striving if possible to make out a 
claim.217 
Here lie the roots of the “three-hat” inquisitorial process that the Supreme 
Court approved for Social Security disability claims 106 years later.218 
The initial examiner’s brief and the evidence was passed on to the Board of 
Review. Although the examiner’s determination was not final until approved 
by the Board, the latter was instructed to defer to the factual determinations of 
the initial examiner.219 At this point, however, the case was not over. If satisfied 
 
217.  WALKER, supra note 215, at 44. 
218.  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
219.  Comm’r of Pensions, Order No. 59 (Aug. 20, 1881), reprinted in FRANK B. CURTIS & WILLIAM 
H. WEBSTER, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF 
ARMY AND NAVY PENSIONS AND BOUNTY-LAND WARRANTS; DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF 
THE INTERIOR, AND RULINGS AND ORDERS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS THEREUNDER 
350, 350 (1885) (“Matters of fact . . . as well as the ascertainment of the character and 
reliability of testimony and credibility of witnesses, are questions solely for the adjudicating 
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with the legal sufficiency of the claim, the Board of Review would pass the file 
on to the Medical Referee (an office created in 1873), where individual medical 
reviewers fixed the amount to which the claimant was entitled by reason of his 
disability. Here, again, the medical examiner was to treat the opinion of the 
examining civil surgeon(s) or Surgeon General with deference. If the Board of 
Review made a finding adverse to the claimant, he was entitled to take an 
appeal to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Indeed, if at any point the 
examiners or medical personnel found a claim defective, the claimant was 
invited to submit additional information that might support an award. 
Although this process was based almost exclusively on paper records and 
sworn affidavits, it favored claimants. Information provided to the Pension 
Bureau came mostly from persons known to the claimant, either through his 
military service or residence in a local community. And, while acceptance rates 
are difficult to compute,220 they seem to have hovered between seventy and 
eighty percent.221 
Moreover, as in contemporary Social Security disability adjudication, the 
paper record gave way to face-to-face hearings and cross-examination when the 
relationship between the Bureau and the claimant took on an adversarial flavor. 
Where claims were likely to be denied because fraud was suspected, 
investigation was done by special agents who examined the claimant and 
witnesses personally. Prior to 1881, this examination was largely ex parte, but 
thereafter was done on notice and opportunity to contest.222 Special agents 
were instructed that their examinations were to “be conducted in no way 
secretly, but . . . free and open to all parties in interest, and any claimant or 
pensioner shall have the privilege of meeting his accuser face to face, and to 
cross-examine all the witnesses against him.”223 
While this was a highly articulated and bureaucratically specialized process, 
it was nevertheless one in which adjudicatory personnel necessarily exercised 
 
divisions . . . . The sole function of the Review Board is to treat cases judicially, upon the 
papers . . . .”). 
220.  The annual reports of the Pension Bureau provide statistics on applications and awards, but 
the lag between application and award meant that an application in 1871 might well have 
been decided in 1872 or even later. Hence, awards as a percentage of annual application does 
not reflect the true award rate with complete accuracy. 
221.  See Heywood T. Sanders, Paying for the “Bloody Shirt:” The Politics of Civil War Pensions, in 
POLITICAL BENEFITS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC PROGRAMS 137, 148-50 (Barry 
S. Rundquist ed., 1980) (computing the award rates for the period 1878 to 1899). 
222.  See 1883 PENSION OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
PENSIONS 325 [hereinafter PENSION OFFICE REPORT]. 
223.  GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SPECIAL EXAMINERS OF THE UNITED STATES PENSION OFFICE 7 
(1881). 
MASHAW_PRESS_V1WEB.DOC 5/10/2010 2:40:30 PM 
federal administration and administrative law in the gilded age 
1425 
 
significant discretion. And, as anyone familiar with contemporary disability 
determination processes knows,224 disability decisions are analogous to fact-
based determinations by one-person juries. They are influenced by the 
subjective understandings of the adjudicators and by the adjudicatory climate 
created by both administrative and political controllers. Whether the Pension 
Office was lenient or strict in its determinations thus depended not only on the 
understandings and discretion of individual examiners, but also on whether 
the adjudicatory climate of the time emphasized assuring benefits for all 
eligible individuals or protecting the fisc and preventing fraud. And, as is true 
of contemporary disability benefits administration, the political climate 
changed in response to shifting public and congressional concerns and changes 
in presidential administrations. 
Consider In re Ammerman.225 According to the published decision of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior who first ruled on the case, 
[a]ppellant alleges that on or about September 1, 1863, while standing 
in front of his tent, certain of his comrades being engaged in play 
among themselves, one of them kneeled down be hind [sic] him, and 
another standing in front pushed him over the one kneeling, and that 
he was thrown on his head and shoulders, producing a fracture of the 
left clavicle . . . .226 
The application was rejected on the ground that this horseplay did not qualify 
as an injury that had occurred in the line of duty. However, when Benjamin 
Harrison replaced Grover Cleveland, a new wind swept through the Pension 
Office, and Ammerman’s claim was granted.227 Because the Harrison-
Cleveland race had revolved importantly around differences over pension 
policy (Cleveland had vetoed numerous private bills granting pensions to 
denied applicants and a general statute eliminating the requirement that 
disabilities be service-connected), Ammerman’s case caught the attention of the 
New York Times. The title of the article, Bidding for Popularity: All Sorts of 
 
224.  See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) (describing the process of Social Security disability claims 
adjudication). 
225.  1 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 
AND THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES GRANTING AND COVERING PENSIONS 5 (1887) 
[hereinafter PENSION CLAIMS]. 
226.  Id. 
227.  3 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at 1 (1890). 
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Pension Claims Now Passed, suggests some skepticism concerning the new 
Assistant Secretary’s pension policy.228 
Indeed, there was widespread belief that the pension system was riddled 
with fraud and deeply compromised by partisan political competition. General 
M.M. Trumbull wrote, “‘[v]eteran diseases’ are those miraculous ailments 
which rage unsuspected in the bodies of old soldiers until seductive pension 
laws bring them to the notice of the sufferers.”229 And, William Glasson, the 
early historian of the military pension system, described the 1890 statute as 
“the high bid for the political support of the 450,000 G.A.R. [Grand Army of 
the Republic] men and other ex-soldiers, with both the Republican and 
Democratic parties bidding.”230 The views expressed about the pension system 
in the popular and elite press seemed to follow party lines. Republican outlets 
found the pensioners honorable and deserving; Democratic and independent 
sources (including some Republican reformers or “Mugwumps”) saw military 
pensions as ill-disguised raids on the Treasury, facilitated by unscrupulous 
pension attorneys and claims agents.231 
Congress also intervened massively in pension administration through the 
passage of private bills and personal assistance to claimants in perfecting their 
applications at the Pension Office. Morton Keller reports, “in the 49th 
Congress [1885-1887], 40 percent of the legislation in the House and 55 percent 
in the Senate consisted of special pension acts.”232 And Robert M. La Follette, 
Sr., estimated that he spent a quarter to a third of his time in the House of 
Representatives (1884 to 1890) engaged in pension casework.233 In these 
senses, “politics” influenced pension adjudication. But, there is nothing 
nefarious or corrupt in congressmen passing statutes that benefit their 
constituents or engaging in case work. And, in cases like Ammerman, the 
 
228.  Bidding for Popularity: All Sorts of Pension Claims Now Passed, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1889, at 5 
(discussing, in addition to Ammerman’s case, Assistant Secretary Cyrus Bussey’s decision to 
award a pension to William Jones of the Ohio Volunteers). Jones was injured, according to 
the article, while “standing on a portico in front of his quarters at dinner time, eating his 
rations, when two of his comrades, who were scuffling . . . , pushed him backward over the 
balustrade. The act was intentional on the part of his comrades, and was unsuccessfully 
resisted by Jones.” Id. 
229.  M.M. Trumbull, Pensions for All, 35 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 721, 724 (1880). 
230.  GLASSON, supra note 200, at 238. 
231.  See Blanck, supra note 179, at 129-48. 
232.  MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 311 (1977). 
233.  ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, SR., LA FOLLETTE’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF 
POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 84 (3d ed. 1919). 
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Harrison Administration was quite open in maintaining that the Cleveland 
Administration had been too strict in its interpretation of the pension laws.234 
On the other hand, some practices at the Pension Office could make 
pension administration a tool of electoral politics. With a constant backlog of 
work, pension cases could be rushed to completion in the months immediately 
preceding a national election. President Garfield’s Pension Commissioner, 
Colonel W.W. Dudley, is reported to have allocated scarce personnel 
disproportionately to the task of deciding claims in electorally critical states and 
to have ordered that no claims be finally denied in the months preceding the 
presidential election.235 
The level of fraud and the effects of political chicanery at the Pension Office 
are difficult to estimate. In her monumental study of military pensions, Theda 
Skocpol calculates that less than one percent of the 300,000 pension 
applications that were granted in the period 1861 to 1876 were subsequently 
denied because of fraudulent applications.236 But, as Skocpol notes, that may 
not be a good measure of the extent of illegitimate claims, and no other is 
available. She ultimately concludes that “nothing exact can be said about the 
proportions of illegitimate pensioners or expenditures.”237 The effects of 
illegitimate political maneuvers are similarly difficult to assess. Although there 
is some evidence that Democratic counties did better in their pension 
applications during Democratic administrations and Republican counties in 
Republican administrations, a recent statistical analysis finds that decisions on 
claims were overwhelmingly determined by the medical evidence submitted by 
examining physicians (or boards of physicians).238 
Whatever the true relationship between partisan politics and pension 
administration, oscillations in statutory and interpretive policies could not be 
resisted by the Pension Office. It had to be responsive (to the extent that the 
law allowed) to the demands of its political overseers, even at the cost of 
consistency across time. Inconsistency on the part of examiners and medical 
personnel acting at any one time, however, was, at least potentially, within 
administrative control. The Pension Office’s attempts to ensure both 
 
234.  4 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at iii (1891) (stating in the preface that it is intended to 
highlight “a spirit of larger liberality exercised by the present administration in applying the 
pension system to those entitled to its benefits”). 
235.  See Theda Skocpol, America’s First Social Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil 
War Veterans, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 109-10 (1993). 
236.  Id. 
237.  THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (1992). 
238.  Blanck, supra note 179, at 148-71. 
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responsive and consistent interpretation of pension legislation created an 
elaborate, and somewhat arcane, internal law of administration. 
4. Center and Periphery at the Pension Office 
The Military Pension Bureau was one of the larger enterprises of the federal 
government. By the mid-1880s, it had over 1,500 personnel in its central office 
in Washington. And as we have seen, all final determinations on veteran’s 
claims were made only after central office review both by the Board of Review, 
which determined the legal sufficiency of the claim, and by the Office of the 
Medical Referee, which assigned disability ratings. This centralized oversight 
clearly helped to unify adjudicatory norms. But, the central office was highly 
dependent upon information that came in from the field. While central office 
personnel could send cases back for additional development, they were in some 
sense at the mercy of both the examiners in field offices around the country and 
the medical professionals who did disability examinations on contract with the 
Bureau. In its attempts to control the activities of these dispersed and part-time 
personnel, the Pension Office generated a continuous stream of manuals, 
instructions, digests, and precedents. In the process, it necessarily made policy 
in order to implement the laws. 
For the purposes of this case study, I will look at pension office policy from 
two perspectives. First, I will examine how the Pension Office sought to 
control the activities of examining surgeons. While other aspects of the 
evidence in a pension case were often important, the reports of the examining 
surgeons were clearly the most critical evidence in the mine run of cases. 
Assuring disinterested and professional examinations was one of the Pension 
Bureau’s highest priorities. Second, I will look briefly at the way in which the 
Pension Office shaped the substance of the pension system in its interpretation 
of what it meant for a disability to have been incurred “in the line of duty.” As I 
shall show, the Pension Bureau ultimately shifted military pensions from a 
compensation scheme for war-related injuries to a scheme for supporting 
disabled veterans and their dependents, provided the veterans’ disabilities 
could be traced to some event in their military service for which they were 
themselves blameless victims. 
5. Examining Surgeons 
The 1862 chartering legislation empowered the Commissioner “to appoint, 
at his discretion, civil surgeons to make the biennial examinations of 
pensioners which are or may be required to be made by law, and to examine 
applicants for invalid pensions, where he shall deem an examination by a 
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surgeon to be appointed by him necessary.”239 Congress announced no criteria 
for appointment, and Commissioner Barrett described the qualifications of the 
physicians chosen in the most general terms: 
[R]egard has been had not only to the professional skill and standing of 
the persons selected, but also to their integrity and impartiality in 
rendering a just verdict on the cases coming before them. . . . The 
number and locations of examining surgeons having been left to my 
discretion, it is proper to state that I have designed to make 
appointments only where the convenience of applicants seemed to 
require such an officer, and that it has not been thought best to appoint 
such examiners where the constant and ready attention of regular army 
surgeons could be relied on.240 
By the end of 1863, over six hundred examining surgeons had been 
appointed.241 
Biennial examinations of recipients by teams of two surgeons had been a 
feature of the pension landscape since 1859,242 and an 1864 amendment to the 
general pension law allowed the Commissioner to order special examinations 
as well, “from time to time, as he shall deem for the interests of the 
government.”243 Whether doing initial, biennial, or special exams, examining 
surgeons were to provide certificates giving “a particular description of the 
wound, injury or disease, and specify[ing] how and in what manner [the 
pensioner’s] present condition and disability are connected therewith. The 
degree of disability for obtaining subsistence by manual labor must also be 
stated.”244 
 
239.  An Act to Grant Pensions, ch. 166, § 8, 12 Stat. 566, 568-69 (1862). 
240.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 581-82 (1862). 
241.  Id. at 582-86; id. at 639-48 (1863). 
242.  Act of Mar. 8, 1859, ch. 88, § 2, 11 Stat. 439, 439. 
243.  Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 8, 13 Stat. 387, 388. The Commissioner’s 1864 Report alluded 
to the potential cost-savings such biennial and special examinations could produce: a review 
of the 407 pensioners enrolled at the Boston agency by Doctors George Stevens Jones and 
A.B. Bancroft resulted in a twenty-two percent reduction in the dollar value of the roll. 
PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 658-59 (1864) (reporting a decrease in the roll 
from $29,596 to $23,176 and hypothesizing that “[a] general reduction, in an equal or still 
greater proportion, of the entire invalid list, without any injustice to the pensioners, may be 
assumed as the result of a strict enforcement of this law”). 
244.  SEWELL, supra note 215, at 262-63. Initially, nonappointed civil surgeons could also perform 
these examinations upon a showing of the impracticability of obtaining an examination 
from appointed surgeons. But a claimant was required to supplement the nonappointed 
surgeons’ certificates with affidavits establishing their competence and impartiality, an 
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From the onset, equitably assigning rates of compensation for the wide 
array of disabilities and diseases claimants presented was the Bureau’s single 
greatest challenge. Remember, first, that there were two separate 
compensation schemes at work: one scaled payments primarily according to 
rank, the other according to severity of impairment with no consideration of 
rank. In an attempt to harmonize them, the Commissioner construed total 
disability for manual labor in the 1862 statute to mean “a total disability for the 
performance of manual labor requiring severe and continuous exertion.”245 By 
contrast, manual labor in the 1866 and 1872 statutes was interpreted “to include 
also the lighter kinds of labor which require education and skill.”246 This 
distinction (sensible, but hardly obvious from the legislation) still left a large 
gap between the monthly rates under the two regimes, and the Commissioner 
lobbied Congress for the establishment of an intermediate rate.247 When 
Congress passed the Consolidation Act in 1873, it responded not by defining 
compensable injuries with greater precision, but with a sweeping one-sentence 
delegation: “the rate of eighteen dollars per month may be proportionately 
divided . . . .”248 
“Proportionality” was the Bureau’s second great challenge. Despite the 
Commissioner’s constant pleas for “a more definite system” for rating 
disabilities,249 and “some method of securing greater uniformity in estimating 
the disabilities of invalid pensioners and claimants,” such as the “preparation of 
a scale of disabilities . . . to be intrusted to a commission of surgeons” or a 
designated medical officer within the Bureau,250 no congressional assistance 
was forthcoming. The Commissioner undertook to set proportional ratings 
himself through the issuance of rulings and through guidance promulgated to 
the examining surgeons. 
In 1870, the Commissioner began providing the examining surgeons with 
detailed guidelines. For example, the temporary loss of the use of a limb was an 
eight-dollar total disability, while the permanent loss of the use of a limb was a 
fifteen-dollar third-grade disability. For purposes of subdividing the eight-
 
added expense that many invalids doubtless preferred not to incur. Moreover, the Bureau 
would not reimburse invalids for examinations conducted by nonappointed surgeons. 
HENRY C. HARMON, A MANUAL OF THE PENSION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
249-50 (1867). 
245.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 661 (1874). 
246.  Id. 
247.  Id. at 331 (1872). 
248.  Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 5, 17 Stat. 566, 569. 
249.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 658 (1864). 
250.  Id. at 791 (1865).  
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dollar rate, the loss of a thumb or a single hernia was one-half disability; the 
loss of an index finger or a big toe was three-eighths disability; and the loss of 
another finger or toe was one-fourth disability.251 These guidelines were 
further refined in each new set of instructions.252 By 1883, the Commissioner 
reported that there were 120 different grades of pensions being paid to disabled 
veterans.253 
As time passed, the Bureau also sought to professionalize its rating process. 
In 1871, the Commissioner had created a Medical Division “[i]n order . . . to 
multiply the safeguards against error, ignorance, and dishonesty, which affect 
both the right of the pensioner and the interests of the Government.”254 He 
staffed the Division with “competent surgeons, whose duty it is rigidly to 
inspect all returned certificates and to correct and adjust all medical questions, 
under the supervision of the Commissioner.”255 The Division set quickly to 
work and in 1872 returned “at least 40 [percent] of the certificates of 
examination of this class of claimants . . . for reconstruction and greater  
detail . . . .”256 The Consolidation Act created the office of Medical Referee, 
whose initial occupant, T.B. Hood, proved a powerful force for standardizing 
the Bureau’s approach to medical questions. Using the expertise of this 
growing medical apparatus, the Commissioner promulgated yet more refined 
rules defining fractional rates of disability and clarifying statutory terms.257 
 
251.  U.S. PENSION BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS TO EXAMINING SURGEONS FOR PENSIONS [hereinafter 
PENSION BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS], reprinted in PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 
437-38 (1870). 
252.  Id. at 8-9 (1884); Id. at 6 (1877). For the fractional rates corresponding to the degrees of 
deafness, see Comm’r of Pensions, Ruling No. 136 (Oct. 7, 1885), reprinted in CURTIS & 
WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 397; and Comm’r of Pensions, Ruling No. 80 (Apr. 3, 1884), 
reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 395.  
253.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 313 (1883). 
254.  SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 388. 
255.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 388 (1871). 
256.  Id. at 331 (1872). 
257.  See Comm’r of Pension, Ruling No. 136 (Oct. 7, 1885) (defining fractional ratings for forty 
subdivisions of eighteen-dollar third-grade disability), reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, 
supra note 219, at 397; Comm’r of Pension, Ruling No. 80 (Apr. 3, 1884) (same), reprinted in 
CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 395; Comm’r of Pension, Ruling No. 57 (n.d.) 
(defining fractional ratings for subdivisions of eight dollar “total disability”), reprinted in 
CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 394; U.S. PENSION BUREAU, BUREAU OF PENSIONS, ITS 
OFFICERS AND THEIR DUTIES: THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WORK OF ADJUDICATING CLAIMS 
IS PERFORMED 88-91 (1893).  
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The Bureau emphasized the importance of examining surgeons’ 
independence, professionalism, and identification with the Bureau rather than 
with claimants. Normatively, an examining surgeon was to 
bear in mind that he is an agent for this Office and not for pensioners 
or claimants. He is not under any circumstances to advise claimants, or to 
directly or indirectly aid them in the preparation or prosecution of their 
claims, for the moment he does so, though his intentions may be 
perfectly pure, he puts himself in the attitude of an attorney, a position 
he should sedulously avoid.258 
Even if they were agents of the government, individual physicians might be 
biased in some undisclosed fashion or have idiosyncratic views about particular 
maladies and their effects. As early as 1868, therefore, the Commissioner began 
to use multimember boards of surgeons for reviews or initial examinations 
where possible. In 1882, Congress was finally convinced to mandate that all 
examinations be made by three-surgeon boards.259 Commissioner Dudley 
noted in his report on the implementation of this new requirement that, as a 
matter of policy, where possible, he organized boards to contain two members 
of one political party and one of the other.260 Although all pension 
commissioners, including Dudley, were suspected of using their discretion to 
aid incumbent administrations, he, at least, seems to have attempted to 
depoliticize professional medical judgments in the adjudication of individual 
claims. 
Nonetheless, three-man, partisan-balanced boards were a compromise 
position, a retreat from a more radical proposal advanced by Commissioners 
Baker and Bentley in 1875 and 1876: the replacement of appointed, but part-
 
258.  PENSION BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 251, at 16 (1877) (emphasis added). Examining 
surgeons were reminded that they were confidential advisers to the Bureau, id. at 8, and 
charged to report every instance of violation of the pension laws and every case of fraud or 
attempt at fraud, id. at 16. A circular from the Commissioner warned, “Examining surgeons 
are recognized as confidential agents of the Office. In no instance should they communicate 
what they have recommended, or intend to recommend, either to an attorney or a claimant.” 
Comm’r of Pensions, Circular No. 3 (Sept. 23, 1873), reprinted in PENSION BUREAU 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 251, at 23 (1877). The 1884 instructions also prohibited the 
delegation of a surgeon’s duties to nonappointed physicians. PENSION BUREAU 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 251, at 13 (1884).  
259.  Act of July 25, 1882, ch. 349, § 4, 22 Stat. 174, 175 (“[A]ll examinations, so far as practicable, 
shall be made by the boards, and no examination shall be made by one surgeon excepting 
under such circumstances as make it impracticable for a claimant to present himself before a 
board . . . .”). 
260.  PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 324 (1883). 
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time, civil surgeons with a professional staff of salaried employees. In 1875, 
Commissioner Baker lamented that 
[n]umerous instances have occurred where incompetent surgeons have 
been imposed upon the Office, no means being at hand to test their 
qualifications before appointment. In other instances, claim-agents 
have secured their appointment by means of petitions to members of 
Congress, thereby placing the examining-surgeons under obligations to 
give biased ratings of disabilities, favorable to their clients.261 
Commissioner Baker saw bias resulting not only from the obligation incurred 
through political patronage, but also from “local prejudices and influences.”262 
More mundanely, examining surgeons might simply be unfamiliar with the 
evaluative standards of the Bureau or might file fatally incomplete certificates. 
In such cases, the Bureau could remand, requesting a more thorough or 
pointed examination, but the costs of multiple examinations for the same claim 
were high, and often the Bureau’s only remedy was delisting the surgeon.263 
Commissioner Baker thus suggested  
the employment of a number of surgeons at a fixed annual salary, equal 
in amount to at least the average earning of first-class physicians, who 
shall be assigned to certain defined districts into which the country 
shall be divided . . . . It is believed that sixty will be the number 
required . . . .264  
Commissioner Bentley enlarged upon the so-called “sixty surgeons” plan in 
1876, advocating the deployment not only of salaried surgeons but 
investigative clerks to work alongside them, thereby eliminating the system of 
proof by ex parte affidavit and potentially biased medical examination, and 
instead substituting a system of roving commissions, operating under the 
hierarchical control of the Bureau. 
 
261.  Id. at 441 (1875). 
262.  Id. at 442. 
263.  Turnover among the examining surgeons was not trivial. Between June 1874 and June 1875, 
for example, of 1443 surgeons, 70 were dismissed for incompetence or neglect of duty, 49 
resigned, 23 died, 18 changed residence, giving an attrition rate of around 11%, and 214 new 
surgeons were appointed. Id. at 440. In the previous year, attrition was a comparable 10%. 
Id. at 659 (1874). 
264.  Id. at 442 (1875). 
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[The surgeon and clerk] should constitute a commission on behalf of 
the Government to make the required medical examinations in any 
case, and to receive the parol testimony offered in its support; and to 
that end the claimant, with his principal witnesses should appear before 
them and submit themselves to cross-examination on behalf of the 
Government.265 
The necessity for a more thorough, even adversarial, style of evaluation of 
the medical aspects of claims arose, as Doctor Hood pointed out, because of a 
fundamental change in the nature of pension applications. Through the 1860s, 
the vast majority of claimants alleged wounds or disabilities which were 
relatively easily verifiable; a decade later, however, it was “comparatively rare 
that claim is now made for a disability contracted in service; it is a question of 
sequels to disabilities incurred in service.”266 Tracing the pathological 
connection of existing diseases to their service origins became a major concern. 
A host of maladies were urged as caused by weaknesses resulting from wartime 
injuries or diseases. Whether these causal stories were true, or even 
scientifically plausible, was a source of continuing debate. The problems 
described by Baker and Bentley were all too real, but Congress never acted on 
their recommendations. Employing full-time medical personnel to assist in 
disability determinations has never been politically popular. The American 
Medical Association long opposed the inclusion of disability insurance under 
the Social Security system on the ground that it was the camel’s nose under the 
tent of socialized medicine. And even today, the Social Security Administration 
relies almost exclusively on treating physicians and contract personnel for both 
the provision of medical evidence and its interpretation. 
The last line of supervision for examining surgeons was the Medical 
Division, which attempted to control examinations more closely by specifying 
the particular medical issues to be resolved and by scrutinizing surgeons’ 
certificates and returning those that did not pass muster. The Bureau initiated 
all medical examinations by issuing an order to a surgeon or board of surgeons 
(and forwarding a copy to the claimant); each order “set forth precisely the 
injuries and diseases, or both, for which the applicant claims, and the surgeon 
should therefore look very carefully to the order, that the examination shall 
include every alleged cause of disability.”267 Special instructions might 
accompany orders, and surgeons were to return those instructions and the 
 
265.  Id. at 703 (1876). 
266.  Id. at 704-05 (quoting Doctor T.B. Hood). 
267.  PENSION BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 251, at 13 (1884). 
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order itself along with their certificate of examination. Insufficiently detailed 
certificates were rejected: 
When a certificate shall fail to furnish information upon which the 
claim may be intelligently and safely adjudicated, it will be returned to 
the surgeon for amendment in the defective points, and if it may not be 
corrected without the re-examination of the claimant, the examination 
will not be paid for.268 
Preliminary review and rejection of such certificates fell to the medical clerks in 
the Medical Division.269 
Because no adjudication became final until reviewed in the central office, 
the quality and efficiency of the examiners and clerks in that office were a 
central concern. And, as previously noted, by the mid-1800s, the central office 
was a large enterprise. In his 1883 Report, the Commissioner of Pensions 
indicated that, by April of that year, of the more than 1500 employees in the 
central office fifteen were medical examiners and thirty-five were the principal 
“legal” examiners. But, those fifty decisional personnel oversaw an army of 
over one thousand clerks who, in fact, carried out most of the examining 
functions.270 
The Commissioner was at pains to explain to Congress that “[t]he speedy 
and proper adjudication of pension claims depends upon the judgment and 
qualifications of the examining force who have the work in hand.”271 He argued 
that this required both selection and promotion on the basis of merit, including 
not only formal schooling but also “a careful examination to determine 
whether the applicant possesses the other qualities necessary to a full 
understanding of the business in hand.”272 Clerks and examiners were hired 
based upon rather basic educational requirements but were then trained by the 
more experienced people in the division. They spent their first six months as 
probationary employees. The Commissioner reported that about ten percent 
were mustered out after the probationary period.273 Clerks were then promoted 
up through the clerical ranks (four grades) and to examiner status based upon 
 
268.  Id. at 18; see also WALKER, supra note 215, at 52. 
269.  Report of N.F. Graham, Acting Med. Referee, to W.W. Dudley, Comm’r of Pensions (Sept. 
21, 1883), reprinted in PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 337-39 (1883). 
270.  For a breakdown of the clerical force at the Bureau between July 1882 and June 1883, see 
PENSION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 222, at 329 (1883). 
271.  Id. at 330. 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id. 
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their work in the Bureau. According to the Commissioner, “promotion has 
been granted irrespective of race, influence, or anything else than attainment in 
the work of this office.”274 
It would appear that although the Bureau of Pensions operated in a highly 
charged political environment, it was nevertheless a highly bureaucratized 
operation. Procedures and evidentiary requirements were specified in great 
detail. The work was parceled out to employees who had discrete functions and 
who attained their positions on the basis of merit and accomplishment within 
the Bureau. Systematic review of the work product was provided by the 
Medical Referee’s office and the Board of Review. The whole adjudicatory 
regime operated under the rules and guidelines promulgated by the 
Commissioner and the precedents set by decisions on appeal to the Secretary of 
the Interior. All of this internal law was published and made available to 
interested parties.275 
Notwithstanding the relatively small number of appeals, the Secretary of 
the Interior sometimes made significant policy by precedent. Decisions on the 
question of whether injuries were incurred within the “line of duty” provide an 
important example. Until 1890, all invalid pension legislation required that 
compensable diseases and disabilities originate “in the line of duty.” For many 
years, the Bureau took as foundational a pre-Civil War opinion of Attorney 
General Caleb Cushing, which framed the issue not as a question of the 
soldier’s status at the time of his injury—that is, on active duty, rather than on 
furlough or under arrest—but instead as the relationship between the conduct 
causing the injury and the soldier’s military obligations. 
[T]he performance of duty must have relation of causation or 
consociation, mediate or immediate, to the wound . . . . [T]he question 
is not whether, when the cause of disability or death occurred, the party 
was on duty or not, in active service, or on furlough or leave . . . but 
whether, in any of the possible conditions of service, the cause of 
 
274.  Id. at 330-31. 
275.  Appeals in rejected cases were numerous but small in relation to the total caseload. In 1883, 
for example, the Commissioner reported that 746 rejected applicants had appealed their 
cases to the Secretary. Id. at 322. But, in that same year, the Bureau disposed of over 104,000 
cases, rejecting nearly 43,000 of them. Id. tbl.6, at 387. It should be noted that this was 
eighteen years after the war had ended, and allowance rates tended to decline as claims came 
to be more and more based on allegations that some injury or disease incurred during the 
war had produced a disability that manifested itself only two decades later. In the early 
years, up to 1870, allowance rates were above eighty percent. Id. at 307. 
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disability or death was appurtenant to, dependent upon, or connected 
with, acts within, or acts without, the line of duty.276 
Thus, a soldier under military detention pressed into defense of his fort could 
nonetheless sustain a pension-conferring injury, while one on active duty 
wounded in an unnecessary or prohibited activity, like drinking or fighting, 
could not. 
The Secretary of the Interior elaborated on this basic theme in a variety of 
contexts. A soldier acting in conformity with his superior’s orders and Army 
regulations was presumptively acting in the line of duty, while one violating an 
Army regulation was not.277 The Secretary held pensionable injuries sustained 
by a colonel in an unprovoked attack by an inferior officer,278 but rejected a 
widow’s claim based on the poisoning death of her husband, who mistook 
extract of colchicum (a medicinal alkaloid, in small quantities) for whiskey.279 
Curtis and Webster’s Digest discusses a number of other situations that 
presented similar questions, including injuries incurred while foraging for food 
and accidental wounds.280 For many years, all of these precedents adhered 
closely to Attorney General Cushing’s early approach. 
This principle undergirded the initial decision in the Ammerman 
“horseplay” case described above.281 Brokenshaw’s case, also decided by 
Assistant Secretary Hawkins, reached the same conclusion. Brokenshaw alleged 
“an injury of left side . . . caused by three soldiers, names unknown, jumping 
on him while he was climbing into his bunk, crushing ribs of left side just 
below his heart.”282 The Assistant Secretary cited as controlling both 
Ammerman, for the proposition that roughhousing had “neither a natural nor a 
logical connection with the military service and the line of duty in said 
 
276.  7 Op. Att’y Gen. 149, 149 (1855). 
277.  Compare In re Cook (Pension Bureau Nov. 8, 1862), reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra 
note 219, at 265, with In re Champion (Pension Bureau Aug. 15, 1865), reprinted in CURTIS & 
WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 265. 
278.  In re Vimont (Pension Bureau Jan. 17, 1866), reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 219, 
at 265. 
279.  In re McCarty (Pension Bureau July 14, 1881), reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 
219, at 266. 
280.  CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 219, at 264-81. 
281.  In re Ammerman (Pension Bureau June 25, 1886), reprinted in 1 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 
225, at 5 (1887). 
282.  In re Brokenshaw (Pension Bureau July 23, 1887), reprinted in 1 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 
225, at 194 (1887). 
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service,”283 as well as an earlier ruling of the Commissioner, In re Harrington,284 
for the proposition that “[t]he Government cannot be held responsible for 
injuries received during personal quarrels and altercations which are in no way 
incident to the performance of military duty.”285 Evidently, the quasi-judicial 
review performed by the Secretary not only exhibited deference to, but took 
seriously and occasionally adopted the reasoning of, the decisions of the 
Bureau. 
In overruling both Ammerman and Brokenshaw, Assistant Secretary Bussey 
announced a definite intent to broaden the scope of the line of duty: 
[Ammerman] was in his proper place, ready to perform such duty as he 
might be called upon to do. The injury alleged . . . happened to him 
without any fault or neglect on his part. The injury was connected as a 
result with the service, in that the service had placed him in the position 
where, without fault on his part, he had received such injury. This 
connection is sufficiently close and direct . . . . In the vast mass of cases 
in which pensions are allowed, the injury or the disease on account of 
which the allowance is made is connected with the service in no other 
manner than that obedience to military orders and regulations placed 
the soldier in the position where he was exposed to the causes of such 
disease or injury.286 
With respect to Brokenshaw, the Assistant Secretary went further, engrafting 
onto the line of duty inquiry the common law concept of contributory 
negligence: 
In the original Ammerman decision . . . the Department declined to 
recognize the doctrine of contributory negligence as affecting the line of 
duty, and failed, therefore, to notice either the guiltiness or the innocence 
of the injured party. . . . [Brokenshaw] was . . . in no degree a 
contributor to his own injury, but was merely the helpless recipient of 
an irresistible assault. His title to remedy is plain, but it does not lie 
against his assailants. It lies in the system of pensions . . . . Brokenshaw 
 
283.  Brokenshaw, reprinted in 1 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at 196 (1887). 
284.  In re Harrington (Pension Bureau Aug. 29, 1885), reprinted in CURTIS & WEBSTER, supra note 
219, at 279. 
285.   Brokenshaw, reprinted in 1 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at 195 (1887) (quoting 
Harrington). 
286.  In re Ammerman, (Pension Bureau 1887), reprinted in 3 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at 1, 
2 (1889). 
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was “in his proper place, ready to perform such duty as he might be 
called upon to do” . . . .287 
Bussey’s decisions constituted a major shift in the basic purposes of the 
military pension system. Prior decisions rejected the idea that the government 
functioned as an “insurer” against soldiers’ everyday injuries. Military pensions 
were, on this view, designed to compensate for injury or illness traceable to 
military conduct—acts either of a peculiarly soldierly nature or taken under 
orders. The later Brokenshaw result embraces an understanding of the pension 
system as a broad-based workers’ compensation scheme through which 
federally provided compensation substitutes for private remedies. 
Precedent in the Pension Bureau thus seems to have operated very much as 
common law lawyers expect it to operate in courts. Over long periods, 
individual cases arising out of multitudinous contexts were rationalized in 
terms of a basic principle, such as Attorney General Cushing’s opinion, that 
made the cases “line up.” Changing social circumstances, in the Ammerman and 
Brokenshaw cases, an election that signaled displeasure with restrictive pension 
decisions, produced a substantial change of direction. But that change of 
direction was articulated by drawing on preexisting legal principles as well, this 
time to explain why prior decisions were in error. If wise adjudicatory decisions 
are those that both respect the past and anticipate the future, Assistant 
Secretary Bussey’s expansive vision of “line of duty” was wisdom incarnate. A 
year after his Brokenshaw decision, Congress eliminated the requirement that a 
veteran’s disability result from injury or disease incurred in the line of duty. 
6. Pension Administration’s Internal Law 
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, it is easy to imagine 
that the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s finally brought recipients of 
government benefits within the ambit of administrative law’s insistence that 
fair procedures and transparent rules be made available to those subjected to 
adverse government action.288 To be sure, disappointed Social Security 
 
287.  Brokenshaw, reprinted in 3 PENSION CLAIMS, supra note 225, at 195 (1890) (quoting 
Ammerman).  
288.  This is nothing more than the received wisdom that surrounds Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970), and its progeny. Before he became widely known for his popular book, The 
Greening of America, Charles Reich was famous in legal circles for his pathbreaking articles 
lamenting the poor state of the protection of economic interests based on government 
beneficence. Those articles, Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The 
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); and Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE 
L.J. 733 (1964), were cited by the Court in Goldberg’s footnote 8. 397 U.S. at 263 n.8. By 
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applicants and recipients had long had a statutory right to hearings before an 
independent hearing examiner—the process upon which the APA’s formal 
adjudicatory hearings were modeled. But so-called “grant and benefit” 
programs, including veterans’ benefits, are excepted from the coverage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Hence, in the absence of specific statutory 
requirements, pre-Goldberg claimants asserting interests based on government 
beneficence seemed to be bereft of legal rights—left to the vagaries of 
discretion exercised through informal processes and applying secret law—or 
perhaps simply individual subjective judgment. 
With judicial review precluded by statute until 1988289 and Congress 
largely inattentive to both the substance and procedures for claims 
adjudication, veterans seeking military pensions appear as legal stepchildren 
from the viewpoint of external administrative law. Yet a detailed look inside 
the administration of veterans’ benefits in the Gilded Age reveals a very 
different picture. Administrators developed a regularized, transparent system 
that was surely as fair to claimants and beneficiaries as the technology of the 
times and the demands of mass adjudication would allow. Nor are these 
developments of merely antiquarian interest. As I will suggest below, closer 
attention to the internal law of contemporary administration might not only 
make us better informed about the administrative law we actually have, but it 
may also inform our approach to what external administrative law should 
demand. 
But the Pension Bureau is one case and we should recognize that veterans 
were then, and are now, a politically popular subset of beneficiaries. Although 
the program had its detractors, the internal law elaborated in the 
administration of nineteenth-century veterans’ benefits was not against the 
grain of broad political sentiment. Pornographers, fraudulent marketers of 
defective goods and worthless stocks, abortionists, and organizers of rigged 
 
1975, the development of due process protections for governmentally conferred interests was 
being characterized variously as “a due process explosion” or a “due process revolution.” See 
Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975); Doug 
Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 531 (1975). 
289.  For many years, judicial review of veterans’ claims was precluded by 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) 
(1970), which provided: “[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or 
fact [concerning a claim for benefits] . . . shall be final and conclusive and no other official 
or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such 
decision . . . .” This, and subsequent amendments to § 211, were held not to preclude 
constitutional claims, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), but most other types of legal 
challenge remained immune from judicial review. This situation changed with the adoption 
of the Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988), which 
converted the Veterans Administration into a cabinet level department and created a new 
Article I court, the United States Court of Veterans Appeals. 
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lotteries are not nearly so political appealing. Yet, as my next case study will 
show, while the Post Office was both aggressive and creative in pursuing such 
persons or firms, it was scrupulous in providing procedural and structural 
protections for those subject to its power to deny them the crucial privilege of 
access to the U.S. mails. 
C. Regulation and Adjudication at the Post Office 
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, it is difficult to 
appreciate the significance of the Post Office in the political, economic, and 
social life of the early Republic. In Richard John’s well-known account,290 the 
carriage of newspapers, and hence the dispersion of news from national 
population centers to the interior, made the Post Office a critical, perhaps the 
most important, institution in the development of American national identity. 
This high politics of state building was, of course, conjoined with the low 
politics of political patronage. Post offices, indeed multiple post offices, could 
be opened in every congressional district, and Congress jealously guarded its 
legislative prerogative to designate post offices and post roads.291 
In a system of de facto congressional appointment of local federal officials, 
congressional patronage went well beyond the satisfaction of local constituent 
pressures for the opening of a post office in every hamlet in the nation. 
Carriage of the mails was by contract and these contracts provided additional 
scope for congressional patronage through the congressman’s influence with 
local postmasters. Indeed, the opportunities for corruption in the process of 
letting contracts for mail carriage created some of the major political scandals 
of antebellum politics. These scandals generated significant bureaucratization 
of Post Office administration well before the advent of Pendleton Act civil 
service reforms,292 and reform continued throughout the Gilded Age.293 
Members of the Railway Postal Service and the clerks in the central office of the 
Post Office in Washington, D.C., for example, were subjected to training and 
testing that went far beyond the requirements of the Civil Service Commission. 
Indeed, the members of the Railway Postal Service may have been the most 
 
290.  RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN 
TO MORSE (1995). 
291.  See Mashaw, Recovering, supra note 9, at 1293-95. 
292.  See Mashaw, Administration and the Democracy, supra note 9, at 1619-24. 
293.  NELSON, supra note 190, at 122-23. 
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highly trained and efficient personnel of the federal government outside of 
certain branches of the military.294 
Notwithstanding increasing coverage and usage of telegraphic 
communication, commercial dealings at a distance were almost completely 
dependent upon a secure and effective system for delivering the mails. In the 
absence of bank clearinghouses, the mails provided not only the means for 
making or negotiating business arrangements, they provided the payment 
system as well. One of the most familiar, indeed, iconic, scenes in motion 
pictures about the American West depicts the danger and excitement of bandits 
robbing either a stage coach or a train. Passengers fork over their money and 
jewelry, but the principal interest of the outlaws lies in the mailbags. Those 
mailbags are filled with money. Federal criminal law recognized the economic 
importance of a secure postal system from the earliest days of the Republic. 
Opening a letter containing money was made a capital offense in 1794.295 
Letter writing was not solely the provenance of commercial intercourse and 
political instruction.296 As restless Americans migrated from their original East 
Coast habitats to populate the Western lands, first across the Alleghenies and 
then across the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains as well, familial and 
social bonds were maintained through the mails. The personal letter became 
virtually a literary form, and the privacy of a sealed first-class letter was 
guarded by severe sanctions for anyone breaking the seal.297 
Given the importance of the mail system to the political, economic, and 
social life of the nation, congressional attention initially focused largely on 
insuring a comprehensive, effective, secure, and inexpensive postal system. The 
Post Office was a service organization. To be sure, it had some ancillary 
authority to regulate how mail was packaged and to determine what postage 
was due for different types of communications, but the content of those 
communications was none of the government’s business. As with many aspects 
of American life, the issue of slavery and the Civil War transformed the Post 
Office’s regulatory authority. After the war, reform-minded Americans saw in 
the Post Office a means for carrying on their moral crusades against obscenity, 
 
294.  For a detailed, if somewhat glorified, description of the training and testing of clerks and 
Railway Mail Service employees in the Post Office, see MARSHALL CUSHING, THE STORY OF 
OUR POST OFFICE: THE GREATEST GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT IN ALL ITS PHASES, 68-100, 
163-91 (1893). 
295.  Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 16, 1 Stat. 354, 360-61. 
296.  On the growth of letter writing as a general social practice, see DAVID M. HENKIN, THE 
POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (2006). 
297.  Id. at 93-118. 
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pornography, abortion, gambling, and fraudulent commercial and investment 
schemes. Their efforts built on earlier, sometimes extralegal, regulation of what 
was considered mailable. And, as we shall see, it took some time for the postal 
authorities to work out reasonable procedures for determining whether 
allegedly objectionable materials were indeed unmailable. 
1. The Emergence of Post Office Regulation 
Amos Kendall seems to have been the first Postmaster who exercised 
authority to censor the content of the mails. In the mid-1830s, Abolitionists in 
New York and Boston began mailing to Southern destinations thousands of 
pamphlets advocating the end of slavery. Local citizens in Charleston, New 
Orleans, and Norfolk broke into their local post offices and seized and burned 
the Abolitionists’ literature. The Postmaster in New York then stopped 
transmitting Abolitionist materials and sought instruction from 
Washington.298 The Postmaster at Charleston also sought advice from Kendall, 
who informed him that the Post Office had no legal authority to exclude 
newspapers from the mail or to refuse their delivery because of their content. 
On the other hand, Kendall seemed to take back his own advice when he 
added, “We owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher one to the communities 
in which we live, and if the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is 
patriotism to disregard them.”299 President Jackson immediately sought 
congressional authority for the Post Office to reject mail that tended to 
undermine “amicable intercourse.”300 Jackson’s proposals received a cool 
reception in both the House and the Senate, and the 1836 revision of the postal 
law reaffirmed the prior position that postmasters were forbidden to withhold 
delivery of the mail for any reason.301 
Nevertheless, on Jackson’s advice, Kendall instructed Southern postmasters 
that Abolitionists’ papers should be delivered only to persons who subscribed 
 
298.  The controversy over Abolitionist literature is described in considerable detail in MATTHEW 
A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN JACKSONIAN 
AMERICAN 149-51 (1975); and DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: CONGRESS AND 
THE POST OFFICE 26-41 (1977). See also W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1938). 
299.  Amos Kendall, The Incendiaries, NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore), Aug. 22, 1835, at 448. 
300.  Andrew Jackson, Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 7, 1835 in THE 
STATESMANSHIP OF ANDREW JACKSON AS TOLD IN HIS WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 399 (Francis 
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
301.  Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 270, § 32, 5 Stat. 80, 87. The legislative history of Jackson’s proposal 
is discussed briefly in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733-35 (1877). 
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to them. President Jackson even suggested that postmasters should take the 
names of subscribers and have them published in local newspapers. Hence, 
congressional legislation notwithstanding, censorship of the Abolitionist press 
quickly became the rule in the South.302 This implicit power to censor the mails 
in order to preserve the public peace was supported by later attorneys general. 
Concerning complaints that the Deputy Postmaster at Yazoo City, Mississippi, 
was refusing to deliver copies of a Cincinnati newspaper, Attorney General 
Caleb Cushing wrote: 
On the whole, then, it seems clear to me that a deputy postmaster, or 
other officer of the United States, is not required by law to become, 
knowingly, the enforced agent or instrument of enemies of the public 
peace, to disseminate, in their behalf, within the limits of any one of the 
States of the Union, printed matter, the design and tendency of which 
are to promote insurrections in such State.303 
With the outbreak of war, the relationship between the Post Office’s 
actions and congressional and presidential instruction remained complicated. 
In 1861, Congress authorized the suspension of mail delivery to the seceding 
states.304 This authorization, however, failed to specify how mail from the 
South to the North was to be treated. Postmaster Blair initially allowed mail to 
be delivered if it came by private courier to various drop off points in loyalist 
jurisdictions.305 On August 1, 1861, President Lincoln ordered total suspension 
of all commerce between the North and the South.306 This seemed to undercut 
Blair’s more lenient policy, but he continued to apply it. Lincoln’s blockade 
order, in Blair’s view, was meant to be enforced by the Treasury and War 
Departments, and they had failed to give him any instructions concerning 
cutting off the mail.307 
 
302.  Kendall’s orders are discussed in WAYNE E. FULLER, THE AMERICAN MAIL: ENLARGER OF THE 
COMMON LIFE 92 (1972); and THEODORE D. JERVEY, ROBERT Y. HAYNE AND HIS TIMES 379-
81 (1909). 
303.  8 Op. Att’y Gen. 489, 501 (1857). 
304.  Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 61, 12 Stat. 177. 
305.  FOWLER, supra note 298, at 43. 
306.  Business Activity Compatible with a State of War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1861, at 4. 
307.  The Great Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1861, at 1. 
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Blair continued to innovate. He ordered the withholding of mail addressed 
to particular individuals whom the State Department suspected of treason,308 
and he ordered the New York Postmaster to cease acceptance of five 
newspapers that had been indicted for disloyalty.309 By the end of 1861, Blair 
had suspended mailing privileges for twelve newspapers, not all of which had 
been indicted.310 Blair seemed to assume that his actions required no legislative 
authorization. He justified his summary suspension of mailing privileges by 
arguing that judicial proceedings to prove treason were too slow. While Blair 
agreed that the government could not shut the papers down without providing 
appropriate judicial process, he also believed that the government was not 
required to aid in the circulation of material harmful to the war effort.311 
In 1862, the House Judiciary Committee inquired into Blair’s authority to 
determine what could and could not be transmitted through the mail. In his 
testimony before the Committee, Blair claimed a twenty-five-year tradition of 
excluding treasonous communications from the mail “solely by authority of the 
executive administration.”312 In Blair’s view, nothing in the statutes governing 
the Post Office Department required it to become a party to treason. 
On the other hand, Blair’s testimony before the Committee revealed that 
his censorship activities had gone well beyond the attempt to interdict 
treasonous letters or publications. He had also withdrawn a number of obscene 
or scandalous publications.313 His actions went well beyond the existing 
statutes concerning obscenity, which restricted mail delivery only of 
publications coming from abroad. In the end, however, the Judiciary 
Committee approved Blair’s policy. Like Blair, the Committee concluded that 
the failure to exclude these materials would allow the “postal system, 
 
308.  2 THE WAR OF REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE RECORDS OF 
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 162, 179, 191 (1897) (reproducing correspondence 
between Trott, Blair, and Secretary Seward). 
309.  REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, 3 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-1, at 582-84 (1861) 
[hereinafter 1861 REPORT]; FOWLER, supra note 298, at 45. 
310.  FOWLER, supra note 298, at 48. 
311.  1861 REPORT, supra note 309, at 583 (citing Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story for the 
proposition that the government need not be the agent of its own destruction). 
312.  FRANCIS W. KELLOGG, POSTMASTER GENERAL’S AUTHORITY OVER MAILABLE MATTER, H.R. 
MISC. DOC. NO. 37-16, at 8 (1863) [hereinafter MAILABLE MATTER REPORT] (featuring the 
testimony of the Postmaster General). 
313.  Id. at 8-9. 
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established and sustained for the benefit of the people, [to] be turned into the 
means of the destruction of life, property, and morals.”314 
Congressional legislation caught up with Blair’s pornography policy in 
1865 in a statute providing that “no obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or 
other publication of a vulgar and indecent character shall be admitted into the 
mails of the United States.”315 But the 1865 statute contained only criminal 
penalties for its violation. Provisions in the original bill that would have 
authorized the Postmaster General to seize obscene publications received at the 
Post Office were eliminated in the final statute.316 Notwithstanding this 
apparently intentional “gap” in the statute, the Justice Department supported 
the Post Office’s position that it could exclude obscene publications from the 
mail.317 According to one report, in 1873 alone, postal inspectors seized not only 
obscene materials, but 15,000 letters from young people soliciting obscene 
matter.318 
In a similar legal move, the Postmaster General, supported by the Justice 
Department, found an implied seizure authority in an antilottery statute 
making it a criminal offense “to deposit in a post-office, to be sent by mail, any 
letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar 
enterprises offering prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever.”319 Indeed, the 
antilottery statute was broader than the obscenity statute because it covered 
letters in addition to circulars or other printed matter. But the letter portion of 
the statute proved unenforceable. The Post Office had not been given authority 
to open and inspect sealed envelopes or packages without a warrant. As a 
consequence, Attorney General Evarts found it “quite impossible, in the 
present state of the postal laws, to develop or define any rules which would 
furnish safe guidance to the postmasters of the country in attempting to 
enforce the prohibition of the [lottery] statute.”320 A postal employee who 
opened or detained mail suspected of containing lottery-related material 
without a warrant would violate the 1836 statute prohibiting any unauthorized 
tampering with the mail. Even if the employee acted reasonably and in good 
 
314.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 661 (1865) (containing the debate on the Committee’s 
report); see MAILABLE MATTER REPORT, supra note 312, at 8; FOWLER, supra note 298, at 51; 
WAYNE E. FULLER, MORALITY AND THE MAIL IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 100 (2003). 
315.  Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 89, 13 Stat. 504, 507. 
316.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 661. 
317.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 41, 42-43 (1873). 
318.  FULLER, supra note 314, at 252. 
319.  Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194, 196 (1868); see 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 538 (1868). 
320.  12 Op. Att’y Gen. 538. For a description of the multiyear campaign against the Louisiana 
Lottery and its offshoots, see CUSHING, supra note 294, at 505-65. 
MASHAW_PRESS_V1WEB.DOC 5/10/2010 2:40:30 PM 
federal administration and administrative law in the gilded age 
1447 
 
faith, the Attorney General believed that the employee was unlikely to escape 
liability. 
Congress continued to amend and reform the regulatory provisions of 
postal statutes throughout the 1870s and 1880s.321 For our purposes, the most 
important new initiative was an 1872 statute reorganizing the Post Office and 
codifying its governing statutes.322 This statute introduced the so-called “fraud 
order.” Upon evidence that a fraudulent scheme was being pursued through 
the use of the mails, the Postmaster General was authorized to issue an order 
directing local postmasters to refuse payment on money orders drawn to the 
perpetrator of the fraud and to return to sender all registered mail addressed to 
the target individual or firm. Here at last was explicit statutory authority for 
the Post Office to use administrative means to protect the mails from misuse, a 
power that it had been exercising since 1835.323 Although textually broad, the 
fraud order statute was construed to avoid converting all common law frauds 
accomplished through some use of the mails into a federal offense. As the 
Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office put the matter: 
It is not every fraudulent practice that can be reached through the 
instrumentality of these statutes. The statutes are leveled at fraudulent 
schemes and devices. A party pursuing a legitimate business may be 
guilty of the wrong of cheating and defrauding his client or customer, 
and that, too, through the medium of the mails, without subjecting 
himself to the penalty imposed by the statutes. It is true that if the mails 
are used in the furtherance of any particular plan or system of cheating 
or defrauding it would bring the party thus offending within the 
purview of the statute. It must appear, however, that there exists a plan 
 
321.  Those statutes include: Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (strengthening the 
antilottery statutes, including banning second-class periodicals from the mails if they merely 
contained lottery related advertisements); Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, 25 Stat. 873 
(providing a list of particular schemes that were forbidden to be promoted by the use of the 
mail); Act of Sept. 26, 1888, ch. 1039, 25 Stat. 496 (providing for the first time explicit 
congressional authorization for the Post Office to confiscate obscene material “under such 
regulations as the Postmaster General shall prescribe”); Act of June 18, 1888, ch. 394, 25 Stat. 
187 (expanding the provisions of the Comstock Law to cover any matter that exhibited 
“libelous, scurrilous, or threatening” language on the wrapping); Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 
186, 19 Stat. 90 (strengthening further the antilottery and obscenity statutes); and Act of 
Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (strengthening the obscenity provisions of prior law and 
promoting Anthony Comstock’s campaign against sexual immorality). 
322.  Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283. 
323.  Similar explicit authority was provided for the removal of obscene material in an 1888 
statute providing that obscene matter “shall be withdrawn from the mails under such 
regulations as the Postmaster-General shall prescribe.” Act of Sept. 26, 1888, 25 Stat. at 496. 
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or scheme or device for obtaining money by a false pretense and that 
the use of the mails constitutes a material element of this device.324 
The flexing of Post Office regulatory muscle did not go uncontested in the 
courts, but broad scale attacks on the constitutionality of national regulation of 
the mails were rebuffed. The most important decision, Ex parte Jackson,325 
involved a habeas corpus petition by Orlando Jackson, a lottery promoter, who 
had been convicted of violating the antilottery statute and sentenced to pay a 
fine of one hundred dollars. He had been arrested in New York and was 
detained there pending satisfaction of the judgment against him. 
Jackson argued that the lottery statute violated Article I, § 8 of the 
Constitution. Although the power to establish post offices and post roads gave 
Congress the power “to protect the mail by appropriate legislation,” it also 
imposed a duty, in Jackson’s view, to provide “the secure transportation and 
delivery of all letters and packets which were considered legitimate mail matter 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”326 Lotteries had been used as 
financing devices by states and localities since the earliest days of the Republic. 
In classic reductio ad absurdum form, Jackson argued that allowing the Congress 
to regulate the mailability of lottery materials would make it possible for 
Congress to “cut off all means of epistolary communication upon any subject 
which is objectionable to a majority of its members.”327 
While the habeas petitioner, Jackson, concentrated on the question of 
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause and the postal power gave Congress 
the authority to pass the statute in question, the Justice Department defended 
on the procedural ground that the posture of the case did not permit the Court 
to hear a habeas petition at this juncture.328 Neither the petitioner nor the 
government addressed the potential First and Fourth Amendment problems 
involved in censoring the mails, but the Supreme Court’s opinion at least 
touched on both issues. 
Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court, ruled for the government. 
Congress’s power to determine what would be carried in the mails, and to 
where, necessarily implied a power to determine that some items would not be 
carried and should be excluded. Field seemed unconcerned by the potential 
First Amendment problem, but went out of his way to make clear that in 
 
324.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 864, 865 (1883). 
325.  96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
326.  Id. at 729. 
327.  Id. at 730-31. 
328.  Brief of the Government, Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (No. 6). 
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implementing the lottery statute, sealed correspondence could not be opened 
without a warrant.329 However halting and uncertain the statutory 
authorizations, Ex parte Jackson supported Congress’s and the Post Office’s 
authority to regulate the content of the mails in the interests of public welfare 
and morals. 
The antivice regulatory actions at the Post Office were, of course, part of 
the larger antivice crusades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
And they were linked together in the person of Anthony Comstock,330 a larger 
than life morals vigilante who epitomized the fears of “respectable” Americans 
concerning the deteriorating moral tone of the century. Comstock operated 
both locally and nationally. He was both chair of the Committee for the 
Suppression of Vice of the New York Chapter of the Young Men’s Christian 
Association, and Special Agent for the Post Office to enforce the 1872 statute. 
Comstock was no mere enforcer. Finding the 1872 legislation too weak, 
Comstock mobilized public opinion and lobbied effectively for a much stronger 
set of restrictions which were embodied in the so-called Comstock Law of 
1873.331 
Armed with more powerful regulatory authority, Comstock cut a wide 
swath. He estimated that by the end of his career that he had been responsible 
for over 3600 arrests. He claimed to have destroyed 73,608 pounds of books; 
877,412 obscene pictures; 8495 negatives for making obscene photos; 98,563 
articles for immoral use; 6436 indecent playing cards; and 8502 boxes of pills 
and powders used for purposes of abortion.332 But Comstock, while a 
formidable and picturesque figure, was primarily interested in criminal 
prosecutions and the seizure and destruction of immoral articles from their 
manufacturers or distributors, rather than in administrative enforcement. We 
will turn our attention, therefore, to the less titillating, but equally far-
reaching, activities of the Post Office in exercising its fraud order authority. 
 
329.  96 U.S. at 735. 
330.  See, e.g., NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY 
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1997) (describing Comstock’s campaign to stamp 
out abortion and contraception). 
331.  Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598. 
332.  JAMES R. PETERSEN, THE CENTURY OF SEX: PLAYBOY’S HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION: 
1900-1999, at 11 (1999). 
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2. Fraud Order Jurisdiction 
Because the use of the mails was essential to all enterprises that operated in 
interstate commerce, the fraud order authority gave the Post Office something 
akin to the jurisdiction that would later be provided to the Federal Trade 
Commission to issue cease and desist orders against deceptive acts and 
practices in commerce. Moreover, as exercised, the Post Office’s antifraud 
authority anticipated the more focused jurisdiction of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug Administration. The courts and 
the Justice Department generally acceded to the Post Office’s broad 
construction of its regulatory jurisdiction. 
For example, the Post Office intercepted the mail of, and brought criminal 
charges against, the issuer of bonds in an enterprise that amounted to little 
more than a Ponzi scheme.333 The defendant complained that there was no 
fraud involved in making promises that he could not keep. The Supreme Court 
concluded that although there were no outright falsehoods in the bond 
offering, beyond the obvious inability of the issuer to make good on the 
promise of spectacular interest payments, the postal statute embraced 
“everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or 
suggestions and promises as to the future.”334 Similarly, a fraud order was 
issued against C.W. Mixer for peddling bogus cures for cancer. Responding to 
Mixer’s advertisements, the Department of Agriculture acquired some of 
Mixer’s medications, tested them, and found them to be completely ineffective. 
On that basis, the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department 
notified Mixer that he must show cause why a fraud order should not be issued 
against him.335 
But neither the statutes nor the judicial decisions had much to say about 
the means by which these substantive restrictions would be implemented. 
Those matters would be left largely to the policies adopted by the Post Office 
Department itself. 
 
333.  Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
334.  Id. at 313. 
335.  See Hearings on H.R. Res. 109 To Investigate the Post Office Department Before the House 
Committee on Expenditures in the Post Office Department, 62d Cong. 2013 (1911). 
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Early in the nineteenth century, the postal service began to employ “special 
agents” to investigate inefficiency, corruption, and theft in the postal system.336 
These special agents had broad powers of inspection, but no authority to arrest 
malefactors or bring prosecutions on behalf of the Post Office. Over time these 
temporary and ad hoc special agents evolved into a core of postal inspectors 
that was recognized in legislation.337 Like most parts of the federal government, 
the inspection bureau was perennially underfunded,338 but business was brisk. 
Inspectors responded not only to departmentally initiated inquiries but also to 
thousands of complaints that poured in from ordinary Americans. The Office 
of Inspection handled nearly 30,000 complaints in 1880, a figure that had risen 
to nearly 200,000 by 1900.339 
While many complaints and investigations involved loss or destruction of 
the mail, by 1879 the obscenity and fraud business was sufficient to justify a 
specialized group of inspectors.340 As complaints arrived, usually addressed just 
to the Postmaster General, the Division of Post Office Inspections and Mail 
Depredations categorized the complaints by topic and assigned them to field 
offices located throughout the country. Special agents who concentrated on 
particular sorts of offenses were assigned to investigate the complaints. While 
in the early days of the Post Office special agents were a motley crew who failed 
to give the central office successful control over local operations,341 by the 1870s 
and 1880s the special agents had become an elite core who not only enforced 
the postal statutes but operated as an all-purpose investigative bureau which 
unified local practices and displaced the historic powers of local postmasters.342 
Post Office Inspectors or Special Agents were indeed a part of the folklore 
of the American West. They wrote memoirs celebrating their daring deeds and 
investigative methods which sold widely and promoted the detective story as a 
 
336.  FULLER, supra note 302, at 240. 
337.  See Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 270, § 9, 5 Stat. 80, 81. 
338.  See REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 41-1, at 10 (1869); FULLER, 
supra note 302, at 273. 
339.  FULLER, supra note 302, at 258. 
340.  REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 46-1, pt. 4, at 18 (2d Sess. 1879). 
341.  See CARPENTER, supra note 49, at 70-77. 
342.  Id. at 94-116. On the crucial role of the emergence of rural free delivery in curbing the power 
of local postmasters, see id. at 123-43. 
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new literary genre.343 They were a quasimilitary corps that was increasingly 
recruited from the other elite corps at the Post Office, the Railway Mail Service. 
And, as at the Pension Office, the Post Office organized these officials along 
functional lines that featured specialization of subject matter and recruitment 
and promotion on the basis of merit.344 
There was also heavy involvement in enforcement by the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Post Office Department. While seizures could be 
effected by the Post Office staff, prosecutions had to be carried out by U.S. 
Attorneys. Moreover, there were constant questions about whether particular 
items fell within the obscenity, fraud, or antilottery statutes. Questions of law, 
practice, and interpretation were answered by the Assistant Attorney for the 
Post Office Department and by the First Assistant Postmaster General through 
the latter’s division of correspondence. In his hagiographic account of the Post 
Office in 1893, Marshall Cushing described the First Assistant Postmaster 
General as “the great conundrum man of the Department.”345 The replies to 
questions sent out through the division of correspondence were periodically 
codified in the rulings of the Post Office, which in Cushing’s description “were 
printed in the Postal Guide and became the law and gospel of the 
postmasters.”346 
The reach of the obscenity laws seems to have been a continuous source of 
concern to the Assistant Attorney General, who struggled to instruct the 
inspectors concerning the difficult line to be drawn between the offensive and 
the obscene. Thus, while the Assistant Attorney General may have agreed with 
the complainants that a publication called the Labor Vindicator was 
characterized by “great vulgarity of expression,” vulgarity was not the same as 
obscenity.347 The Assistant Attorney General turned back a similar effort to 
exclude the popular Police Gazette from the mail.348 And Reverend H.W. 
Spalding’s effort to suppress a pamphlet entitled The Deitistic Pestilence and the 
Religious Plague of Man was rebuffed with the opinion that the federal statutes 
prohibited the mailing of obscene material, not blasphemous attacks on the 
church.349 
 
343.  Id. at 70. For a flavor of the tales of the special agents, see CUSHING, supra note 294, at 320-
71. 
344.  CARPENTER, supra note 49, at 83-84. 
345.  CUSHING, supra note 294, at 192. 
346.  Id. 
347.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 41, 43 (1873). 
348.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 866, 866-67 (1883). 
349.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 898, 899 (1884). 
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Direction of lower-level personnel obviously could not be carried out solely 
through the medium of opinions of the Assistant Attorney General for the Post 
Office Department. The primary source of instruction seems to have been the 
monthly Postal Guide. The Guide was distributed to all local postmasters and 
was available to the public by subscription. The policies of the Department 
were also collected from time to time in codified form in bound sets of Post 
Office regulations. Some examples from the 1879 regulations will provide a 
general sense of what was covered. 
Some instructions were procedural, such as the direction that postmasters 
should submit items to the First Assistant Postmaster General if they were in 
doubt about their mailability.350 Others were more substantive, such as the 
direction that regular issues of newspapers could not be excluded from the mail 
just because they contained advertisements for lotteries.351 And some were 
protective, such as the instruction that local postmasters were prohibited from 
detaining first-class matter on the mere suspicion that it contained forbidden 
articles or from breaking the seal on any letter or package to determine its 
content.352 These same regulations instructed postmasters to seize obscene 
matter wherever encountered and forward it to the dead letter office,353 even 
though, as previously recounted, the statute criminalizing the use of the mails 
to transport obscene matter contained no seizure authority. 
The inability to inspect sealed or first-class mail created significant 
problems of enforcement. To be sure, much of the material advertising 
lotteries, promoting fraudulent schemes, or hawking obscene publications was 
mailed second or third class and was therefore open for inspection. But 
payments made for banned materials were almost always sent first class or by 
registered mail. Hence, for example, so long as potential customers knew that 
lottery tickets were available they could be bought and sold through the mails 
in sealed envelopes.354 On the other hand, once someone was determined to be 
 
350.  POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 228, at 80 (Arthur H. 
Bissell & Thomas B. Kirby eds., 1879). 
351.  Id. § 227, at 80. 
352.  Id. § 434, at 112. 
353.  Id. § 436, at 112, 113. 
354.  An early opinion of the Justice Department suggested that any communication addressed to 
a lottery company could be seized as unmailable. 1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 455 
(1879). But this position was rebuffed by the judiciary, Commerford v. Thompson, 1 F. 417 
(C.C.D. Ky. 1880), and later regulations of the Post Office Department instructed local 
postmasters that they could not assume that letters addressed to lottery companies or their 
agents contained material concerning lotteries. H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 50-63, § 379, at 159 
(1887). 
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engaged in a fraudulent scheme (which sometimes also applied to lotteries) all 
of their mail could be interdicted. The fraud order thus became one of the Post 
Office Department’s most important regulatory tools. 
4. The Fraud Order Process 
As in other cases, the Post Office investigated potential frauds both on its 
own initiative and in response to complaints made to postal officials, the 
Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department, U.S. Attorneys, 
and other government departments. Local postmasters who became aware of 
lottery or fraud schemes were directed to investigate and to make appropriate 
notification to the local U.S. Attorney and the Postmaster General. If the 
central office believed that the facts justified a fraud order, a notice was sent to 
the target of the potential order outlining the charges and inviting a written 
response.355 An Assistant Attorney General’s opinion in 1883 noted that 
“[w]hen a preliminary notice is sent the party charged, if he desires, is heard by 
himself or attorney. He is allowed to file his written statement and that of 
others supported or unsupported by affidavit. Indeed the greatest possible 
latitude is allowed for explanation or defense.”356 Oral hearings seem not to 
have been routine although there is evidence that they were provided in some 
cases.357 After the hearing, paper or oral, the Assistant Attorney General made a 
recommendation to the Postmaster General, who then decided whether or not 
to issue a fraud order. 
Notice and opportunity to defend were excluded in situations in which 
there was conclusive evidence of fraud.358 Moreover, the evidence upon which 
the fraud order was based may not have been fully revealed to the target. 
Evidence often came largely from the postal inspector’s reports, which had 
been compiled from confidential statements by informants who had been 
promised anonymity.359 If the Postmaster General was satisfied that the target 
had engaged in fraud through the use of the mails, he issued a written order 
 
355.  See 1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 816 (1874); 1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 
78 (1882).  
356.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t 796, 799 (1883); accord 1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. 
Dep’t 816, 823 (1883). 
357.  See 1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen P.O. Dep’t 95, 96 (1885) (“[T]he argument urged in a petition 
. . . by Mr. Dawson, his counsel, who personally appeared before me and made an argument 
on behalf of the petitioner, is that as the business is now conducted it involves no fraudulent 
use of the mails.”). 
358.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen P.O. Dep’t 796 (1883). 
359.  H.R. REP. NO. 59-4919, at 2 (1906). 
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forbidding the payment of money orders to the company or individual and 
ordering that all mail addressed to the target of the order be returned to its 
sender marked “fraudulent.” 
These procedures were hardly the full formal trappings of civil or criminal 
trial. But the Supreme Court was unreceptive to claims that due process 
required judicial process before the Post Office could intercept someone’s 
mail.360 Moreover, given the limited nature of judicial review by mandamus or 
injunction, the Postmaster General’s decisions concerning whether the facts 
justified an order were essentially unreviewable. In the early twentieth century, 
federal courts did begin to review the question of whether, on the agreed upon 
facts, the Postmaster had exceeded his authority by banning mailable 
materials,361 but they would not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence 
upon which the Department acted. As one court said in a proceeding objecting 
to the evidence upon which a fraud order had been based, “It may have been 
hearsay; it may have been secondary; it may have been delivered by an 
incompetent witness; or it may have been such as the courts would receive. But 
whatever it was, it was evidence satisfactory to him.”362 
These limitations on judicial jurisdiction might be interpreted as a license 
for arbitrary enforcement, but internal law tended to furnish its own 
constraints. The Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department 
counseled the Postmaster General not to accept hearsay “on any doubtful 
proposition.”363 Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General had a lively sense of 
the legal novelty of permitting a person or firm to be completely excluded from 
the mail system. On this basis, he concluded that the power to issue fraud 
orders was meant to be exercised personally by the Postmaster General. In his 
words, 
The power conferred by law upon the Postmaster-General, upon 
evidence satisfactory to him, to order the return of registered letters or 
the refusal of payment of money orders, is a very arbitrary power, in 
derogation of common right, and can be exercised only by the 
Postmaster-General. He has not delegated, and can not delegate, the 
power to inspectors.364 
 
360.  Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904). 
361.  Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). 
362.  H.R. REP. NO. 59-4919, at 2 (quoting People’s U.S. Bank v. Gilson, 140 F. 1 (E.D. Mo. 
1905)). 
363.  1 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t. 816, 819 (1883). 
364.  2 Op. Assistant Att’y Gen. P.O. Dep’t. 247, 248 (1886). 
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Moreover, the instructional guide to Post Office inspectors and local 
postmasters was particularly attentive to both process and the careful 
supervision of street-level personnel. The manual charged the inspectors with a 
thorough understanding of all laws and regulations pertaining to the Post 
Office.365 Local postmasters were prohibited from providing advice concerning 
the mailability of a particular item.366 Once they received arguably unmailable 
material, samples were to be submitted to the central government, either to the 
First Assistant Postmaster General for determination where obscenity was in 
question, or to the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department 
concerning lottery or fraud related materials.367 While the instructions were 
more detailed concerning how Inspectors were to go about their investigation 
of fraudulent schemes,368 the determination of whether a scheme was 
fraudulent or not was left to the Assistant Attorney General and ultimately to 
the Postmaster General.369 Investigators were urged to collect as many 
statements as possible from potential victims of fraudulent schemes and to 
preserve any physical evidence that came into their possession. They were 
authorized to use test letters to determine whether seemingly legitimate 
businesses were actually engaged in fraudulent activity, and they were required 
to consult with their supervising inspector concerning whether a fraudulent 
scheme had in fact been discovered.370 
The great breadth of the fraud regulations, combined with vigorous 
enforcement, generated resistance. In 1906, a bill was unsuccessfully promoted 
in Congress to rein in the administrative powers of the Post Office. Under the 
proposal, no fraud order would take effect until fifteen days after notice of its 
issuance had been received by the target. And the order would be stayed if the 
target filed a bill in a United States Circuit Court, which would apparently 
have had de novo authority to determine whether the fraud order should issue. 
George B. Cortelyou, a former Post Office Special Agent and Postmaster 
General (and then Secretary of the Treasury) defended the existing 
 
365.  U.S. POST OFFICE DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS TO POST OFFICE INSPECTORS CONCERNING THEIR 
CONDUCT, POWERS, AND DUTIES § 11, at 9 (1899) [hereinafter 1899 INSTRUCTIONS]. 
366.  Id. at 94. 
367.  Id. at 95. 
368.  Id. at 57. 
369.  Later editions of the instructions which reach beyond the scope of this study provided 
greater detail concerning fraudulent investment schemes. See U.S. POST OFFICE DEP’T, 
INSTRUCTIONS TO POST OFFICE INSPECTORS CONCERNING THEIR CONDUCT, POWERS AND 
DUTIES § 53, at 63 (1905). 
370.  1899 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 365, § 50, at 60. 
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administrative scheme in an article in the North American Review in 1907.371 
Cortelyou had little doubt that the courts would ultimately sustain the 
determinations of the department even if the bill were enacted. He noted that 
since the enactment of the fraud order legislation, 2400 fraud orders had been 
issued, but only 30 cases had sought to challenge their propriety. Moreover, the 
Post Office had never lost a case.372 That exemplary record is, perhaps, not too 
surprising given the limited nature of judicial review. Nevertheless, according 
to Cortelyou the purpose of the proposed legislation was really to produce 
delay within which the fraudulent scheme could be carried out. In Cortelyou’s 
words: 
It is not the law, but the law’s delay, which the operators of fraudulent 
methods would be glad to obtain. For it must be borne in mind that 
many, if not most, of the schemes to defraud are of the fly-by-night 
order; of the kind whose methods and base of operations are constantly 
changing; who shift from name to name and city to city, for the express 
purpose of avoiding too close scrutiny; who are often hard to locate for 
the deeds of the present and harder to convict for the deeds of the 
past.373 
Cortelyou went on to give a number of examples of the types of frauds that 
had been prohibited by the Post Office fraud order process and to regale his 
readers with the stories of extensive delays that were attendant upon 
prosecution of these same malefactors in court. Cortelyou assured his readers 
that fraud orders were issued only after careful investigation and a hearing of 
all sides by the Assistant Attorney General. Moreover, he asserted that the 
Department often entered into settlements with targets of inquiry. 
According to his description, when investigators determined that 
“advertisements or misleading statements were not deliberately designed to 
defraud and that the business is not otherwise open to serious criticism, the 
opportunity is given to discontinue the objectionable features, and the business 
is allowed to proceed undisturbed.”374 He described the Post Office 
investigators as conciliators or mediators as well as enforcers. When 
investigating complaints against reputable concerns, he said, “it usually 
develops that misunderstandings occurred through delays in shipment, loss in 
 
371.  George B. Cortelyou, Frauds in the Mail: Fraud Orders and Their Purposes, 184 N. AM. REV. 
808 (1907). 
372.  Id. at 815. 
373.  Id. at 812. 
374.  Id. at 809-10. 
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transit or some other cause easily accounted for and explained, giving the 
Department an opportunity to act as peacemaker and adjust the difficulty.”375 
If Cortelyou is to be credited, the fraud order process was a fair, even a 
benign and helpful, regulatory scheme. It was one whose effectiveness 
depended crucially on the ability of the Post Office to enforce the postal laws by 
administrative means. The attempt to emasculate the fraud order process by 
judicial review was defeated in the same year that the Hepburn Act rescued the 
ICC’s regulatory authority from the clutches of an unsympathetic Supreme 
Court.376 But Congress seems not to have had consistent views concerning the 
need for administrative enforcement. In 1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act also 
failed to provide any effective means for removing adulterated foods and drugs 
from the market save through lawsuits. And Cortelyou’s admonitions seem to 
have been forgotten when the Federal Trade Commission was established in 
1914 and given a cease and desist authority that had no bite until judicially 
enforced. Thus, when some of the jurisdiction that was exercised by the Post 
Office through its fraud order process was parceled out to more specialized 
agencies in the early twentieth century, those agencies arguably wielded less 
potent regulatory mechanisms than the ones the Post Office had been 
exercising in various forms since the 1830s. 
iv.  administrative law in the gilded age 
The social, economic, and political ferment of the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century makes our twenty-first-century pace of change seem almost 
modest by comparison. Our enduring images of that period are summoned by 
words like “capital,” “monopoly,” and “invention”; “party,” “scandal,” and 
“corruption”; “labor,” “farmers,” and “immigrants.” Private enterprise ruled, 
we are told, and bent government to its will. A squalid politics of partisan 
competition and a corrupt scramble for government subsidies disgraced 
America’s democratic pretensions. The conspicuous display of private wealth 
gilded an era whose underlying realities were widespread poverty, urban 
slums, and social injustice. 
This story is more than a historical conceit, but it fails to do justice to the 
generation that, emerging from the horrors of the Civil War, built the 
foundations of an empire in a few short years.377 The crucible of war revealed 
 
375.  Id. at 810. 
376.  See Merrill, supra note 53, at 27-33. 
377.  For some revisionist history of the period, see THE GILDED AGE: A REAPPRAISAL (H. Wayne 
Morgan ed., 1963). 
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the underlying self-indulgence of Emersonian idealism and individualism.378 
Military duty and comradeship schooled a realistic faith in values of 
competence and useful work. Educated men who returned from the war, and 
women who endured it, chose active lives in both private and public life. They 
understood their reborn nation in nationalist terms,379 not in terms of 
Jeffersonian longings for weak and decentralized governance or agrarian 
individualism.380 
In many ways, the national government provided a tepid response to the 
social, economic, and political demands of the times. Yet there was reform and 
there was state building. Between 1861 and 1891, while the population of the 
country doubled,381 federal civilian government employment more than 
quadrupled.382 Moreover, in Leonard White’s description, the government 
bureau was moving toward a model of “businesslike” government.383 Not only 
were businessmen found as the heads of departments, executive leadership also 
was provided by the appointment of returning military officers to civilian posts 
and the increasing presence of academics whose specialties were of the more 
practical sort found in departments of statistics, economics, or political science. 
And as we have seen, even before Pendleton, bureaus were instituting systems 
of merit appointment and promotion, as well as organizing their work into 
specialized units. 
Stephen Skowronek argues that these civil service reforms were a 
“patchwork” built on top of a dominant and counterveiling system of 
patronage. In his words, “[t]he merit service grew as an expedient response to 
new demands on government, but it operated as a contradiction within a state 
that relied upon very different talents and procedures.”384 Skowronek uses a 
similar patchwork metaphor to characterize reforms in the Army and for the 
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. His general position is perhaps 
summed up in his description of the politics of the Interstate Commerce Act: 
 
378.  See FREDRICKSON, supra note 76. 
379.  See, e.g., 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, Amendments of the Constitution, Submitted to the Consideration 
of the American People, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER: CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 137 (1881). 
380.  See Samuel Fowler, The Political Opinions of Jefferson, 101 N. AM. REV. 313 (1865). 
381.  This figure was calculated from estimated population totals in 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
supra note 11, tbl.A6-8, at 8 (1975). 
382.  This figure was calculated from 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 11, tbl.Y308-317, at 
1103. As in prior periods the largest numbers of new employees were in the Post Office 
Department, but other parts of the executive establishment grew at a comparable rate. 
383.  WHITE, supra note 73, at 387. 
384.  SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 82. 
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“Congress had not transformed the conflicts within society into a coherent 
regulatory policy but had merely translated those conflicts into governmental 
policy and shifted them to other institutions.”385 
I have no quarrel with Skowronek’s account, only with his emphasis. When 
compared with European models of bureaucratic administration, or with 
American bureaucracy in the post-New Deal era, American civil administration 
was indeed a patchwork—a work in progress that contained many conflicting 
elements. But what American governmental reform, then or now, has not been 
a patchwork, a compromise between the old and the new and among the 
contending interests with a stake in the policy outcome? Coherence is not the 
dominant attribute of congressional legislation. The failure of Pendleton, or 
other reforms, to reconstitute the American state on a rational-bureaucratic 
model should not blind us to developments that left American government 
with significantly greater capacities near the end of the nineteenth century than 
it had when it emerged from the Civil War. 
Similar caution should be used in assessing Theodore Lowi’s claim that a 
student of congressional legislation in the Gilded Age would be unaware of 
major social movements to promote the rights of workers, farmers, or 
women.386 To be sure, women’s rights are nowhere to be found in late 
nineteenth-century national legislation. But the creation of departments of 
labor and agriculture surely hint at the recognition of the demands of workers 
and farmers for attention from the national government. And the fingerprints 
of farmers’ groups were all over both the Interstate Commerce Act and the 
Morrill Land Grant Colleges legislation subsidizing higher education in the 
agricultural and mechanical arts. To be sure, much remained to be done. But 
these new departments institutionalized the voice of important social 
movements in public administration. Subsequent legislative policy would 
depend importantly on the information and proposals generated by the 
administrators charged with attending to these clientele groups. Modest first 
steps provide the capacity for bolder strides through both legislative and 
administrative initiatives.387 
These are hardly the only areas in which the federal government occupied 
new policy space, created new bureaus and departments, or increased 
 
385.  Id. at 149. 
386.  LOWI, supra note 7, at 78. 
387.  On the signal success of the Department of Agricultural in building a bureaucratic system 
largely immune from political control, see CARPENTER, supra note 116, at 179-325. 
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governmental capacities.388 Administration was growing, taking on new roles, 
and becoming more professionalized. But where was administrative law? 
According to Frank Goodnow, in the first book-length treatment of 
administrative law published in the United States, administrative law was both 
ubiquitous and invisible.389 In Goodnow’s view, although administrative law 
“has exercised on Anglo-Saxon political development an influence perhaps 
greater than that exerted by any other part of the English law,” the term 
administrative law formed a part of the legal vocabulary of only “the most 
advanced legal thinkers.”390 Goodnow begins, therefore with a definition: 
“Administrative law is . . . that part of the public law which fixes the 
organization and determines the competence of the administrative authorities, 
and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his rights.”391 For 
Goodnow, the law fixing the competence of administrative authorities and that 
fixing the rights of individuals in relation to those authorities, were but two 
sides of the same coin: 
[W]hile administrative law emphasizes the powers of the government 
and the duties of the citizen, it is nevertheless to the administrative law 
that the individual must have recourse when his rights are violated. For 
just so far as administrative law delimits the sphere of action of the 
administration it indicates what are the rights of the individual which 
the administration must respect.392 
As previously mentioned, in his later treatment of American administrative 
law,393 Goodnow breaks the field into three principle categories—the law 
relating to the relationship of administration to the political branches, the law 
governing legal control through judicial review, and the legal rules and 
processes developed in the course of administration by those officials having 
policymaking authority. The last is, of course, what Bruce Wyman 
characterized in his 1903 treatise as the “internal law” of administration.394 
And, as Wyman recognized, the striking feature of administrative law in the 
whole of the nineteenth century was how little administrative law was 
generated by external sources, the courts, presidential direction, or 
 
388.  See SHORT, supra note 12; WHITE, supra note 73. 
389.  1 GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 44, at 6-9. 
390.  Id. at 7. 
391.  Id. at 8-9. 
392.  Id. at 8. 
393.  GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 44, at 371-72. 
394.  WYMAN, supra note 44. 
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congressional statute, and how much was established by the rules, precedents, 
and practices of administrative agencies themselves. The Gilded Age was no 
exception. 
A. Political Accountability 
To be sure, legislation provided much of the basic skeleton of 
administrative law in postbellum America. Congress created numerous 
departments and bureaus and reorganized others. It shaped federal civilian 
employment through its veterans’ preference legislation,395 repeal of the 
Tenure of Office Act, and passage of the Pendleton Civil Service statute. 
Theodore Lowi’s estimate396 that nearly half of congressional legislation in this 
period was devoted to the establishment or reorganization of government 
authorities might be somewhat inflated, but legislative state building in the 
Gilded Age was substantial. 
Still, much of this activity was inspired by administrative practices and 
proposals.397 And legislation often gave broad authority to administrators 
concerning the organization and procedure by which the statute was to be 
implemented and substantial control over substantive policy as well. Statutory 
authority for Post Office regulation of lotteries, pornography, obscenity, and 
fraud ratified and strengthened preexisting Post Office practice. Amendments 
to that authority, such as the Comstock Law of 1873,398 were promoted by the 
administrators in charge of enforcement. The Pension Office, notwithstanding 
constant congressional attention to the pension laws, had less success 
promoting its desired reforms. In some cases, such as the sixty surgeons bill, 
congressional apathy or opposition thwarted administrative plans for a more 
professionalized and unified administrative system. But in others cases, 
Congress’s failure to act, or the vagueness of its statutory language, simply left 
the Pension Office to develop its own organization, procedures, and 
substantive interpretations. 
Presidential creation of administrative law was at a low ebb following 
Lincoln’s assassination. While Andrew Johnson narrowly escaped 
impeachment for his alleged violation of the Tenure in Office Act, that statute 
 
395.  J. RES. 27, 38th Cong., 13 Stat. 571 (2d Sess. 1865). 
396.  LOWI, supra note 7, at 77. 
397.  See supra notes 99-107. 
398.  Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598. 
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remained in effect until Grover Cleveland orchestrated its repeal in 1887.399 
And while the Pendleton Act in some sense strengthened the President by 
reducing congressional influence over lower level appointments, 
administration in the departments seems to have operated mostly independent 
of presidential direction. The President could, by appointment of like-minded 
administrators, change administrative policy, as we saw in connection with the 
interpretation of “line of duty” by the Pension Office in the late 1880s. But, like 
Congress, the President had no staff to assist him in the management of the 
executive branch. As Leonard White reports: 
There was no agency directly serving the President to inquire, to report, 
and to advise. In the absence of such administrative aids he was 
necessarily barred from an active role in management. His mind was 
directed primarily to Congress, not to the executive departments.400 
There is some irony in the recognition that in an era of bellicose political 
competition, and one in which every action of the government tended to be 
interpreted in terms of partisan political motivation, the actual implementation 
of government programs seems to have operated relatively free from the 
control of the elected branches of the government. The abstract structure of the 
legal relationship between Congress, the President and administrators gave 
elected officials ultimate authority over all administrative action. 
Administrators could not act without statutory authority or human and fiscal 
resources. These were all within the control of Congress. The President 
retained the power to appoint and, after a two-decade hiatus, regained the 
removal power—a power that had been transformed by convention into a 
presumptive power to direct administrative action, at least within the 
boundaries laid down by legislation.401 Yet the information advantages of 
continuous attention, even in understaffed and underfunded agencies, gave 
administrators substantial autonomy. The part of administrative law that deals 
with the structure of political control of administration had by the end of the 
nineteenth century taken on a form that is familiar to twenty-first-century 
administrative lawyers. Political control was supreme in theory, but spotty in 
fact. 
 
399.  JAMES FORD RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850, at 
265-66 (1919). 
400.  WHITE, supra note 73, at 392. 
401.  See GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 44, at 62-70. 
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B. Legal Accountability 
Legal control through the judiciary was, by contrast, quite decidedly 
different from our contemporary understandings. The “partnership” model of 
court-agency relations that emerged in the twentieth century was barely 
perceptible in the decisions of the federal courts or the legislation empowering 
executive departments and agencies. Writ review by mandamus or injunction 
emphasized agency authority both to interpret and to implement the law. And, 
while administrative determinations could be called into question in suits 
between private parties, the degree to which courts would second guess prior 
agency determinations was uncertain. Common law actions against officials for 
damages tended to yield de novo judicial determinations both on law and fact. 
On the other hand, Land Office determinations were routinely treated as 
subject to attack only for lack of jurisdiction, notwithstanding some incursions 
on the Land Office’s final authority over legal interpretation in private suits for 
equitable relief. Meanwhile, full fledged appeals were allowed from the 
decisions of the Court of Claims. But the most numerous class of monetary 
claims was excepted from Court of Claims jurisdiction: the multitudinous 
claimants for veterans’ pensions could pursue relief from the judiciary only 
through an almost universally ineffective application for a writ of mandamus. 
Given the paucity of appellate review, the basic rule of public 
administrative law that emerges from the judicial decisions of the nineteenth 
century is that administrative discretion will not be disturbed by judicial 
intervention. Private rights were protected by private actions. Where those 
actions brought the legality of the determinations of government officials 
incidentally into question, the authority of the court to decide questions of fact 
or law was highly dependent upon the form of private action brought. 
Decisions in these “private actions” evidence an awareness of their “public law” 
overtones, but they tend to be resolved on the basis of private law principles. 
The central preoccupation of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 
administrative lawyers, the struggle to make legal control in the administrative 
state respond to appropriate general principles of administrative and judicial 
competence, is visible only at the margins of the nineteenth-century 
jurisprudence.402 
 
402.  Or perhaps, once again, we are looking in the wrong places. In a recent paper, James 
Pfander and Jonathan Hunt investigate the private bill practice in antebellum America. 
James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification 
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the author). They find that Congress routinely enacted private bills to compensate 
officers who had been held liable for illegal acts, but who had acted reasonably or in 
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The Supreme Court also ostentatiously declined to meddle in 
administrative procedure. The constitutional clause that looms largest in 
modern administrative procedure, the requirement for due process of law, is 
almost wholly absent from the administrative law jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court seemed exasperated by due process claims against either the 
national or the state governments. In Public Clearing House v. Coyne,403 when 
reviewing a challenge to a Post Office fraud order, the Court said: 
It is too late to argue that due process of law is denied whenever the 
disposition of property is affected by the order of an executive 
department. . . . That due process of law does not necessarily require 
the interference of the judicial power is laid down in many cases and by 
many eminent writers upon the subject of constitutional limitations.404 
It was even more dismissive of claims against state actors in Davidson v. 
New Orleans,405 where it lamented: 
It is not a little remarkable, that while [the Due Process Clause] has 
been in the Constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the 
authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century . . . this 
special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the 
judicial forum . . . . But while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a 
restraint upon the power of the States, only a very few years, the docket 
of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that 
State courts and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There is here 
abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the 
scope of this provision as found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, 
it would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and 
 
accordance with their instructions from superiors. Moreover, Congress also compensated 
parties who were unable to sue the offending officer because the officer was absent or 
insolvent. Id. at 29. Hence, on their interpretation, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
of official common law liability, operated not to deny inquiry into the reasonableness of 
government action, but to put that inquiry in the hands of Congress. See id. at 5-6. And in 
the halls of Congress these matters were handled by specialized committees that built up 
precedent and deployed it in a quasi-judicial fashion. Id. at 15, 24 n.122. Hence, to some 
degree, the familiar reasonableness review in contemporary American administrative law 
was, while missing from nineteenth-century judicial review, firmly ensconced in another 
institution. 
403.  194 U.S. 497 (1904). 
404.  Id. at 508-09. 
405.  96 U.S. 97 (1877). 
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the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is 
looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this 
court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court 
of the justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the 
legislation on which such a decision may be founded.406 
The Court would, of course, begin to heed some of these litigants’ cries in its 
substantive due process jurisprudence of the early twentieth century. But it 
would be many more years before a concept of “administrative due process” 
would be developed that separated the question of administrative due process 
from the question of whether adjudicatory jurisdiction was required to be 
placed in an Article III court. 
C. Managerial Control Through Internal Law 
The limitations on political control and judicial review in nineteenth-
century America emphasized the role of administrators themselves in 
developing an internal law of administration. Some of that law was 
transsubstantive administrative law in familiar contemporary fashion. The 
Civil Service Commission had jurisdiction that cut across the whole of the 
Executive Branch. And the Justice Department’s authority to provide 
interpretive advice not only made it an arbiter of the construction of particular 
legal provisions of interest to an individual agency, but also gave it a capacity to 
provide constructions that informed the activities of all agencies.407 The bevy of 
cross-cutting legislation that now applies to all federal administrative 
agencies,408 however, lay far in the future. Most “internal administrative law” 
was, at least formally, the work of individual agencies or departments and 
related to their own affairs. 
Yet it is not difficult to see a series of quite familiar “rule of law” principles 
emerging from administrative practices common to many agencies.409 The first 
is surely uniformity and consistency in the application of the law. To some 
degree this is imperative in any hierarchical system in which top level 
 
406.  Id. at 103-04. 
407.  Opinions of the Attorneys General first became generally available in 1840. On the 
development of the advisory functions of the Attorney General, see HOMER CUMMINGS & 
CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE 
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 78-92 (1937). 
408.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 150-68 (6th ed. 2009). 
409.  See WYMAN, supra note 44, at 342-56. 
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administrators wish to keep control over subordinates. But as early as the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, Thomas Jefferson, that archenemy of 
bureaucracy, was insisting that centralized control was essential to protect 
citizens from biased or erroneous actions by federal officials.410 My case studies 
document the significant administrative energies devoted to promoting 
uniformity and consistency in both the Pension Office and the Post Office. 
Each published a constant stream of rules, guidelines, and precedents to 
instruct lower level personnel. Moreover, decisions were subjected to multiple 
levels of internal review that put final authority in relatively few hands in the 
central offices. 
Administrative practice also furthered norms of transparency. Although 
there was no Federal Register Act, or Federal Register, the administrative rules, 
guidelines, and precedents were made available to the general public—at least 
the interested public—not just lower-level personnel. Transparent enunciation 
of administrative policy had reached a high degree of sophistication in the 
Pension Office, a practice that not only produced a “level playing field” for 
claimants, their agents, and attorneys, who were seeking public benefits, but 
also provided constant fodder for critique in the popular press and more 
academic publications. Regulatory enforcement authorities then and now are 
more circumspect about publishing their enforcement methods and priorities. 
But information concerning the Post Office’s enforcement of the antilottery, 
antipornography, and antifraud statutes was made available through its 
monthly Postal Guide and the publication of decisions by the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Post Office Department. 
Finally, notwithstanding the absence of judicial demands for administrative 
due process, the adjudicatory processes at both the Pension Office and the Post 
Office paid significant attention to issues of adjudicatory fairness. Adjudicators 
were not neutral in the sense of modern administrative law judges, or the 
Board of Review established to review valuation questions in the Treasury 
Department in 1890. But the Pension Office gave strict instructions to 
examiners and to examining physicians concerning their posture vis-à-vis both 
claimants and the government. They were not to favor either, but to decide 
cases on the facts presented. It established three-physician boards to limit 
idiosyncratic bias, and even sought to avoid partisan bias by dividing the 
members of the boards, where possible, between the political parties. 
 
410.  Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor Charles Pinckney (July 18, 1808), in 12 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 102 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 
eds., 1905). 
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In a similar fashion, the Post Office sought to avoid local or prosecutorial 
bias in enforcement. Local postmasters were not allowed to interdict letters or 
publications presented for mailing without clearance from the Assistant 
Postmaster General. And fraud order determinations could not be made by 
investigating special agents, but had to be referred to the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Post Office Department, and ultimately to the Postmaster 
General. Hearings concerning whether a fraud order should issue were held 
before the Assistant Attorney General, who was not an employee of the Post 
Office. 
Notice and opportunity to contest were also prominent features of both of 
these adjudicatory systems. Pension Office claimants and Post Office targets 
had access to counsel to press their claims, opportunities for appeal within the 
agency process, and the opportunity to fully present their evidence and 
confront and contest contrary evidence in the government’s possession. A 
substantial portion of these hearing processes was carried on through 
documentary presentations, but that is true in administrative proceedings 
today. Orality and cross examination were provided, then and now, only when 
necessary for the adequate presentation and testing of evidence.411 
The rich development of what Bruce Wyman characterized as internal 
administrative law is mostly missing from contemporary legal analysis. To be 
sure, practitioners in one or another substantive area pay close attention to 
agency lawmaking within their particular fields. But since the monumental 
study of administrative processes undertaken to inform the drafting of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act,412 little attention seems to be paid to the 
degree to which these practices reflect broader normative currents in the way 
administrative action should be structured and constrained. The major 
contemporary exception to this balkanization of the study of internal law might 
be found in the emerging field of global administrative law. Global 
administrative law almost necessarily imagines that there is a normative core of 
responsible and responsive administrative practice that can be identified and 
implemented without necessarily making administrative institutions 
accountable either to elected representatives or to courts having broad 
jurisdiction to review their decisions. For, at the global level, these political and 
legal constraints hardly exist.413 
 
411.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 
(1971). 
412.  ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941). 
413.  For a flavor of the global administrative law scholarship referred to here, see Sabino Cassese, 
Administrative Law Without the State: The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
MASHAW_PRESS_V1WEB.DOC 5/10/2010 2:40:30 PM 
federal administration and administrative law in the gilded age 
1469 
 
A similar attention to administrative practice in the emergence of internal 
administrative law norms might be rewarded at the domestic level as well. To 
take one example, when the Supreme Court decided the famous Goldberg v. 
Kelly case,414 it proceeded as if there were no tradition of notice and 
opportunity to contest in the law of American public benefits. This was, of 
course, true if one looked only for judicial decisions requiring administrative 
hearings in those programs. But if the Court had looked at the administrative 
practices of the Veterans Administration in adjudicating claims to military 
pensions, or the practices of the Social Security Administration in adjudicating 
disputes concerning old age or disability pensions, it would have found well-
articulated practices that closely tracked the demands that it seemed to pull 
from thin air and impose on the adjudication of public welfare claims. 
Justice Black looked at traditional practice, but in the wholly different 
context of creditor-debtor relations in private law. And only Chief Justice 
Burger, joined by Justice Black, gave controlling significance to the then-
Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s internal administrative law. 
That department had a proposed rule in process concerning the requisites of a 
“fair hearing” in the program of Aid to Families of Dependant Children that 
would have required all of the elements deemed necessary by the majority 
opinion in Goldberg, plus some additional ones, such as, the public provision of 
the assistance of counsel. 
The Court’s willingness to impose procedural formalities in Goldberg v. 
Kelly was, of course, influenced by its exposure to other welfare cases involving 
oppressive practices in some state welfare agencies and by the racial and class 
discrimination issues latent in the administration of need-based public 
assistance. But, even if one believes that the Supreme Court should 
constitutionalize benefits administration beyond some very basic requirements 
to assure respect for individual dignity, as I do not,415 the Court’s approach 
would have been better articulated as an acceptance of customary best practices 
in a broad range of public benefits regimes. Moreover, attention to practice and 
internal law across agencies playing similar roles might be more protective of 
individual procedural protections than the “thumb on the scales” for 
 
& POL. 663 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale? Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law 
Frontier in Global Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143 (2005); and Benedict 
Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15. 
414.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
415.  See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (arguing 
for a “dignitary theory” of due process). 
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administrative discretion that the Court invoked in retreating from Goldberg. 
The bland statement in Mathews v. Eldridge416 that the Court must give 
“substantial weight . . . to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged 
by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the 
procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement 
claims of individuals”417 provides little assurance that the Court has educated 
itself concerning the realities of benefits administration in social security 
disability cases or in similar or related programs. 
coda: the jurisprudential status of internal 
administrative law 
Because the “internal administrative law” created by agency rules, 
precedents, and practices is largely ignored by modern administrative law 
scholarship418 and legal analysis, it may seem odd to think of this law as “law” 
at all. Forgetting that administrative law both constitutes and empowers 
administrative action at the same time that it structures and constrains 
administrative behavior, administrative law is often thought of as just that set 
of external constraints that limit agency discretion. And even if one recognizes 
the broader vision of administrative law that Frank Goodnow articulated,419 the 
idea of agencies “constituting” administrative law through their internal 
decisions about organization and procedure seems to undermine the notion 
that legitimate administrative authority comes only through legislation, or in 
some instances, presidential direction. Internal law seems to cut agencies loose 
from the external political and legal controls that make them “lawful” actors. 
The question of what makes internal administrative law “law” is a deep one 
that cannot be taken up in this Article. For now, suffice it to say that I believe 
that the “lawness” of internal administrative law is to be found precisely in the 
same place as the recognition of the law-like nature of all public law. Benedict 
Kingsbury has recently suggested that this same problem with respect to global 
administrative law should be approached from two directions, that is, by 
combining the Hartian positivist or “social fact” conception of law with a 
 
416.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
417.  Id. at 349. 
418.  For a similar lament, see Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 859, 861 (2009), stating that “[T]he aim of this Article is to create the category of 
self-regulation and to persuade students of the administrative state that it has been a 
mistake to ignore it.” 
419.  See supra notes 389-393 and accompanying text. 
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normative element that explains why only certain social facts give rise to the 
recognition of their law-like quality.420 
Concerned, as other global administrative law scholars are, by the lack of 
legitimating electoral or legal controls for many global administrative actors, 
Kingsbury sees this as a special problem for global administrative law. But this 
is a problem for all of administrative law—indeed, for all of public law. As Jack 
Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson have argued, legal analysts often distinguish 
between international law on the one hand and national constitutional law and 
national public law on the other.421 National public law is understood as a 
nonproblematic expression of sovereign will; international law is seen as a 
problematic exercise in hoped-for compliance. But this conventional 
understanding simply ignores the deep similarities in both systems. 
Mesmerized by the routine compliance of public officials with domestic 
statutes, constitutions, and judicial judgments, observers fail to note that the 
same enforcement problem that is said to be a dominant characteristic of 
international law also infects national public law. If those exercising the 
sovereign power decide not to abide by the law, there is nothing standing 
outside the state that will force them to do so. 
Thus, the question of how administrators bind themselves by their internal 
administrative law is but a microcosm of the more general question of how the 
rule of law can, or does, work in any domestic constitutional regime. 
Americans tend to place their faith in judicial review. But what binds the courts 
or motivates their attempts to bind others? The question of who guards the 
guardians is as old as the idea of government according to law. 
Yet, that the internal law of administration did work in nineteenth-century 
America, and does work now, is hardly controversial. Both inside and outside 
of administration, agency rules, practices, and precedents are taken both to 
have normative force and to be subject to normative critique concerning 
whether they instantiate an appropriate vision of lawful administration. How 
practice comes to have normative force and subject itself to normative critique 
is a question for another time. A study of administrative law in the Gilded Age, 
an era before the field of administrative law had a name, simply makes it more 
obvious that this is a question worth investigating. For in an era in which 
electoral and judicial controls over administration were even weaker than they 
 
420.  Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 
(2009). 
421.  Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
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are today, without a robust internal law of administration the rule of law in 
American public law could hardly be said to have existed. 
